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ABSTRACT
Very little is known about the small firms sector and the 
new firm formation process in the Welsh economy. This 
study attempts to bridge this gap in Knowledge and adds to 
the growing body of information on new firm formation and 
development in the U.K. and its regions.
The approach adopts a largely microeconomic perspective 
within a business policy strategy. Data is obtained from 
interviews with the founders of some 61 new independent 
firms in South Wales. Further information is derived from 
interviews with representatives of the major banks and 
support agencies in the Principality.
The study, therefore, provides data which allows a 
comprehensive comparison with studies of other areas and 
an assessment of the new firm formation process in Wales. 
Information is provided on both the initial start-up and 
the development of new and independent firms. This study 
also makes a contribution to knowledge in several other 
areas:-
1. It outlines a method to estimate the importance of new 
firms in employment generation in Wales. This method 
could usefully be extended to other regions and indeed 
to the U.K. as a whole.
2. It provides statistics on the size distribution of 
firms in the private manufacturing sector of 
Industrial South Wales which can also be classified 
according to ownership status. A potentially 
important factor in the new firm formation process.
3. It shows that existing theories of price determination 
are largely inadequate at describing methods of new 
firm pricing. Data are presented on the pricing 
practices of firms when they first enter a market and 
a representative model of pricing methods in new firms 
is suggested.
4. It attempts to relate various microeconomic concepts 
to the very specialised situation found in new firms, 
both at the time of start-up and during the infant 
stage of business development. Barriers to entry, 
scale and location decisions and limits to firm growth 
are considered in this context.
XI
TERMINOLOGY
Small Firm: For the most part, this study adopts the 
qualitative definitions identified by 
The Bolton Committee. A small firm is, 
therefore, one which has a small share 
of the market; is managed by the owners 
and is independent of a larger 
enterprise, allowing independent 
decision making. Where the small firm 
is referred to in the statistical sense 
the most widely used (U.K.) quantitative 
definition of 200 employees or less is 
adopted.
New Firm: The new firm is also referred to as tne 
start-up. It refers to the birth of a 
wholly new and totally independent 
entity. Unless otherwise stated, both 
new firms and start-ups relate only to 
independent firms and not new branch 
plants, subsidiaries or transfers of 
existing firms.
Firm: The firm, the company, the venture, the 
business and the enterprise are all 
taken to be synonymous.
Entrepreneur:
Coordination:
The entrepreneur is also the founder, 
the person who 'undertook 1 the start-up 
process, coordinated resources at the 
start-up stage and directly managed and 
controlled the business in its infancy.
The activity of reallocating resources 
specifically the allocation of resources 
which occurs as a direct result of 
entrepreneurial activity. The 
entrepreneur purchases and/or enters 
into contract with factors of 
production. In this study there are 
basically two types of coordination:-
i) Start-up coordination, which is the 
harmonisation of decisions and 
allocation of resources during the 
start-up process up to the point 
where trading actually begins.
ii) On-going coordination - the 
allocation of resources within the 
framework of the new business, the 
day-to-day management and control 
of the business.
XII
Screening: Screening is effectively a process of 
assessment. The outcome of this 
assessment results in either a passage 
through the screening process or being 
retarded or stopped by the screen. 
Basically, the screening process can be 
viewed as being made up of a filter (or 
sieve) and while there may be many 
levels of screening, the financial 
screening process is the one usually 
referred to in this study. This is also 




In order to allow adequate sample sizes 
for the sub-divisions, the industrial 
groupings for this survey have been 
classified in the following manner:-
Survey Group; SIC (1980)
1. Mechanical Engineering:
2. 'Other' Metal Goods:
3. Textiles and 'Other' 
	Manufacturing:
4. Printing and Paper:
5. Wooden Articles:















Where mention is made of the service 
sector it is usually meant to refer to 
those sectors identified above, namely 




The birth of any new firm is a unique occurrence. For the 
founder it provides a distinct alternative to other labour 
market options available and to the economy the new firm 
is a vital component of structural dynamics. Indeed it is 
difficult to think of any branch of economic theory that 
is not significantly affected by the birth of new firms.
The 'new firm' is usually seen as a special case of tne 
'small firm' and until the 1970's the small business was 
seen in the light of increasing industrial concentration, 
furthermore, by insignt rather than research, the small 
firm did not seem to conform very well with established 
microeconomic theory and the levels and trends in 
unemployment were less alarming than at present. With the 
publication of the Bolton Report, the mid 1970's saw an 
increase in interest in the small firm sector. Research 
was directed at proving that small firms played an 
important role in economic development - particularly as 
generators of new employment.
The early 1980's saw a backlash against small firms, 
however, as the results of research work pointed to 
considerable reservations about small firms as generators 
of employment (particularly in the U.K.) Current research 
into the small firm sector is concentrating on individual 
characteristics rather than broad generalisations of its 
overall role in employment generation and recognition of 
the extreme levels of heterogeneity in the sector has 
caused research to concentrate on the manufacturing sector 
and become localised in geographical coverage with the 
subject matter more specialised and structured. It is 
against this background that this study must be viewed.
Reasons for Study
During the late 70's and early 80's considerable 
theoretical and empirical work was carried out by a number 
of researchers into the 'theory of new firm formation' and 
the significance of the small firm economy to local, 
regional and national development.
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The nature of these studies required a limited 
geographical coverage and so, as various regional and sub- 
regional surveys were reported, a large amount of evidence 
on these subjects became available and researchers in one 
area were urging similar studies to be carried out for 
other regions, both in the U.K. and internationally.
Studies were carried out for Scotland, (Cross, 1981); 
North East England, (Storey, 1980); the East Midlands, 
(Forthergill and Gudgin, 1979); South Hampshire (Mason 
1982), West Midlands (Firn and Swales, 1979) and the 
Northern Region (Johnson and Cathcart, 1979). Wales and 
the South West were missed out in these regional studies. 
In fact it seems that relatively little is known about the 
Welsh small firm sector let alone new firm formation in 
particular. Such a lack of information and research into 
the Welsh small firm economy seems to be a major gap in 
the literature. It is not possible, therefore, to compare 
characteristics of new Welsh firms with those of other 
regions of the U.K. or internationally. Is the new firm 
in Wales an important source of new employment? Are the 
types of business start-ups in the Principality similar to 
those of other depressed regions such as Scotland? Does 
the new firm in Wales conform to characteristics of other 
areas?
The only major study of the small firm sector in Wales so 
far traced is that undertaken by Eibeik (1982), who was 
concerned with various aspects of small manufacturing 
firms in the Principality. The Eibeik survey, however, 
was mainly concerned with firms employing 200 and 400 
people and which were quite old and established businesses 
(70% were over 11 years old). Eibeik, in fact, noted that 
there had been no detailed research of the Welsh small 
firm economy and had not been able to find any literature 
on the subject other than speculation and broad 
generalisations.
Despite numerous studies for other areas few had extended 
their scope outside examining the characteristics of 
founders and nature of business start-ups. Very little is 
known about the microeconomic problems of the new firm, 
for example, how important are barriers to entry in 
practice, how they are perceived by founders? What 
factors determine the size of the initial start-up? How 
do founders fix a price initially in the absence of
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previous experience of that practice? And after start-up 
what factors limit the early growth of the firm? What 
characteristics are associated with the development of the 
infant firm?
Aims of the Study
The aims of this study, therefore, are to provide an 
analysis of the new firm formation process in Wales; to 
document the start-up and infant development 
characteristics of businesses in the region and to discuss 
the degree to which the Welsh firms surveyed conform to 
those of other areas. Furthermore, relevant microeconomic 
theories will be discussed in context of the special 
situations found in:-
a) the start-up itself
b) the early infancy period of the firm
The Study
Since this is the first survey of the new firm formation 
process in the Welsh economy the approach takes a broad 
perspective with data on both manufacturing and certain 
service sector firms. The heterogeneity of new firms and 
the need to make comprehensive comparisons with other 
studies necessitates this broad ranging approach. The 
main body of data used in this study was obtained from a 
series of semi-structured interviews with founders of new 
independent Welsh firms, 61 business interviews were 
undertaken during 1985. Additional information was 
derived from interviews with several major support 
agencies and the clearing banks in Wales.
In order to define the scope of this study and how it fits 
into this broad subject area, a conceptualised process view 
of events (stages) leading up to and following a discreet 
business start-up is shown in Figure 1.1. The early 





















































and are principally the domain of sociologists and 
psycho1ogists^. tohile certain entrepreneurial 
characteristics will be identified, no attempt will be 
made to relate these to psychological theories of 
entrepreneurship such as 'need for achievement' or 'locus 
of control 1 . Despite this it is recognised that these 
psychological traits may mean (even at an early stage) 
that a significant proportion of the population may be 
unsuitable for entrepreneurship and enter the so-called 
'inert group*.
The study begins by reviewing a series of hypotheses about 
the previous experience of firm founders in terms of the 
local industrial structure or incubator environment. The 
next stage, as shown in Figure 1.1., is a series of events 
which may have acted as a trigger, such as redundancy, 
starting a process of sel f-assessment which tak.es into 
consideration the personal qualities, the resources 
available and the perceived opportunities. On the basis 
of self-assessment, a decision is made in the context of 
the persons labour market alternatives. If the decision 
is to go ahead with a business idea the next stage is 
usually one of formal screening by a third party - such as 
the approach to a bank or other financial institution for 
backing. The institutions involved in this screening 
process have a set of criteria which filter applications 
and the relationship between the criteria used and type of 
application is vital to the number of entrepreneurs who 
actually start-up a business.
After the results of screening the decision to go ahead by 
a successful entrepreneur is followed by the need for 
coordination on the part of the founder. Suppliers, 
customers, premises, labour and finance have to be found 
and coordinated.
The actual trading of the business may now begin as a 
result of the coordination start-up process and the 
initial policies adopted by the 'firm'. Competitors and 
customers will react to the entry and policies adopted by
A review of the work of psychologists into 
'entrepreneurship 1 is undertaken by Perry, MacArthur, 
Meredith and Cunnington (1986), pp.55-62. See also 
Storey (1982), pp.77-92.
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the newly born firm and the feedback will probably result 
in the amendment of policies and attitudes in an attempt 
to survive. This feedback will be the first stage of the 
learning process (or a continuous interaction) which will 
largely determine the future development of the business. 
The early infant stages of the firms life cycle will, 
therefore, be studied, but other developments as the firm 
enters its youth or middle age are outside the brief of 
this study-*-.
Figure 1.1 provides an outline for this study. The 
chapters follow this process view of events. Chapter 
Three reviews the efficiency of the Welsh economy as an 
incubator for the formation of new firms. Trends in 
employment and unemployment and specific characteristics 
of the Welsh economy may explain the 'climate of 
incubation 1 . Available data on new firm formation is 
presented .
Chapter Four determines the elements that make up the 
supply of entrepreneurs. The characteristics of new firm 
founders are compared with 4 major studies in the U.K. and 
the extent to which the Welsh survey conforms to aspects 
of new firm formation theory is assessed.
Chapter Five is entirely devoted to Finance, which is 
particularly looked at as a screening process. The 
effective supply of new firm founders is in part 
determined by the nature of the financial screen (filter) 
and this is examined in depth from both the banks and the 
founders viewpoints. The analysis in this section is used 
as a starting point for a simple simulation model used in 
Chapter Nine.
Chapter Six considers the problems of coordination 
involved in the start-up process in addition to that of 
obtaining finance.
A follow up study of the start-up firms interviewed 
would allow a further analysis as the firm develops 
beyond the infant stage.
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Chapter Seven examines some microeconomic factors at the 
start-up stage. What factors determine the scale of a 
start-up? What do founders perceive as important barriers 
to entry, witn particular reference to competitors 
reactions both perceived and actual? It suggests that 
barrier theory should address itself to the medium through 
which entry barriers are actually assessed - namely the 
financial screening process. Chapter Seven also examines 
the importance of the initial pricing decision of new 
firms. Existing explanations are shown to be inadequate 
for the unique problem of initial product pricing in the 
vast majority of new enterprises. Survey data is 
presented and a representative model of new firm pricing 
is suggested.
Chapter Eight considers tne changes in policies, attitudes 
and perceptions that occur after the initial feedback from 
customers. It traces the aspects of growth and 
development of new firms in tneir infant stage of the firm 
life cycle and limits to infant growth are highlighted.
Chapter Nine takes a macro perspective using the survey 
data and V.A.T. statistics. A method is outlined to 
estimate the numbers of jobs created in new firms in 
Wales. Estimates are made separately for both 
manufacturing and certain service sector firms, these are 
then compared with jobs created under traditional regional 
policy. Given these estimates the role and performance of 
various small firm support agencies is outlined and 
tentatively assessed.
The Role and Importance of New Firms
The main conceptual problem that effects this research is 
that once a business has started, then at the risk of 
stating the obvious, it becomes a 'small firm' and ceases 
to be a start-up, although it may continue to be called a 
'new firm' as such for a number of years after it was 
'born'. The start-up stage is effectively an interface 
between informalised coordination of economic actions, 
(non-entity) and some more formalised organisational 
structure, that is a 'small firm 1 .
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The role of the new firm in the economy is then intimately 
linked with the role and importance of small firms per se. 
Before concentrating on new firm formation and development 
it is necessary to briefly examine the importance of small 
firms in general to the economy.
Attitudes on the role and importance of small firms have 
undergone considerable change, particularly since the 
publication of the Bolton Report in 1971. One of the main 
features of changing industrial structure this century has 
been the increasing concentration of British manufacturing 
output and employment by the largest firms in the economy.
The counterpart to the increasing large firm concentration 
has been the decline of the small manufacturing firm which 
shows a long term downward trend. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 
reproduce data derived by Prais (1976, pp.185-188) in 
graphic form. Clearly, the number of very small 
manufacturing establishments in the U.K. slumped between 
the 1930's and the mid 60's (the figure for 1968 is only 
about 37% of the 1930's total). Furthermore, while data 
on employment in these establishments is more limited, 
Prais shows that between 1930 and 1954 employment in small 
U.K. manufacturing units (10 or less employees) fell by 
140,000.
It would seem that the role of the small firm in the 
economy has been declining quite markedly and it may, 
therefore, seem odd that there should be so much research 
effort devoted to and interest in the small firm sector. 
To put this in perspective it is necessary to review some 
of the reasons put forward to explain the increasing 
importance of giant firms.
The survivor principle (Stigler, 1958) would predict that 
since larger firms were making up a larger proportion of 
output and employment, then this must be because large 
firms are more efficient than their small firm 
counterparts, particularly the large scale at plant level 
was the most efficient size, furthermore, this arguement 
could be used in the majority of industrial groups -(Evely 
and Little (1960) show that concentration had increased in 
twice as many sectors as it had fallen between 1935 and 
1951).
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A number of reasons for the trend towards increasing 
concentration being experienced over this period in almost 
all developed countries, were put forward. Schumpeter 
argued that large organisations tended to have monopoly 
power resulting in an enormous incentive to introduce cost 
reducing innovations and indeed large firms were seen to 
be spending more on R& D per employee than small firms 
(Freeman, 1974). Allied to Schumpeter's views on 
innovations in large firms were the increasing awareness 
of economies of scale at the plant level, furthermore, 
with the expansion of international trade in the post-war 
period the scope for reaping economies of scale in 
production increased considerably. If technical economies 
of scale at the plant level meant that the minimum 
efficient size of production was large compared to the 
size of the market, then only a relatively small number of 
large plants would capture a major share of tne market. 
In the words of Bannock (1981, pp.82-83) - "These powerful 
ideas took their grip upon the minds of many economists 
and they seemed to be pointing to the rapid disappearance 
of any significant role for small firms in modern economic 
development".
In fact, a number of important issues came to light, 
particularly in the 1970's and these caused a reappraisal 
of the role of the small firm in the economy, it is 
against this background that we must view the present 
s t ud y .
Firstly, a number of studies have shown that R& D work is 
more productive in small, rather than large firms - Hay 
and Morris (1979, pp.446-450). The Bolton Committee 
(1971) reported - "Many of the greatest technical advances 
right up to the present day (1969) have been made by small 
firms and often by individuals working in small firms", 
(p.77).
Secondly, Prais.(1976) provided evidence that technical 
economies of scale at the plant level was unable to 
explain increasing concentration and Hannah and Kay (1977) 
found that most of the increase in concentration was, in 
fact, the result of mergers rather than internal growtn of 





































































































































































































there will be significant non-technical economies 
associated with the increase in the size of the firm and 
indeed the Bolton Committee report (1971) highlighted many 
of the reasons why small firms were at a comparative 
disadvantage to their larger counterparts.
Apart from the theoretical reappraisal of the role of 
small firms in the economy during the early 1970's, there 
seems to have been important changes in the trends in 
concentration. In fact, it seems that the rate of 
increase in concentration fell sharply, so that between 
1968 and 1977 market concentration was actually stable 1 .
The most significant reappraisal of the importance of 
small firms came, however, in the form of their ability to 
create jobs. Economists had for a long time been 
interested in the question: where do jobs come from in 
the modern economy? The analysis of such questions had 
mainly been concerned with structural and sectorial 
differences in employment creation (and loss). It was 
established that the old staple and primary industries 
were contracting and other sectors, particularly service 
industries, were the growth areas in the economy. This 
type of approach is basically a 'vertical dimension' and 
has been the subject of much study, particularly as an 
explanation of regional problems and the erosion of the 
manufacturing base. The late 70's saw the development of 
another dimension as a way of analysing the job creation 
process. This was a horizontal dimension - one of firm 
size. The difference in the two dimensions are noted by 
Joan Mitchell (1980).
The concentration of study on differences in firm size and 
the importance of each size group as generators of 
employment were highlighted by studies by Birch (1979) for 
the U.S. and Fothergill and Gudgin (1979) for the U.K. 
Both these studies took the size of firms as the major 
variable effecting the distribution of new jobs and job 
losses. This marked a considerable break with the 
vertical dimension (industrial sectors) approach. Both of 
these studies concentrated almost entirely on size and 
little account was taken of the sectorial distribution.
1 Utton (1982) argues that when adjustment is made tor 
foreign trade the 5-firm concentration ratio actually 
fell over that period.
1.11
The results of both studies have a number of limitations 
and the work of Birch in particular has been criticised 
(Johnson and Storey, 1986, Armington and Odle (1984) and 
Storey (1982)). Birch however, did find that 2/3rds of 
all net new jobs in the U.S. over the period 1969-76 were 
'created' by very small firms of less than 20 employees 
and indeed small firms of less than 100 employees made up 
as a group over 81% of net jobs created.
Both Fothergill and Gudgin and Storey (1982) have warned 
of the dangers of drawing policy conclusions from these 
figures, since Birch failed to draw the distinction 
between manufacturing (wealth creation) and service 
sectors. However, Fothergill and Gudgin broadly confirmed 
Birch's findings that the smaller firms were providing net 
additions to employment (in the U.K.) and that larger 
firms were net losers of jobs (even in the manufacturing 
sector). While they conclude that small firms are 
important, they argue that they have not been, or are 
likely to be, the overwhelming source of new jobs in the 
U.K. For example, between 1968 and 1975 in the East 
Midlands, firms in the size band 0-20 employees increased 
total employment by only 2.7%.
A more recent U.K. study by Gallagher and Stewart (1984), 
clearly shows that small firms make a disproportionately 
larger contribution to job creation - in contrast larger 
companies have a much poorer performance. Their study 
shows that over 50% of all new jobs were created in firms 
employing less than 100 people and while this is clearly a 
smaller contribution than Birch suggested for the U.K., it 
is still a highly significant contribution to job 
generation especially when one considers that firms of 
less than 100 employees make up less than 30% of total 
manufacturing employment in the U.K.
Even a review of the Census of Production 1979-1982 
reveals that only manufacturing establishments with 20 
employees or less showed any net increase in employment at 
all. It can be seen, for example, that larger 
manufacturing firms were significant net losers of jobs 
with those employing 1,000 or over recording net fails in 
total employment of around l/3rd compared to the 1979 base 
year.
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Despite all this evidence, it is obviously a vast over­ 
simplification to argue that because small firms in 
general are more significant generators of jobs than large 
concerns, then smallness is the most important factor - in 
short, the horizontal dimension to analyse may have gone 
too far. As Joan Mitchell (1980) asks - "There is serious 
question as to whether size has any real economic 
significance either for analysis or for policy. Small may 
be beautiful, but is it operationally useful to 
economists?"
The following provides some indication of the importance 
of small firms in general to the study of economics, in 
addition to their job generating role outlined above.
1. Small firms are a good proxy for what might be called 
the margin of the market. Since economists are 
overridingly concerned with marginal changes then 
they must clearly attempt to understand the role of 
the small firm as a prime indicator of changes in 
marginal advantages or disadvantages of a particular 
size, of a particular commodity or service, etc.
2. Small firms, almost by definition lack market power . 
Their small share of the market means that they tend 
to correspond more closely with the conditions of 
perfect competition than do larger firms, (they are
price takers). This, together with lower
o unionisation and better industrial relations means
that they tend to act as a damper on cost push based 
inflation and will only passively react to a demand 
pull type inflationary process. Any growth in the 
economy which occurs through the medium of the small 
firm sector might, therefore, be thought to be 
relatively inflation free growth.
1 See the Bolton Committee (1971) definitions of small 
firms.
2 A review of evidence on this subject is given in 
Storey (1982) .
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3. Since small firms tend to be labour intensive, any 
increase in employment in small firms will be greater 
than that in a corresponding large firm - to meet a 
given increase in output (and in light of the current 
high levels of unemployment such an arguement may be 
politically attractive).
4. Small firms employment (200 employees or less) makes 
up the majority of the working population (CBI, 1980, 
pp.12-13). As a result particular factors which 
affect small firms in general will have important 
implications for the economy as a whole.
5. The Bolton Committee accepted that small firms are 
generally more adaptable than larger ones, especially 
in the short run. It is possible that they can react 
to changes in the market place faster than a large 
organisation with centralised decision making and 
large fixed capital investments in inflexible capital 
intensive production facilities. (Prais (1976) uses 
this arguement to explain the hiccup in the decline 
in manufacturing establishments that occurred during 
the Second World War).
6. Small firms have an economic role as both competitors 
to and complements to larger firms. Large, highly 
diversified firms often trade in relatively small 
specialised goods (as well as the mass markets). In 
these markets small specialist firms can provide a 
real competitive alternative to the large firms, 
possibly restricting prices to a level more closely 
resembling that of competitive markets than would 
otherwise have been the case. Furthermore, since the 
costs of collusion of large numbers of firms may be 
prohibitive, then small firms protect the economy 
from being subjected to even more monopoly power and 
the resultant erosion of competitive markets. Not 
all small firms are direct competitors with large 
firms, many service markets that are too small tor 
the giant enterprises to be concerned with. They 
fill niches in relatively small locationaliy or 
industrial space - what Penrose terms the 
interstices in the economy.
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Without some form of differentiation it is hard to 
explain the continued survival of many small firms in 
competition with the larger conglomerates. Small 
firms, therefore, tend to be innovative in order to 
maintain sufficient product or process 
differentiation to justify survival. The great 
majority of such innovations, however, are unlikely 
to represent a significant technical breakthrough or 
revolutionary design, but tend to be very marginal 
changes on existing design or method of production. 
Indeed the 'innovation 1 may just be a personal touch 
to business negotiations or marketing. In effect the 
innovation role of small firms may be largely 
intangible and could simply represent an increase in 
the level of goodwill of the business.
Bannock (1981) argues that small firms may be the 
least costly way of allowing the economy to adopt to 
bouts of structural change. In particular there are 
fewer political repercussions at the closure of small 
firms than of large concerns. In certain cases it is 
possible to envisage a position in which the growth 
of employment in small or new firms is directly at 
tne expense of employment in larger firms. Tne 
benefit of small firms cannot, therefore, be measured 
solely by the net addition to jobs since the 
considerable variations in the fortunes of small 
firms to allow a more continuous adoption of new 
methods, better working practices and even to 
increase the effective mobility of labour that would 
otherwise be the case. It may be that the small firm 
increases the ability of the economy to adopt to 
structural change.
Small firms may be more productivity efficient than 
larger firms. Liebenstein (1966 and 1975) argues 
that members of an organisation will not have a 
single productive capacity per unit of time, but the 
productivity will depend largely on the effort 
devoted within that time. Furthermore, he argues 
that the effort made will depend on the motivation of 
individuals or groups of individuals. This 
motivation is related to the expected reward or 
return, to the degree to which the individual is
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supervised (and thus, his ability to slack) and to 
the degree of certainty with which he views his own 
job within the organisation.
In a small firm then the effect of any individual's 
effort can more easily be identified than in larger 
concerns. Moreover, the lack of effort can be seen 
to effect the likelihood of the firm failing, allied 
to this the fact that the individual may feel a more 
significant responsibility and loyalty to the small 
firm owners with whom he has personal everyday 
contact. The result of all these influences may 
cause an individual to devote more effort to his work 
in a small firm than if he was doing an equivalent 
job in a larger organisation. Thus, the competitive 
pressure on the small firm results in each labour 
unit being more productive (given the same capital 
equipment) than it would be in a 'safe 1 larger or 
more mature firm.
Given the potential importance of the role of small firms 
in general to economic life, then the new firm should be 
seen as a special case. The birth of a firm is an event 
that facilitates and enhances the role of the small firm 
previously outlined.
To economic theory the role of the business start-up is a 
vitally important one. The competitive elements of the 
classic structures of traditional economic theory are 
derived from the extent to which firms are barred from 
entering into competition with other firms.
In traditional economic theory the theory of new firm 
formation is included in the formal model of perfect 
competition. Consider an industry which conforms exactly 
with all the restrictive assumptions of perfect 
competition. The industry is in long run equilibrium when 
each firm is maximising its profits, but these profits are 
exclusively 'normal profits' (formally P = MR = MC = AC).
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Consider now an increased demand for the industry's 
product. This causes prices to adjust upwards until the 
new higher level of demand equates with supply. The new 
price, however, is a short run phenomenon and all firms in 
the industry will be reaping profits which are 
significantly above normal profits.
Entrepreneurs will be attracted to enter this industry and 
they will do so until the abnormal profits of all firms 
have been totally eroded. In other words the mechanism of 
adjustment in a perfectly competitive world is the 
formation of new firms which cause an expansion in 
industry wide supply. Incidentally, the output of 
existing firms in the market place actually falls (despite 
the shortages). The most important assumption in this 
context is the absence of barriers to entry and, therefore, 
demand changes will provoke a quantity response in terms 
of new firm formation or firm failure. The new firm, 
therefore, has a highly important role in economic theory 
since it is the mechanism by which markets adjust from one 
position of static equilibrium to another.
The central place of the new firm in economic theory is 
not only confined to the models of perfect competition. 
For imperfectly competitive markets actual or potential 
entry of new ventures may significantly influence the 
price and output decisions of existing firms.
Bain (1949) first concentrated attention on new firms in 
their role as potential competition. He showed that 
unless theory was modified to include this potential 
threat of entry, then it would be unable to explain how 
many firms were observed to be producing at a level where 
marginal revenue was actually negative. Bain further 
argued that the existence of various barriers to entry 
would ensure that existing firms set a price which was 
above their perfectly competitive level, i.e. above the 
long run average cost curve.
The importance of barriers to entry will be described in 
detail in Chapters 6 and 8, but perhaps the most important 
point to make here is that both the models of perfect and 
imperfect competition assume that the decision on the part 
of the entrepreneur to enter any particular market is 
based solely on his overriding objective - that of profit 
maximisation. In other words, it is assumed that there is
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an abundance of entrepreneurial talent and that this 
•factor 1 will move into that industry (or competition) 
which offers the highest net advantage - in much the same 
way as other factors of production, land, labour or 
capital. Moreover, this reallocation of entrepreneurial 
talent amongst various possible alternatives is wholly 
outside the control of any rational individual. Thus, the 
rate of new firm formation is determined largely by the 
demand for new firms which is signalled by the rate of 
profit in individual industries^. Despite this basic 
insight, research has increasingly drawn attention to the 
supply side factors of entrepreneurshlp almost to the 
point of neglect of any role for the demand for new firms.
Mansfield (1962) tested this hypothesis and despite 
data problems (see Storey (1982) pp.62-63) found that 
entry rates were higher when profits in particular 
industries were rising.
1.18
REFERENCES - CHAPTER 1
1. Armington, C. & M. Olde Big Place of Small Firms in 
Job Generation: The U.S. Experience, In U.K. Small 
Business Statistics and International Comparisons, 
ed. Bannock G., The Small Business Research Trust, 
1985.
2. Bain, J.S. Barriers to New Competition, Harvard 
University Press, 1956.
3. Bannock, G. The Economics of Small Firms: Return 
from the Wilderness. Oxford, 1981.
4. Birch, D.L. 1979 (See Chapter 2 - References)
5. Bolton, J.E. Small Firms Report of The Committee of 
Inquiry on Small Firms, HMSO, 1971.
6. C.B.I. Smaller Firms in the Economy, 1980, pp.34-38.
7. Elbeik, M. Aspects of Small Manufacturing Firms in 
South Wales. P.hD. Thesis, UWIST, 1982.
8. Evely, R. & I. Little Concentration in British 
Industry, National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research Studies 16, Cambridge 1960.
9. Fothergill, B. & G. Gudgin The Job Generation 
Process in Britain, 1982.
10. Freeman, C. The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 
1974.
11. Gallagher, C.C. & H. Stewart Jobs and the Business 
Life Cycle in the U.K., Research Report No.2, 
Newcastle University, 1984.
12. Hay, D.A. & P. Morris Industrial Economics, Theory 
and Evidence, Oxford University Press, 1979, pp.446- 
450.
1.19
13. Johnson, P.S. & D.J. Storey A Review of Small 
Business Research, mtLSLEHSt^onaJ^ Sma.L.L ^H^i-H6.^ 
Journal, Vol.4, No.4, Summer 1986.
14. Liebenstein, H. Allocative Efficiency and X- 
Efficiency, American .Economic Rev^e_w, No.56, 1966, 
pp.392-415; and
Liebenstein, H. Aspects of the X-efficiency of the 
Theory of the Firm, Be.11^ Jo.HEHfLL' No - 6 ' 1975, pp.580- 
606.
15. Mansfield, E. Entry Gibrats Law Innovation and the 
Growth of Firms, Ame^r^can Economic Review, No.52, 
1962, pp.1023-1050.
16. Mitchell, J.E. Small Firms Policy: A Critique, Three 
Banks Review, June 1980, pp.50-61.
17. Perry, C., MacArthur, R., Meredith G. & B. Cunnington 
- Need for Achievement and Focus of Control of 
Australian Small Business Owner-Managers and Super- 
Entrepreneurs, International SmaJ^ Bijsj^ness; ^°_HE£^.:k' 
Vol.4, No.4, Summer 1986.
18. Prais, S.J. Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain: a 
study of the growth of concentration in manufacturing 
industry in Britain 1909-1970, 1976.
19. Stigler, G.J. The Economies of Scale, The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 1958.




THE SURVEY: METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
In order to study the start-up stage, it is necessary to 
analyse the events and attitudes of those involved leading 
up to, during and immediately after, this stage. More 
specifically the research is aimed at identifying the 
important elements of newly formed businesses in the 
following categories:-
1. Characteristics of new firm founders sucn as age, 
education and previous employment history, these 
identify some of the important characteristics leading 
up to the actual start-up stage and include the 
motivations of new firm founders.
2. Aspects of the start-up stage itself, such as 
finance, location, markets, competitors, problems, 
attitudes (perceptions), employment and pricing 
practices.
3. Aspects of early (infant) development, such as growth, 
changes in markets, methods, organisation, problems 
and attitudes and pricing practices.
These three categories are obviously related and the 
nature of this inter-dependence will be analysed, moreover 
they must be viewed in the context of the economic sub- 
environment of which they are (or potentially are) a part.
Given the need tor data on each of the categories outlined 
above and of relating these to the industrial structure of 
the Welsh economy and its sub-regions, this chapter 
describes the methods used to obtain this information.
Industrial Database (SWISS)
New firms in S. Wal-es are born into a very particular 
commercial and industrial environment. It can be argued 
that this industrial structure has major influences on the 
decision to start-up (both supply and demand factors) and 
that new firms modify the regional industrial structure, 
if only at the margin.
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The study of business start-ups in S. Wales, therefore, 
would be greatly aided by the availability of detailed 
information of the industrial and commercial structure of 
the region and its sub-regions.
It is the absence of such detailed information that has 
plagued research into the small business sector of most 
regions of the UK and for the economy as a whole. For S. 
Wales the most comprehensive statistics are the Employment 
Records II Census (Known as ERII's), which are local 
employment accounts of the Department of Employment. The 
ERII's provide employment figures for each 3 digit minimum 
list heading (MLH) by employment area.
The ERII's however, give no indication of the size 
distribution of firms or even the number of firms within 
each industrial order. In order to derive such 
information it was necessary to look for alternative 
sources.
Market research and credit rating companies have been used 
widely by researchers as sources of large databases of 
firms (Birch 1979, Gallager and Stewart 1984). However, 
those available as regional or county breakdowns for Wales 
only provide size distributions of firms classified as 
size bands and there are no corresponding employment 
figures (e.g. Market Location Ltd. 1982).
Potentially the most lucrative source of information on 
the industrial structure of S. Wales is an establishment 
database kept by Mid Glamorgan County Council's Industrial 
Development Unit, who operate the 'Industrial Information 
Service 1 (1NDIS).
The INDIS database has records from 1978 onwards and holds 
business names, addresses, postcodes, description of 
activity, MLH's and employment data. The main aim of the 
industrial information service is to promote intra 
regional import substitution and therefore the main use of 
the database is in providing an industrial product 
directory and excess capacity register of firms in S. 
Wales. However, because these are the main uses of the 
database it is not possible to tabulate the data or do any 
form of numeric analysis.
2.02
For the purpose of this study it was decided, despite the 
significant effort needed, to transfer ail the 
manufacturing establishment records from the INDIS 
computer to our own database (SWISS). During this process 
inconsistencies and incomplete establishment records were 
identified and subsequently amended.
The complete database SWISS contains details of 1,948 
establishments accounting for almost 110,000 employees in 
South Wales. The database is named SWISS which stands for 
South Wales Industrial Structure Statistics.
Last updated in January 1986, SWISS covers the 
manufacturing sectors of Mid Glamorgan, West Glamorgan, 
South Glamorgan and Dyfed. (Unfortunately, the source 
database (INDIS) does not cover Gwent, the only other 
county in industrial S. Wales). For each of these 
counties, records of employees (exact number not size 
band), MLH, ownership status and an establishment code are 
kept.
It is possible to interrogate SWISS to provide a detailed 
industrial size distribution of firms for each of the four 
counties and in total. (This is provided in a series of 
tables in Appendix I).
The characteristics of new firm formation and development 
will be analysed in the context of this data on the size 
distribution of manufacturing firms and attempts will be 
made to relate both the supply of, and the demand for, new 
firms to particular characteristics of the Welsh 
industrial structure.
Most major surveys of the small business and start-up 
sector have to rely heavily on questionnaire survey 
methods (Bolton 1971, Huisman & Ridder 1984, Cross 1981, 
Gudgin et al 1979, Masson 1982). This is because even the 
most basic information (such as registration of business 
names) is not available, let alone the very detailed data 
required for a comprehensive study.
The present study is made up of three types of interviews. 
Interviews with banks, enterprise agencies and with newly 
formed businesses. The first two were conducted before
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designing the questionnaire or developing the sampling 
process for the major series of interviews with business 
start-ups in S. Wales.
Bank Interviews
Before embarking on the major interview survey of business 
start-ups, it was decided to approach the major clearing 
banks in an attempt to:-
a) Judge what type of financial information could be 
obtained from this source and what internal statistics 
or reports we may be allowed access to.
b) Assess the importance and mechanics of the small firms 
loan guarantee scheme.
c) Assess the attitudes of senior bankers to small 
business loans and the general criteria adopted by 
individual banks.
In order to accomplish these aims, an initial contact was 
made by telephone and then a letter introducing the survey 
was sent to the Regional Directors of local Head Offices. 
The letters included a list of questions requiring 
statistical answers and pre-interview briefings. Finally, 
the bankers were interviewed, and questions were ordered 
into three parts: general, statistics available and small 
firm loan guarantee scheme.
It is worth noting here that none of the major clearing 
banks actually keep records based on the size of firm to 
which finance is extended. It is unlikely therefore that 
banks have anything other than a subjective estimate of 
the riskiness of investments to different sizes of 
companies or for that matter to start-up situations.
The Wilson Committee (1979) suggested that there are 
potentially viable small businesses unable to obtain 
finance because bankers are excessively risk averse. It 
is clear, however, that without a detailed breakdown of 
accounts by firm size, even the banks themselves cannot 
accurately forecast the riskiness of small business 
investments.
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Interviews wrth Enterprise Agencies
Enterprise Agencies were set up with the aims of 
marshalling the resources of the community to create an 
environment favourable to business enterprise, in 
particular, New Small Businesses.
Enterprise Agencies can be seen to perform a number of 
functions among which are:-
a) Provision of free general advice and signposting (to 
where additional help is available) to individuals 
wishing to set up their own business (or those running 
businesses with specific problems to overcome).
b) Preparation of business plans, financial forecasts, 
(possibly including central office services).
c) Advice and assistance in location of premises.
d) Marketing and market research advice.
e) Advice on legal and taxation matters.
f) Coordination of various 'training' programmes at local 
level.
In these respects the Enterprise Agency movement must be 
seen as a very significant aid to new firm formation 
(largely as a result of reducing the many frictions 
involved in the start-up process).
Clearly then any study of the start-up process would have 
to analyse the role and effect of Enterprise Agencies in 
this context. In order to do this contact was made with 
the six established Enterprise Agencies in S. Wales, 
namely:-
a) Newport Enterprise Agency (NEA)
b) Cardiff and Vale Enterprise (CAVE)
c) Neath Development Partnership (NDP)
d) Merthyr & Aberdare Development of Enterprise (MADE)
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e) West Glamorgan Enterprise Trust (WGET)
f) Llanelli Enterprise Agency (LEA)
Interviews with representatives of each establishment were 
conducted with the aims of:-
a) Establishing the records kept and the extent to which 
we would be allowed access to them.
b) Obtaining lists of a representative sample of clients.
c) Obtaining inside views/initiatives towards the various 
aspects of the Enterprise Agency structure, role and 
effects.
d) Obtaining relevant internal reports.
All expressed interest in the project and cooperated fully 
to allow us access to their client lists.
The precise effects of Enterprise Agencies on the start-up 
process will be discussed in detail in Cnapter 9, using 
results of interviews, both with the agencies themselves 
and those of their clients.
The Questionnaire
After completing interviews with the six enterprise 
agencies, who each provided a list of business start-ups, 
the next stage was to design a questionnaire.
It was most important to make the questionnaire as 
comprehensive as possible and a number of questions were 
formulated in such a way as to provide reliable and 
realistic comparisons with major studies published for 
other UK regions, notably the North East and Scotland. 
Despite the possibility of interview bias, it was decided 
to use an interview schedule rather than a mail 
questionnaire, as the method of data collection. The 
great advantage of this method is its flexibility and 
allows a higher response rate for questions within the 
questionnaire.
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In his book 'Questionnaire Design and Attitude 
Measurement", Oppenheim (1966) states, "There remains the 
undisputed advantage that the richness and spontaneity ot 
information collected by interviewers is higher than that 
which a mailed questionnaire can hope to obtain", (p.32)
The section headings of the interview schedule 
(questionnaire) include:-
a) Characteristics of entrepreneur
b) Finance
c) Support Schemes






j ) Problems encountered
k) Turnover/profitability and growth
See Appendix B - Interview Questionnaire.
In all, over 150 responses were required of each
interviewee.
The aspects of good questionnaire design require 
considerable skills and great care was taken to word each 
question consistently across interviews, to avoid leading 
or ambiguous questions and to measure the extent of 
respondent knowl-edge without prompting (and before any 
prompted knowledge was measured).
A number of the studies previously mentioned used 
questionnaires consisting almost entirely ot 'closed 1 
questions, effectively a list ot expected or possible 
answers. Such an approach is usetul due to:- (a) ease ot
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handling results; (b) ensuring consistency tor 
comparisons; (c) jogging the memory of the respondents.
The disadvantage of this approach is the loss of 
expressiveness and spontaneity, it may not record what a 
respondent really thinks because it forces him to chose 
betwen given alternatives. Thus, despite the difficulty 
of analysis and indeed of recording responses in the 
field, a number of questions were left as 'open' as 
possible (free answers). These can be seen in Appendix 
B, but some of the questions which require open answers 
include:-
a) How did you determine the price at which you sold your 
products when you first started trading?
b) How do you determine your prices now?
c) How did your competition react to you setting up your 
business?
d) List any problems in obtaining outside finance.
e) Vvhat limits your production? - If you try to expand 
output what will constrain you first of all?
The most significant problem encountered when using open 
questions is the time and effort required to classify all 
the responses i.e. coding. It is inevitably slow and a 
good deal of interpretation of responses is required. In 
fact it was tempting to start designing coding frames as 
soon as the first few interviews were complete, but in 
order to reduce risk of bias and preconceived responses, 
the coding process was only started after the last 
interview of the survey was completed.
The coding frames processed in this manner are given in 
Appendix C, but it must be noted that the order of the 
coding is unimportant and most categories are quite 
independent ot one another. The extensive use ot these 
open (free answers) questions is made largely in 
recognition of the warning given by Wildsmith (1984) who 
writes, "This is tine provided that economists do not 




The six enterprise agencies provided over 150 contacts. 
This list was then divided into two groups.
a) Those businesses who approached the enterprise 
agencies in order to start-up.
b) Those businesses who approached the enterprise 
agencies, but were already established before the 
approach. However, in this case all firms should not 
be more than 5 years old.
This approach was adopted for a number of reasons, the 
obvious one is that of data availability. As a result of 
legislation in 1982 to remove the need for Registration of 
Business names (except that for Limited companies), the 
identification of businesses which had started up in the 
last tew years was made considerably more difficult. The 
lists of clients kept by enterprise agencies was an 
obvious way around this problem.
However, any survey of business start-up which relied only 
on those businesses actually using the services of 
enterprise agencies at the start-up would certainly not be 
a representative sample. In order to reduce the risk of 
any significant bias in results, those firms which had 
started up without the advice of enterprise agencies would 
also have to be analysed. To do this the agencies were 
asked to identify those firms which they did not actually 
help start, but those they have had contact with since, 
for some reason or another.
This approach, therefore, not only short-cuts the 
administrative problem of actually making contact with the 
firms, but also allows comparisons to be made between the 
two effective sub-samples (a) and (b). That is, to test 
the hypothesis that there is a significant difference in 
the start-up process of firms taking advice from 
enterprise agencies, to those that do not. t'urthermor-e, 
the differences, if any, can be traced through individual 
characteristics such as finance, attitudes to public 
bodies, pricing methods, location, size and profitability.
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The list of clients provided by the enterprise agencies 
was based on a representative sample of their clients 
(during the last year). This list was subjected to a 
random selection process, however, since most previous 
studies had concentrated on the manufacturing sector only, 
it was necessary (to maintain realistic comparisons) to 
limit the number of non-manufacturing firms to about a 
third of all interviews.
Having compiled a sample questionnaire, a pilot survey of 
some 10 new firms was undertaken. As a result of the 
learning process inherent at such an early stage, the 
questionnaire was modified slightly and the method of 
initial contact and development to the interview stage was 
developed.
At first, telephone contact was made with the prospective 
interviewees, they were then vetted to ensure that they 
were 'new firms' and that contact was actually with the 
owner/entrepreneur personally. Those who agreed to be 
interviewed were then sent letters explaining the purpose 
of the study and confirming the time and date of the 
interview. Each person was then visited at their business 
premises.
Of the 72 firms initially contacted by telephone, 61 
agreed to be interviewed, a success rate of almost 85%. 
The average length of time spent over the 
questionnaire/interview stage was 1 hour 17 mins. (with 
the shortest being 45 mins. and the longest almost 3 
hours). Whenever possible, after completing the 
interview, a brief tour of the firm's operation was 
undertaken.
This process was extremely time consuming, but in all just 
over 60 interviews were made and after rejecting 4 of 
these (because they did not meet the criteria adopted), a 
total of 57 usable questionnaires were collected and ready 
for processing and analysis. These new firms 
participating in our survey were spread geographically, 
such that some 15 were located in the Merthyr borough, 4 
in the Neath valley, 6 in Newport and South Gwent, 9 in 
Llanelli and South East Dyfed, another 9 in Swansea and 
West Glamorgan and 13 in Cardiff and the Vale of 
Glamorgan.
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26 of the firms interviewed actually contacted an 
enterprise agency in order to start-up. Tne remaining 31 
had recently set up, but without the help and/or advice of 
an enterprise agency.
Table 2.1 shows the age of the new firms at the interview 
stage.





















Source: Survey (South Wales, 1985)
The final sample was based on a random selection of a
representative list of enterprise agencies clients and the
sectorial breakdown of the sample is given in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 Businesses Interviewed ^n the Survey by Type







































Source: Survey (South Wales, 1985)
The seven business sectors described in Table 3.2 are 
fairly well defined and will be used extensively in this 
research. In terms of the Standard Industrial 
Classification (Revised 1980) they can be defined as 
follows:-
1. Mechanical Engineering (MLH) 320-329
2. Other Metal Goods (MLH) 311-316, 330-374









7. Business Services (MLH) 831-840
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In order to make maximum use of the data collected in 
terms of cross referencing and correlation analysis, it 
was decided to use a computer database, (DBase III).
However, in order to do this many of the questions, which 
were 'open ended' and required varied responses/ had to be 
classified into a meaningful index system. This was 
carried out by a manual sort of all tne questionnaires for 
each 'open ended' answer. The resulting list of answers 
were then grouped and classified and then given a code 
which was subsequently transferred onto the computer with 
the relevant questionnaire. (Appendix C snows the 
classification of 'open' responses).
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THE SMALL FIRM ECONOMY IN WALES
THE EFFICIENCY OF THE WELSH ECONOMY AS AN INCUBATOR FOR
NEW FIRM FORMATION
The purpose of this chapter is threefold, first to explain 
the potential relevance of the industrial structure and 
broader economic climate of a region to the numbers and 
types of new firms founded. Secondly, to identify the 
main structural characteristics of the Welsh economy, 
recent trends in sectorial employment and unemployment and 
in particular, the importance of the small firm economy in 
Wales. Thirdly, a review of the available statistics on 
new firm formation in the region.
All economies, (national, regional or local) can be viewed 
as incubators for new businesses. However, there are 
sometimes large differences in the structure of the 
various economic units and this will lead to variations in 
the 'climate' of each incubator. If each region of the 
U.K. has a different 'entrepreneurial climate' tnen over 
time it may be hypothesised that ceteris paribus new firms 
will reveal their preference for a particular climate by 
exhibiting different rates of new firm formation across 
regions.
By working back from this hypothesis it would be possible 
to identify the most efficient 'climate* for new firm 
formation simply by analysing the particular industrial 
social and economic environment of the region with the 
highest rate of new firm formation. In fact during 1981 
and 1982 the South East and South West of England had the 
highest number of new business set- ups per thousand of 
working population. (Ganguly 1982). According to this 
revealed preference hypothesis, the South of England must 
have.a climate of incubation more conductive to new firm 
formation than other regions of the U.K.
In practice, research in this field has concentrated on 
disaggregating the 'climate of incubation' into a number 
of elements. At this stage it is necessary to review 
briefly some of the most important relationships between 




The larger the workforce employed in small firms the 
higher the rate of business start-up. Conversely, the 
higher the proportion of the labourforce in large 
firms the lower the rate of new firm formation. 
(Fothergill & Gudgin 1979), (Storey 1981), (Johnson & 
Cathcart 1979), (Cross 1981) and (Whittington 1983).
jntra-Industry Birth
An area with a relatively large workforce in one 
particular industry will have relatively more new 
firms founded in that type of activity than would 
other regions (Storey 1981, (Johnson & Cathcart 1979), 
(Cross 1981).
Type of Employment
The higher the proportion of the workforce in non- 
manual occupations the higher the rate of new firm 
formation. (Gould & Keeble 1983), (Fothergill & 
Gudgin 1983) and (Whittington 1983).
4. Diversity o_f Industrial Base
The more diverse the local manufacturing industry the 
higher the rate of business start-up and conversely 
the greater the dependence upon one industry or narrow 
group of industries, the lower the rate of business 
start-up. (Cross 1981).
These postulates will be analysed in the context of the 
present survey of business start-ups in Wales, but tor 
this section they should be taken as broad generalisations 
to aid understanding of the structural characteristics of 
the Welsh regional economy.
The most comprehensive synthesis of these postulates was 
undertaken by Storey (1982), p.183-202. He identified 
high levels of entrepreneurship as being associated with
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(a) small incubator firms; (b) managerial experience; (c) 
higher education; (d) easy access to capital; (e) low 
entry to barriers; and (f) nigh levels of disposable 
incomes. Storey then combines these into a simple index 
of regional entrepreneurship for Great Britain. Table 
4.1 reproduces Storey's index.
The resultant index is an unweighted average of rankings 
and should not be used as anything other than a very 
general picture of 'climate 1 of incubation. however, the 
rankings of the elements making up the index of 
entrepreneurs!1) ip provide a useful basis for making 
regional comparisons.
Table 3.1 shows that Wales is thought to be relatively 
inefficient as an incubation 'climate' for most of the 
elements of the index, except education, (i.e. the 
percentage taking degree courses, where it is the highest 
in Britain) and barriers to entry.
Compared to Britain as a whole, Wales is deficient as an 
entrepreneurial incubator climate (i.e. having a low 
ranking), in the following:-
i) The proportion of employment in small 
manufacturing firms.
11) Percentage of school leavers without 
quaiifications.
lii) Percentage of workforce in managerial positions.
iv) Low savings per head.
v) Prices of houses,
vi) Disposable incomes.
Overall, only the Northern region has a lower average 
score on the index than Wales. Both the South West and 
South East regions have average scores which are more than 




























































































































htxgrereurship and the New firm
, 19&i, Tfrhle 10.17.
In a more general context it is this index of 
entrepreneurship that leads Storey to write -
"A policy of assisting the small (at the expense of 
the large) firm risks being regionally divisive, 
since the biggest take up rates are in the areas 
which are currently the most prosperous*'.
Storey (1981) p.115
Having briefly identified some of the main relationships 
thought to exist between industrial structure and new firm 
formation, it is necessary to describe the economic 
background to the survey of new firm formation in Wales. 
These will be discussed under the following headings:-
a) Industrial distribution of employment.
b) Employment change by industry.
c) Unemployment and firm formation.
d) Size distribution of employment units.
e) Wage differentials.
f) Risk aversion.
A . Industr^a^ Dijrtr .ibut^on of_ J[mp.loyment .in the We J^sh 
Economy
This section does not set out to be a comprehensive 
historical account of trends in, and phases of, industrial 
development in Wales. However, it is important to 
highlight some of the main features of recent economic 
trends in order to aid the understanding of observed 
business start-ups (both in number and type).
In 1972 Humphrys wrote -
"Two hundred years of industrial development in S. 
Wales have given the region a character and 
homogeneity which still clearly distinguishes it 
from surrounding areas ..... the simple industrial 
structure (pre 1970) gave all parts of the region a 
common economic base in coal and steel and created 
among the people of the region a solidarity based 
upon shared work experiences in addition to common 
cultural, social and religious ties". 
G. Humphrys (1972) p.11-12.
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The extent to which this character homogeneity and 
solidarity of the region has been modified by the 
subsequent (post 1970) decline in production industries is 
a matter of debate and may have important implications for 
entrepreneurship in the region. However, the first task 
is to compare the industrial structure of Wales with that 
of other regions of the U.K. in order to identify any 
important structural differences. For this purpose Table 
3.2 gives the industrial distribution of employees in 
employment for hales and the regions of the U.K. during 
1981. The dependence on manufacturing industries in Wales 
shows two extremes, firstly Wales has the lowest 
proportion of employment in 'other manufacturing 1 
industries than any other region of the U.K. Indeed the 
Welsh economy is only about half as dependent on this 
sector as the East Midlands or even Northern Ireland. At 
the other extreme metal manufacture and chemical 
industries account for a larger percentage of employment 
in Wales than all regions except the North.
In the service sector only East Anglia has a lower 
dependence than Wales on banking, finance and business 
services. The largest single sector is public 
administration and "other services' accounting for almost 
a third of the total employment in Wales.
In general the employment structure of the Welsh economy 
is not particularly unique, but the differences identified 
above may have significant implications for overall rates 
of new firm formation. For example, the intra-industry 
birth hypothesis stated at the beginning of this chapter, 
would predict that the higher percentage of employment in 
metal and chemical industries in Wales would lead to a 
relatively larger number of new businesses setting up in 
this sector than in most other regions of the U.K. 
However, the metal manufacture and chemical industries are 
associated because of high capital requirements with very 
high barriers to entry and to the extent that these 
barriers prevent new entry, Wales will be losing out on 
overall new firm formation rates, rather like sowing seeds 
on rocky ground. On the other hand those sectors with 
less significant barriers to entry such as business 
services or 'other manufacturing' (tood, printing, 
woodworking, etc) are those in which the Welsh economy 
would not be as efficient at incubating entrepreneurs as 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































characteristics may be tnought to have important effects 
on the rate of new firm formation in general.
B. .EropJ^oyment Change by. Industry
The late 70's to early 80's was 'the period of incubation' 
for most of the businesses in our sample survey and a 
picture of the net change in employment in each industrial 
order is needed to be analysed in the context of its 
potential role in new firm formation.
Table 3.3 compares the employment structure of industry in 
Wales between 1977 and 1981 (based on the Census of 
Employment). Between this period over 70,000 net jobs 
were lost to Wales. The pattern of employment change has 
not been industry neutral with service sector employment 
actually increasing by 15,000 and manufacturing industries 
alone suffering a net employment decline of 71,000. It 
can be seen that only 4 of the 17 manufacturing orders 
showed any net gain, by far the most significant element 
in the net change in employment was the continuing decline 
in metal manufacture which accounted for approximately 60% 
of the total net employment decline in the toelsn economy - 
within the period 10,000 net jobs were being lost each 
year and so by 1981 only 4.2% of employment in Wales was 
in metal manufacture.
The trends in industrial employment decline outlined above 
may have significant direct effects on new firm formation, 
pushing redundant workers into self-employment. There may 
also be a number of more indirect repercussions as the 
structural decline could alter the size distribution of 
firms, the ownership structure (Cross 1981, p.116) and 
the high churning effect on employment will reduce the 
stability of regional and local labour markets. These 
indirect effects will be discussed (in the following 
chapter) in the context of observed behaviour of new firm 
founders.
C. Unemployment and £irm Formation
The relationships between entry rates and levels and 
trends in unemployment is unclear because the effects on 




UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WALES
1970 -1981
o
Source: Welsh Office, Digest of Welsh 
Statistics, 1985.
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Figure 3.2
CONFIRMED REDUNDANCIES OCCURRING IN WALES
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Source: Manpower Services Commission (Wales)
Manpower Information Unit, Unpublished.
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are likely to work in opposite directions (Storey (1982), 
pp.72-73). However, tnere is considerable evidence tnat 
increasing unemployment stimulates entrepreneurship by 
torcing people into setting up their own business. In 
other words there is a positive relationship between new 
independent firm formation and unemployment. (Gould and 
Keeble, 1983; Atkin et al 1983; Fothergill and Gudgin 
1982). Whittington (1983), for example, found that lagged 
unemployment was a significant determinant of rates of 
firm formation, but that its magnitude made it less 
important than some other variables.
Storey (1981) quoting Oxenfeldt writes -
"If an individual is involuntarily unemployed ... 
and ... if he is able to establish a business, then 
he requires little inducement to do so", (p.70).
The importance of push factors to the new firms surveyed 
in this study will be discussed in Chapter 4. At this 
stage, however, the potential importance of unemployment 
to start-up rates in Wales can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
Clearly through the 1970's, Wales has unemployment rates 
between 1 and 2% above the average for Great Britain as a 
whole. (Almost every Welsh county has shown higher rates 
of unemployment over the entire period). The increasing 
unemployment in the 1980's has, if anything, accentuated 
this trend. Figure 3.2 shows the sectorial distribution 
of redundancies in Wales for 1984 and 1985. The high 
levels of redundancies and rates of unemployment in Wales 
may, therefore, push significant numbers of people into 
becoming self employed and indeed, taking into account 
rates of unemployment alone, one might expect Wales to 
exhibit high rates of new firm formation that the U.K. as 
a whole. The picture, however, is obviously complicated 
by the fact that higher rates of unemployment depress 
local and regional demand.
D. The Size Distribution of^ Welsh Business
A number of studies have shown that the size structure of 
the existing stock of firms is a major determinant of 
rates of new firm formation. It is necessary, therefore, 
to examine the size distribution of industry in Wales,
3.11
Table 3.4 % Size Distribution of Employment Units by Region of G.B. 1976









































































































































































Source: Department of Employment, Census of Employment Units, Employment 
Gazette, January 1978, Table 3A.
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however, this would be of limit ed use unless we can draw 
comparisons witn other regions ot Great Britain.
The data in Table 3.4 is calculated from the Census of 
Employment units, undertaken by the Department of 
Employment in June 1976. It shows the size analysis ot 
census units by region based on the number ot employees in 
employment in each size band.
Before interpreting the Table 3.4, it is important to note 
that the 'census units' on which the table is based are 
points where employers held pay records and so each census 
unit may not represent complete firms or workplaces. 
Despite this difficulty, this data is the only way of 
making reliable comparisons of size of businesses across 
the regions of Great Britain.
Scrutiny ot Table 3.4 reveals that the size of 
distribution of employment units in the Welsh economy was 
not significantly different from that of Great Britain as 
a whole in 1976 except pernaps in the size band 500-999 
where it is ranked first. In fact at this level of 
aggregation there seems to be relatively little difference 
in the size distribution of firms across regions. This is 
particularly the case for the size bands between 50 and 
499 employees where the difference between maximum and 
minimum percentages of employment is less than 2%. The 
main regional differences that are apparent are in the 
very smallest, 1-10, the largest 1000+ size bands. Of the 
former the highest percentage figure for all regions is 
that for the South West while the lowest dependent on the 
size band is the East Midlands almost 6% below that tor 
the South West. Of the 1000+ size band, 23.7% of 
employment in the West Midlands is in the size group, but 
only 12.6% of East Anglia's employment is in this group. 
A difference in excess of 11%.
We have seen that the incubator hypothesis is usually 
formulated so that the differences in new firm formation 
rates can be explained by the percentage of employment.in 
the smallest firms (1-10 usually) where there is a priori 
a direct positive relationship and the percentage 
employment in the larger firms (over 500) where a negative 
relationship is expected. Since the differences between 
the size distribution of Wales and Great Britain as a 
whole are relatively small, then it could be argued that
3.13
the rate of new firm formation in tne Welsh region will 
not be significantly different from that of the nation as 
wnole if only the size distribution of industry is 
considered. Regions like the North West however, will be 
expected to experience lower rates of new firm formation 
since they have both a lower proportion of employees 
working in small units and a significantly higher 
proportion of employees employed in large units than the 
average for Great Britain.
There are three shortcomings with the information 
presented in Table 3.4, firstly it only exists for 1976, 
secondly it only exists at a regional level and clearly 
more significant variations in size dominance of 
particular industries will occur at lower levels of 
spatial aggregation (particularly at the districc level) 
and thirdly, it is not possible to break down tne census 
data to give a regional size distribution of firms by 
industry type.
The detailed accounts of the size distribution of 
manufacturing firms in S. Wales are given in Tables A.I, 
A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5 of Appendix A and a summary of the 
overall distribution of manufacturing units is produced in 
Table 3.5.
The Small Firm Manufacturing Economy of Wales
The small firm sector, defined by Bolton (1971) as 200 
employees or less, accounts for 40% of ail manufacturing 
employment in industrial S. Wales . Tne small firm 
economy in West Glamorgan is significantly smaller with 
only one quarter of total manufacturing employment in 
firms of less than 200. Conversely the largely rural area 
of Dyfed is much more dependent on small firm employment.
More significant structural differences are shown in the 
lower size bands, particularly for businesses employing 
less than 20 people. In terms of numbers of firms less 
than 50% of Mid Glamorgan's manufacturing stock is in 
firms below 20 employees, employing only 5% or
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the manufacturing workforce. Compared to South Glamorgan 
and Dyfed, Mid Glamorgan and West Glamorgan will be 
expected to have significantly lower rates of business 
start-ups if the incubator hypothesis previously outlined 
is correct.
The activities undertaken by new firms will not only 
depend on the size distribution of firms, but also on the 
size distribution of firms by industrial sectors. These 
are displayed in Appendix A along with the ownership 
status of the manufacturing unit.
The various implications of the industrial structure 
described above will be discussed in considerably more 
detail when related to aspects of the start-up process. 
Before reviewing the importance of new firm employment in 
Wales, it is necessary to look at another important 
characteristic of the Welsh economy, wage rates.
E. Implications of Regional Wag_e Differentials
One aspect of the explanation of variations in new firm 
formation which has been overlooked in the literature on 
the subject, is geographical and intertemporal wage 
differentials.
The hypothesis so far considered have concentrated on the 
supply of entrepreneurial services which are effected 
mainly by industrial structure. However, none of the 
explanations or models in the literature includes 
differences in earnings between regions or groups, or even 
overtime.
In fact there are good reasons tor including wage 
differentials in the explanation of variations in new firm 
formation rates, particularly regional variations. 
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that each worker or 
unit of labour has a particular transfer earning (or 
opportunity cost). If labour, is paid a wage which is 
below this transfer earning, then in order to maximise his 
return (net advantage), movement will take place out of 
this activity and into the next best alternative which 
will in fact be his transfer earning. The analysis is 
complicated by differing degrees of labour mobility, both
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geographically and occupatlona1ly, but the general 
principle holds.
Knight (1921) effectively used this principle to explain 
entrepreneurship and extended it to include uncertainty. 
He assumed that all individuals possess labour which they 
can supply as workers to a competitive labour market or 
use that labour as entrepreneurs in setting up and running 
a firm.
"The labourer asks what he thinks the entrepreneur 
will be able to pay and in any case will not accept 
less than he can get from some other entrepreneur, or 
by turning entrepreneur himself....... likewise the
entrepreneur himself will offer ..... to labour what
he thinks must in order to secure his services and in 
any case not more than he thinks the labourer will 
actually be worth to him, keeping in mind what he can 
get by turning labourer himself".
Knight (1921) pp.273-274
In short, entrepreneurship is simply one option in a 
possibly long list of alternative occupations. Consider 
now a position in which a labourer is paid a wage which is 
less than that paid to his counterpart in another region. 
Realising this discrepancy he may consider relocation or 
possibly becoming an entrepreneur himself in an attempt to 
internalise the discrepancy. (Such a decision would 
obviously have to take into account the residual nature of 
entrepreneurial return).
The transfer option of entrepreneurship discussed above 
would be particularly important if the regional 
differences in relative returns also effected 
profitability or expected profitability.
Although earnings differentials have not been analysed in 
other studies, their potential importance, if only in 
theory, suggests that it is worthwhile considering them in 
more detail.
Table 3.6 shows the average gross earnings of adult 
workers in hales as a percentage of the average earnings 
in Great Britain as a whole. A number of points emerge: 
the most striking fact is that not one of the areas of 
Wales (however defined) has an average earnings greater
3.17
Table 3.6 AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS FOR FULL-TIME ADULTS
IN WALES - MALE AND FEMALE, APRIL 1984,









































Source: Welsh Office, Digest of Welsh Statistics No.31, 
1985, (Tables 7.21, 7.22, 7.19, 7.20)
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than, or even equivalent to, the Great Britian average 
(although S. Glamorgan has by tar tne smallest 
differential).
Rural areas have a particularly low relative earnings, but 
even the industrialised counties of Gwent and Mid 
Glamorgan have relative wages almost 10% below the 
national (G.B.) average, note also women's earnings 
generally closer to the Great Britian average.
It is tempting to argue that these geographical 
differentials will lead to higher rates of new firm 
formation in rural areas and Mid Glamorgan than would be 
found in S. Glamorgan or the average for Great Britain for 
that matter. However, the transfer earnings mechanism 
should be considered when comparing earning differentials 
across tne same industries. Rural areas may nave lower 
wage rates than Great Britain as a whole, simply because 
they nave different industrial characteristics. 
Unfortunately data on wage differentials across both 
industries and counties is not available. However, it is 
possible to get a broad industry type view of wage 
differentials between Wales and the Great Britain average. 
See Table 3.7.
In general, wages for manual labour in manufacturing and 
productive industries is about the same as the average for 
Great Britain (figures for both 1982 and 1983 show that 
Wales' earnings were below the national average - tney 
caught up during 1984). Also manual workers in non- 
manufacturing employment seem to be relatively worse off 
than their counterparts in manufacturing.
The most important point to make from Table 3.7 is that 
male non-manual workers were being paid about 9% below the 
national average for non-manual workers in all activities 
(this is even lower for non-manufacturing).
Again in each case women's earnings were not so far behind 
their industrial counterparts in Great Britain as were 
men. However, the largest wage discrepancies occur in 
wholesale distribution and construction, where Welsh 
workers earnings are significantly below the national 
average by 25% and 13% respectively.
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Table 3.7 AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS - BY INDUSTRY
FOR MEN AND WOMEN AT APRIL 1984
(Wales as a percentage of G.B. average)
Industry Type
Full Time Manual
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Source: Welsh Office, Digest of Welsh Statistics No.31, 1985, 
Table 7.18.
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It could be argued, therefore, that (ceteris paribus) the 
ratio of new firm formation in wholesale distribution and 
construction will be higher in the Welsh region than in 
Great Britain as a whole. Furthermore, non-manual 
employees are more likely to start their own business than 
their manual worker colleagues in the same industry. This 
last point has important implications for other studies, 
notably Fothergill & Gudgin (1983) and Whittington (1983) 
which show that the proportion of non-manual workers in an 
area had direct and positive effects on the rate of 
business start-up, since some of this effect may have been 
due to regional wage differentials and not simply the 
proportion of manual to non-manual workforce.
The second effect of low relative wage rates which to some 
extent works in the opposite direction in terms of 
fostering an environment conducive to new firm formation, 
is that other things remaining equal low wage rates also 
result in lower levels of regional effective demand for 
products of firms. Although this is less important for 
manufacturing activities than the service sector.
Entrepreneurship
The distribution of firm size in any economy is thought to 
be a function of the distribution of entrepreneurs with 
different attitudes towards risk.
Kihlstrom & Laffont (1979) present a mathematical model of 
risk aversion and entrepreneurial activity. They prove 
that given specific assumptions those economically active 
in the economy with high levels of risk aversion will 
settle to become employees while less risk averse people 
become entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the less risk averse 
the entrepreneur the larger the size ot firm he will be 
content with operating.
Working back from this arguement the size distribution of 
firms in the economy at any particular time should reveal 
the attitudes to risk ot entrepreneurs. Although 
attitudes to risk aversion is only one ot the very many 
factors thought to influence new firm formation, its 
importance to theory merits a much more detailed analysis.
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However, none of the models reviewed in the literature 
that are used to explain differences in new firm formation 
have even considered these attitudes to risk let alone try 
to incorporate them into the explanation .
Regional differences in new firm formation may therefore 
be related to regional differences in risK aversion. In 
order to test this hypothesis it would be necessary to 
assume that the size distribution of firms in a region was 
an indication of relative risk aversion of the regions 
entrepreneurs. Thus, a region with a higher % of firms 
which are large will be indicative of a less risk averse 
population. By further making the assumption that this 
large firm size distribution is a proxy for risk aversion 
and that the proxy variable is constant throughout the 
population, it is possible to conceptualise a picture 
shown in Figure 3.3.
Consider two economies (or regions), economy x has risk 
aversion characteristics shown by the line x-x". (Note 
the population of the economy is ranked according to 
increasing risk aversion). Economy y has risk aversion 
characteristics which are given by y-y*. (Each person in 
economy y has a constant (higher) degree of risk aversion 
by the amount (x-y)).
The line z-z' represents the unconstrained level of risk 
aversion required before a person becomes an entrepreneur. 
In economy y (tne risk averse population), the number of 
entrepreneurs is given by 0-b' (the rest are workers). In 
economy x, the less risk averse, o-a will be 
entrepreneurs, i.e. economy x will have a higher rate of 
new firm formation than economy y.
A survey carried out by Fortune (1986) shows that the 
population of Great Britain is not disposed to taking 
risks, tor example, the survey asked - would you be 
prepared to risk your savings in order to become rich? 
Less than 30% said Yes and the response was similar 























This hypothesis is testable provided that risk, aversion 
measured on the vertical axis is proxied (in the above 
way) by the size distribution of firms in regional 
economies. In practice it would be necessary to examine 
the size distribution of all private sector firms which 
were indigenous to each economy or region, not including 
branch plants, chain stores and subsidiaries, etc.
It is interesting to note that this effect works in 
exactly the opposite direction to the incubator 
hypothesis. As a result if both hypotheses are in fact 
correct (and of similar magnitudes), then it would not be 
possible to observe a significant relationship between the 
proportion of workforce in small firms and the rate of new 
firm formation. Indeed this may explain the discrepancy 
between survey based studies which snow very high spin-oft 
rates for small firms (Johnson & Cathcart (1979); Gudgin 
et al (1979 and 1981)) and aggregate econometric results 
such as Whittington (1983) who could not find any 
relationship of this kind.
New Firms and New Employment in the Economy _in Males
Having discussed the main characteristics and trends in 
the Welsh industrial scene and explained their potential 
relevance to new firm formation, it is now necessary to 
estimate the number of business start-ups in Wales, 
identifying the type of activities involved and possibly 
the contribution of new firms to overall new employment in 
the region.
In an ideal world of data sources it would be useful to 
have information on new firms that would allow researchers 
to categorise them into different size groups and 
industrial sectors. It would then be possible to identify 
the effects that new firms have on the industrial 
structure of the economy, it would be possible to assess 
accurately the importance of new firms in job creation and 
the relative contribution of expansions, openings, 
closures and contractions.
In reality there is no data source that can come close to 
meeting these needs. Most research data has been obtained 
either using databanks from credit rating institutions tor 
national figures (Birch 1979, Gallagher and Stewart 19b4)
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or from localised databanks for sub-regional figures 
(Storey 1981, Mason 1982, Fothergill and Gudgin 1979).
The INDIS databank, used to compile the industrial 
database, SWISS, was the most obvious source of data on 
new business start-ups (and failures) in the counties of 
South (wales. However, there are a number of serious 
shortcomings in its use. Firstly, the database was only 
started in 1978 and this was only for the county of Mid 
Glamorgan. Secondly, and more importantly, is that the 
development of full coverage of businesses in the area has 
been gradual and so the appearance of one new record on 
the files may represent an existing firm being covered for 
the first time and not a new firm as such.
Given these shortcomings it was impossible to place any 
accuracy on the results of comparing records for any year 
with a base year. In order to provide some idea of the 
scale and type of new firm formation in Wales it was 
necessary to look for alternative sources of information, 
these include: (1) the opening and closure records of the 
Welsh Office, (2) self-employed figures, (3) records of 
the small firms service in Wales, (4) VAT registrations 
published by the Department of Trade and Industry. These 
are examined in turn.
Welsh Office Records
Table 3.8 is derived from the opening and closure records 
of manufacturing units in Wales kept by the Welsh Office 
since 1973. Between this date and the end of 1984 some 
1,162 manufacturing units were recorded as openings (this 
includes relocation of firms within Wales) in Wales as a 
whole. In order to estimate the total contribution to 
employment of these new plants it is necessary to 
aggregate the current employment of those firms which are 
still in existance and also the loss of employment 
calculated at a peak level from the closure of new 
openings. The estimated gross new employment created in 
the new openings 1973-1984 is about 58,000 jobs, with 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although it is not possible to relate tnese figures to in- 
situ expansions or contractions, the data can be used to 
show the net change in manufacturing employment and number 
of plants due solely to plant openings and closures.
Thirty two percent of all the manufacturing units opened 
in Wales since 1973 had closed by November 1984. The 
highest failure rate occurs in Gwynedd where almost 50% 
had closed.
By combining figures for both closures of units opened 
since 1973 and the closure of plants that existed before 
1973, it is possible to offset all closures ol 
manufacturing establishments with all openings in the 
period to get the net change in manufacturing units and 
employment.
For Wales as a whole there was a small net gain in the 
number of plants between 1973 and 1984 with the counties 
of Dyfed, Gwynedd and Mid Glamorgan experiencing net 
losses. More significant than the net changes in numbers 
of plants however, is the resultant net effect on 
manufacturing employment. for the region as a whole all 
closures (not including contractions) resulted in the loss 
of 84,000 jobs, while on the plus side only 58,000 new 
jobs were created in openings of plants over the same 
period. The resultant net loss of manufacturing 
employment is just over 26,000 jobs, which is 8% of all 
jobs in manufacturing in the base year (1973), or 22% of 
all net job losses in Welsh manufacturing industry over 
the period.
Despite these net job losses it is clear that new openings 
represent a significant contribution to new job generation 
- about 5,000 manufacturing jobs a year (simple average 
over the 11 year period).
. Employment
The owners of sole trader firms and unlimited partnerships 
are classed as self-employed in official statistics and it 
is worthwhile looking to these figures to enhance our 
Knowledge of the magnitude of business start-up in Wales.
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The problem with figures on self-employment is that only 
net totals are given and so it is impossible to break them 
down into the components of (a) newly self-employed people 
and (b) existing self-employed being taken off the 
register. Nevertheless a number of interesting and highly 
relevant trends can be identified. Table 3.9A allows 
regional comparisons to be made on the basis of the 
percentage of self-employed people in total employment.
Since 1974 there has been a general increase in the 
percentage of the workforce who are self-employed. 
Nationally there were over 2.1 million self-employed 
in 1981, almost 10% of all employees in employment. There 
are, however, significant differences between regions with 
differentials of over 8% of total employment (c.t. North 
region with East Anglia).
Wales, Northern Ireland, the South West and East Anglia 
are relatively more dependent on self-employment than the 
U.K. as a whole, with Scotland and the North region having 
particularly low scores.
Figure 3.4 shows a more detailed picture of trends in self 
employment for Vvales only. It can be seen that between 
1979 and 1984 there was a net increase in self-employment 
of over 40% which is a rise of 42,000 jobs. This is even 
more significant when compared to overall trends in 
employment in Wales because over the same period non self- 
employed employees in employment slumped by 174,000. By 
1984 142,000 people were classified as self-employed in 
Wales, or almost 16% of the employed working population 
(substantially more than most other regions based on 1981 
data). Within this overall trend it is interesting to 
note that the increase in self-employment has not been 
neutral between men and women. The numbers of self- 
employed females increased by 70% in the 5 years since 
1979, the increase for men was a more modest 35%, but it 
should be noted that even in 1984 three quarters of all 
self-employed people were male. (Figure 3.5).
Despite this overall picture it must be recognised that 
there are very considerable age, sectorial and 
geographical differences in the ratio of self-employed to 
employed labourforces within each region. This is 
particularly the case at the district and sub-district 
level. An illustration of this can be made from Table
3 .28
Figure 3.4
Trends in Self-employment & Manufacturing





1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Figure 3.5
Source: Welsh Office, Digest of Welsh 
Statistics, 1985.
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3.9A which shows the proportion of self-employed to 
economically active workforce in the 1981 Census of 
Population. The ratio of 6.9% for industrial South Wales 
as a whole is significantly different at the 5% level to 
the 9.3% for England and Wales as a whole. Furthermore, 
the county of Mid Glamorgan nas a still lower figure with 
each of its constituent districts having a lower 
propensity to self-employment than even the average tor 
industrial South Wales. The figure for Merthyr Tydfii tor 
example, is particularly low with the national average 
being over 70% higher. (These differentials are even more 
striking in the 16 to 25 age group). It is, therefore, 
necessary to bear in mind these sub-regional differences 
(possibly a function of industrial structure) in self- 
employment when studying new firm formation in Wales or 
any other economy for that matter.
Small Firm Enquiries
In an attempt to gain other perspectives on new firm 
formation in the Welsh, economy data was obtained from the 
Small Firms Service in Wales. The Small Firms Service 
(SFS) keeps records of all enquiries it receives, 
including the location of enquiry by county, the size of 
the business, type of business and whether or not it is an 
enquiry for a new venture or an existing business.
It is important to note, however, that the location and 
even the type of clients that the SFS attracts will be at 
least partially influenced by the level and form of 
advertising and promotion undertaken in any area, A more 
significant problem with the data is that a number of 
enquiries may be repetitive, with more than one enquiry 
from the same individual or business.
Despite these shortcomings the information presented in 
Table 3.10 provides a broad indication of the level of 
interest in starting up a business in different counties 
ot Wales and the type of activity being considered.
During 1984 the SFS in Wales received over 16,001) 
enquiries, of these almost 9,200 (or 57%) were enquiries 
specifically relating to business start-ups. The most 
striking feature is the very low percentage ot start-ups 
intended in the manufacturing sector - less than 17% ot
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Table 3.10 START-UP ENQUIRIES AT THE SMALL FIRMS SERVICE
FROM BUSINESSES (AND PROSPECTIVE BUSINESSES) IN WALES DURING 1984























































































































Source: Small Firms Service (Cardiff) Unpublished
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the total. Together the retail and other service sectors 
make up almost 80% of all intended destinations for new 
firms. Furthermore, this picture is consistent for each 
county of wales, except Dyted where more people intend 
starting in manufacturing business than in retailing.
Clearly if actual start-ups reflect this trend, then there 
will be a number of important implications for self- 
sustaining regional growth. These must be examined in 
more detail and to analyse the extent to which existing 
theory can explain these start-up intentions.
V.A.T. 3t.a t
The most comprehensive source of data on business start-up 
and failure in the U.K. is the register of firms paying 
V.A.T. By examining registrations for V.A.T. the number 
of business start-ups can be estimated, likewise the 
numbers of de-reg istrat ions can be used to estimate the 
failure rate of firms.
Since 1982 the Department of Trade and Industry has been 
publishing V.A.T. registration statistics and a number of 
these provide a source of data on Welsh business start­ 
ups . Although this data is the best available (Bannock, 
1985, pp.Xll-Xlll) , there are a number of limitations in 
their use and interpretation. Ganguly (1982) describes 
the major problems as:-
1. The definition of births has to be made according to 
the data available, i.e. the V.A.T. threshold, but 
since the thresholds were set, so as to bring in 
virtually all full-time traders, this seems a 
reasonable definition.
2. Not all registrations are births as such, but do 
exclude voluntary registrations and those caused by 
changes in legal identity, since registrations can 
come from very small existing businesses whose 
turnover has risen above the threshold - caution must, 
therefore, be exercised in using the statistics to 
deduce any particular number of truly new firms.
1. A list of available statistics on Wales is provided in 
the reference section at the end of this chapter.
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3. Registrations can come from new subsidiaries of 
companies, although not in ail cases and so the 
figures are not solely those of new independent firms.
4. Exemptions for V.A.T. vary substantially in the other 
services and financial service sector.
5. Changes in V.A.T. thresholds will effect the number of 
registrations although this is usually indexed and 
Ganguly argues that this problem appears to be less 
significant than might be supposed.
6. The main limitation of the V.A.T. data is that it does 
not provide employment information.
Table 3.11 outlines the most recent and detailed V.A.T. 
figures available for Welsh business start-ups. It shows 
tne number of start-ups by sector tor each of tne counties 
of Wales over a 4 year period, 1980 to 1983 inclusive. 
Start-up rates are conventionally calculated as per 1,UUO 
manufacturing employees, but a more representative figure 
of per 1,000 of the working population is used here . The 
start-up rates are shown in parenthesis in Table 3.11.
The actual start-up figures will be used in Cnapter 9 in 
order to estimate the significance of new firm employment 
to the Welsh economy. At this stage, however, we 
concentrate on the start-up rate. The data from Table 
3.11 is presented graphically in a series of figures (3.6 
- 3.25) .
Overall, the U.K. start-up rate is slightly over 14% above 
that exhibited by the Welsh small firm sector, suggesting 
that Wales does indeed have a climate for incubation, 
which is less conducive to new firm formation than that of 
the U.K. as a whole. There are very considerable
Start-up rates are usually averaged on an annual 
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Source: See Table 3.11
Figure 3.7
BUSINESS START-UPS BY SECTOR
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variations within this trend, however 1 . Only in catering 
trades does Wales have a signiticantly higher rate of 
start-up, whereas production activities, wholesale, 
professional and other services are all at least 30% below 
tne start-up rates for the U.K. as a wnole.
Almost every sector in Gwent, Mid, South and West 
Glamorgan (industrial South Wales) nave start-up rates 
below the national average, with the lowest overall rates 
being in West and Mid Glamorgan (32% and 23% respectively 
below the U.K. formation rates). As the graphs show there 
are quite large discrepancies between formation rates 
(compared to the U.K.) across sectors even within the same 
counties. In particular, not one of the Welsh counties 
have formation rates greater than, or even equal to, those 
in the U.K. in either the 'other services' sector or 
professional and financial services. In the manutacturing 
sector (production), the formation rate for Wales is 29.4% 
below that of the U.K. with Powys being the only county 
exhibiting rates above tne U.K. average. Once again, West 
and Mid Glamorgan are the poorest performers, both almost 
43% below the national average.
How significant are the differences? Consider the 
production sector alone. If the firm formation rate in 
Wales was the same as the U.K. as a whole, then on average 
(over the period 1980-83) another 214 manufacturing firms 
would have been set-up each year in Wales. Using methods 
outlined in Chapter 9, it is possible to make rough 
estimates of the effect on new tirm employment. It is 
estimated that these extra 214 firms would have resulted 
in an additional 1,100 to 1,200 manufacturing jobs within 
2 years of them starting up. Clearly if small firms 
policies in Wales are successful in raising the rate of 
firm formation to those around the national average, then
The graphs that show a relative index of start-ups 
compare the deviation from the U.K. average ot each 
figure and is indexed to show the percentage 
deviation, (i.e. expected - actual graph) - the U.K. 
average is the base 0. U.K. = 0.
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they may have a significant impact on job creation . If 
the causes ot tne lower start-up rates can be identified 
and overcome then there is clearly considerable scope for 
improving the employment prospects, particularly in 
industrial South Wales.
The Urban-Rural Disparity
Figure 3.7 shows the rate of business start-ups per 1,000 
of the working population over the 4 year period 1980-1983 
for both industrial South Wales and rural Wales. There is 
clearly a considerable difference in formation rates in 
rural and urban areas. For each of the nine sectors of 
trade shown, start-up rates are higher in rural areas than 
in industrial South Wales.
Areas of rural Wales have particularly nigh figures in 
construction, retail and catering trades (in catering, for 
example, rural areas have a rate twice as high as the 
national average). Overall, rural areas have start-up 
rates almost 50% higher than those of industrial South 
Wales, even excluding agriculture.
The urban-rural disparity in new firm formation rates have 
been noted by a number ot researchers - O'Farrel and 
Crouchley (1984, p.225) for Ireland; Gould and Keeble 
(1984, p.190) for East Ang11a; Fothergili and Gudgin 
(1984, p.204) and Gudgin (1978) for the East Midlands. 
All these have established that firm formation rates are 
significantly higher in rural areas than in towns and 
other urban areas.
While recognising that all of these studies deal only with 
manufacturing firms, a number ot explanations of the 
urban-rural difference have been put forward. Gould and 
Keeble have argued that the difference is explained by 
differences in the proportion of employment in non-manual 
occupations. They suggest that non-manual employees in
During 1984 there were almost 8,000 confirmed 
manufacturing redundancies (source MIU unpublished) in 
Wales - suggesting that about 15% of these jobs could 
be replaced by somehow increasing the formation rate 
alone to that ot the U.K. as a whole.
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general have a broader range of skills and therefore, are 
more likely to be better at starting a new business 
venture. (In fact regression analysis by Whittington has 
shown that the proportion of manual workers was a 
significant element in determining regional differences in 
firm formation rates).
Fothergill and Gudgin, however, regard this relationship 
as spurious and their own regression results (on data for 
the East Midlands) seem to show that differences in non- 
manual percentages do not cause the urban-rural disparity. 
Fothergill and Gudgin conclude that the urban-rural 
contrast in formation rates is due to the methods used to 
measure formation rates. New firm formation rates are 
usually calculated as 'per 1,000 manufacturing employees'.
This, they claim leads to an exaggeration in formation 
rates in rural areas which tend to have much smaller 
manufacturing bases, thus, when formation rates are 
calculated, which also include a proportion of non- 
manufacturing employment, then the urban to rural 
difference largely disappears.
The arguements put forward by Fothergill and Gudgin do 
not, however, explain tne differences in urban and rural 
areas of Wales (Figure 3.7). This is evident for two 
reasons; firstly, the previous figures show that there are 
even more significant urban-rural differences (for Wales 
at least) in new firm formation rates in non-manufacturing 
trades and secondly, the formation rates used in this 
research are based on start-ups per 1,000 of the working 
population which includes both manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing employment along with the unemployed.
For Wales at least, the disparity remains unexplained 
either by differences in non-manual employment levels or 
by methodological problems. If there are significant 
differences in the size distribution of firms between 
urban and rural areas then the incubator effect may be the 
real cause of the disparity in formation rates. For 
example, Dyfed has a formation rate almost 20% above that 
of the U.K. average and around 50% above that of 
industrial South Wales, this may be caused by the larger 
proportion of manufacturing employment working in small 
plants. Table 3.5 shows that over 20% of Dyfed's 
manufacturing employment is in firms of less than 20
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employees, compared to 12% in South Glamorgan and only 
around 5% in Mid and West Glamorgan. Two pieces of 
evidence, however, may suggest that this factor does not 
wholly explain the urban-rural difference; firstly, Gould 
and Keeble found that the relationship between small plant 
size and firm formation across rural-urban areas was, in 
fact, in the wrong expected direction and weak. Secondly, 
it will be shown in Chapter 4 that the importance of the 
incubator effect in the Welsh small firm sector may be 
less significant than that suggested by other studies.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 also suggest another possible 
explanation of the rural-urban disparity, it was snown 
that rural areas tend to have relatively low wages 
compared to either industrial South Wales or the national 
average for that matter. Furthermore, non-manual workers 
were even further behind the national average weekly 
earnings than manual workers. Both these factors would 
tend to result in a higher rate of business formation in 
rural rather than urban areas. As stated earlier, 
differences in wage rates have not been analysed in other 
studies, but may provide scope for further research. A 
more simple explanation may exist, nowever, since the 
rural areas have lower overall populations, thus, if there 
is some threshold effect, where in any population there 
will be a minimum level of entrepreneurship, i.e. 
autonomous entrepreneurship, then an urban-rural 
difference will exist because of averaging rates across 
areas of very different population sizes. This threshold 
effect would be shown up in regression equations by a 
constant term and this hypothesis is supported by the 
regression results of Fothergill and Gudgin (1983, pp.204- 
205), which shows nighly significant constant terms which 
also have quite high values. In contrast, Whittington 
(1983, p.255), who does not make the distinction between 
urban and rural areas found that there was no constant 
term at all. Indeed, the threshold effect might be 
expected to be more important in trades such as catering, 
construction and retailing and it is these that seem to 
show the greatest difference in formation rates.
Similar differences in formation rates across areas of 
different absolute populations may also be caused by a 
diminishing rate of start-up with respect to various 
dependent variables. (This would cause a lower average
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start-up rate in urban rather than rural areas). However, 
all of the models used in the above studies to test tne 
determinants of formation rates have been linear, although 
there are good reasons tor thinking that the relationships 
may well be non-linear.
Of course, it is possible that firms formed in rural areas 
are formed for different reasons and display very 
different characteristics to those in urban areas, but the 
rest of this research is based on a study of new 
independent firms in industrial South Wales only.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NEW FIRM FOUNDERS
According to Wilmer & Hoggard (1983) during tne pre-birth 
environment stages social interactions occur between three 
groups in society:- (i) the existing active entrepreneur 
group; (11) the group wnich are seriously considering 
the possibility of becoming entrepreneurs (potential 
entrepreneurs) and (111) a group which may be considered 
as inert in the entrepreneurial context.
These environmental stages are long and extremely complex 
with interactions of information between each group which 
may cause a continual relocation of individuals in terms 
of their attitude to entrepreneurship. These complex 
interactions between groups in society will be related to 
variables such as age, sex, class ethnic, religious 
background, education, employment experience and the 
industrial and economic structure of the environment.
In order to identity 'the supply of new firm founders' it 
is necessary, therefore, to examine both the personal 
characteristics of new firm founders and their attitudes 
and motivations.
The present survey of new firms formed in S. Wales (198U- 
85) will be compared with three studies of other regions 
of the U.K. and it is important to take into account the 
nature of samples in each. These are displayed in Table 
4.1.
The characteristics of new firm founders will be discussed 
under the following headings:-
a) Age
b) Educational qualifications
c) Previous worK experience 
Type of business 
Size of business 
Ownership of business
d) Geographical mobility
e) Motivations of founders
Reasons for leaving last employment 
Reasons tor becoming self-employed
.01
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of New Frm Founders
Are there certain age groups wnich tend to nave a higher 
propensity for self employment? It so, what factors 
associated with age are important in the decision to start 
a new business?
Cross (1982) reviewed a number of studies which gave 
figures tor the average age of businessmen and concluded 
that the studies tend to agree (far more than they 
disagree), in that the average new firm founder is 30-40 
years old.
The mean age tor the Scottish survey was 32.3 years, 
whereas Boswell (1972) reported a mean of 36 years of age. 
In fact the average age of founders in the present survey
A .02
was between these two at 35.2. However, the simple 
average age of founders when first starting a business 
masks more significant differences in the distribution of 
ages.
Table 4.2 compares the ages of founders in the present 
study with samples of Scotland and the South of England. 
For both Scotland and Wales only around 10% of 
entrepreneurs become self employed before the age of 25 
and again for both areas only slightly over a quarter 
start a business before they are 30. The two samples 
differ markedly, however, as in the over-30 age group 
Cross found tnat 53.4% of Scottish new firm founders were 
in the 31-45 band and Mason found a similar picture for 
the South of England. In Wales, however, 65% of the 
sample started between these age groups. In otner words 
the formation of a business in Wales seems to be more 
significantly associated with middle age phenomenon than 
in either the South of England or Scotland.
Completing the picture less than 9% of all Welsh 
entrepreneurs surveyed started a business for the first 
time after the age of 45. The figure for Scotland is 
almost 20% and for the South of England over 30%. The 
difference between the present sample and Scotland in the 
over-45 age group is statistically signiticant at tne 5% 
level. This may have important implications for 
differences in motivation to form a new firm across 
regions (see later).
Before leaving the question of age, Table 4.2 also shows 
that tnere are significant differences in start-up ages 
for male and female entrepreneurs, with 50% of females 
concentrated into the narrow 36-40 years old band.
The general picture suggests that individuals set up new 
firms for age specific reasons and that the propensity of 
potential entrepreneurs to start up increases greatly in 
the middle age size bands, 30-45. It is clearly important 
to explain whether this age factor is merely a spurious 
relationship or a surrogate for experience or some other 
age specific reason.
Liles (1974) explains the age specific nature of 
entrepreneurship in terms of now an individual perceives 



















































































































































































































































































































effective capacity is made up of two conflicting effects.
i) How ready he sees himself for undertaking such a 
venture, and
li) How many obligations or distractions he sees as 
holding him back (restraints).
Readiness or self-confidence to start a business 
accumulates over time, most people learning rapidly in 
their early careers and although the rate of learning may 
diminish over time the cumulative effect is of an 
increasingly ready or competent individual. While 
readiness increases with age so too do the restraints, 
family and financial obligations increase (according to 
typical life cycle development). Thus, according to Liles 
hypothesis, effective capacity made up of readiness and 
restraints will usually be increasing until the 
individual reaches his early 30's, after this, however, 
overall effective capacity begins to decline as the 
importance of restraints and distractions increase with 
age. The result is a strong tendency for entrepreneurship 
to be an early middle age phenomenon.
B. Educational Qualifications of New Firm Founders
It was clear from Table 3.1 that Wales has the highest 
proportion of the population going on to degree courses of 
any of the regions of the U.K. Two aspects of this 
concern us, first, does this mean that the rate ot firm 
formation is likely to be higher ceteris paribus in Wales 
and secondly, what are the implications of educational 
qualifications for the development of firms?
Unfortunately, the relationship between educational 
qualifications and start-up rates is unclear1 . Although a 
comparison of education levels of new firm founders (Table 
4.3) in different surveys is useful, both Storey (North
Testing ot the relationship has confused the two 
aspects of: (a) future business prospects and (b) 
rate of start-up, leading to conflicting results, e.g. 
compare Fothergill, Gudgin and brunskill (1979) with 
Whittington (1983).
.05

















































Source: (a) Survey - (South Wales, 1985)
(b) Storey D.J. Entrepreneur ship and the New Firm, 1982, 
p.107.
(c) Mason C.M. New Manufacturing Firms in South Hampshire: 
Survey Results No.13 Discussion Papers, Department of 
Geography, University of Southampton, 1982, p.14.
Note; Classification of qualifications is made for direct 
comparisons with Storey (1982), whose sample most 
closely corresponds with this survey - manufacturing and 
business/professional services.
Miscellaneous qualifications include O Levels, company 
training courses, HNC, etc.
(Storey 1982, pp.107)
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East) and Mason (South Hampshire) agree that only between 
6.5 - 7% of all new firms are founded by people with a 
degree (and/or professional qualifications). In Keeping 
with the figures tor Welsh school leavers who enter degree 
courses. However, 14% of the firms surveyed in this study 
were founded by graduates. on the other hand, relatively 
more Welsh firms tend to be founded by entrepreneurs with 
no formal educational qualifications compared to the North 
East and Scotland.
The role of educational qualifications to the performance 
and growth of new firms will be examined in detail in 
Chapter 8.
C. Intra-Industry Birth
A number of studies have provided evidence that new firms 
are generally started in those industries in which their 
founder previously worked. Storey for example quotes 
Oxenfeldt, "the founder is likely to select for the 
establishment of the new firm the industry which is most 
accessible and to which his prior business experience is 
related". Storey (1982, p.65).
The hypothesis certainly sounds plausible although certain 
factors such as redundancy or closure may act in the 
opposite direction. Storey reports on two studies: the 
first, Gudgin (1978) found that a striking 85% of 
entrepreneurs in the East Midlands claimed to have 
experience in the industry in which they eventually 
established a firm. Secondly, Johnson and Cathcart (1979) 
found that 57% of founders in the Northern region 
established a firm in the same industrial order in which 
they were formerly employed. (See also Oxenfeldt 1943 and 
Cross 1981, p.235).
In order to derive evidence on the relevance of this 
hypothesis for the Welsh small firm sector, Table 4.4 
presents a matrix of intra and inter industry firm 
formation. Each row represents the destination of the new 
firm (according to the hybrid classification shown) and 
are cross referenced against the source industry ot the 
founder, that is the industry he was employed in prior to 
setting up.
4.07
Since the industrial classification adopted is generally 
much broader than individual orders of the SIC it might 
be expected to have a nigh intra industry score (as snown 
by the diagonal). Surprisingly however, only 37% of the 
overall sample for S. Wales were started in the same 
industry as the source industry of employment. This is 
much lower than recorded by any of the previous studies 
tor other regions.
The intra industry relationship is strongest in the metal 
goods industries (mechanical engineering/fabrication and 
other metal goods) wnere over 50% of founders stayed in 
the same industries.
Despite being the broadest grouping of MLH's, there was 
no relationship between the same industries for the 
textiles and other manufacturing group with only one of 
the nine firms founded in this group having intra industry 
origins. There was little or no association of the kind 
hypothesised in the business services sector. More 
generally, about a quarter more new firm founders came 
from service sector employment outside the destination 
business classified for this study (notably employment in 
Government and local authorities), wnicn is similar to the 
28% of founders in non-manufacturing activities reported 
by Cross (1981, pp.233) for Scotland.
Mason (1982, p.8) hinted at the lack of a clear intra 
industry relationship for South Hampshire, noting that 
while over a quarter of all employment in tne county was 
accounted for by the electronics industry, just 11% of new 
enterprises were set-up in this activity.
In conclusion, it seems that there are considerable 
variations in the rate of intra industry birth 
geographically, which may be caused by other aspects of 
the industrial structure (such as the size distribution of 
firms in each sector). These will be studied in the next 
section, but in the context of this study tne intra 
industry hypothesis does not seem to be as relevant in 
explaining the new firm formation process in Wales as it 
is in the East Midlands or the Northern region.
.08










































Source: Survey (South Wales, 1985) 
Notes: * Other: Non-Private Sector
See also Classification for industries 1 to 7 above.
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Previous Employment Experience of Founders: 
The Incubator Hypothesis
The incubator hypothesis here is meant to be related 
solely to the size of the incubator, specifically that 
small firms will be more efficient at nurturing potential 
entrepreneurs who subsequently set-up a business than 
large firms.
This hypothesis is usually based on the argument that 
people employed in small firms will tend to have less job 
security and a broader experience of all aspects of the 
business, rather than the more limited range of work 
experience found in the specialised larger concerns. In 
addition to this, we have already noted in Chapter 4 that 
wage differentials may lead to firm formation and that for 
seemingly the same work, small firms pay lower wages on 
average than their larger counterparts. (Gudgin et al 
1979, p.16). This, though for different reasons, would 
also be observed in empirical studies of incubator 
organisations.
Table 4.5 shows the size of incubator organisations 
reported for the present study. Only about 30% of the 
founders were employed in small firms immediately prior to 
start-up compared to 47% of founders who were from large 
firms (over 200 employees) and a further 13% from non- 
private sources, such as local Government.
The above figures take no account of the absolute numbers 
of employees working in different sized firms in any 
region. In order to do so spin-off rates are usually 
calculated. These are relative indices of the 
productivity of entrepreneurs from firms grouped according 
to size.
Gudgin (et al 1979, Table 7) showed that in the East 
Midlands the rate of spin-off of new firm founders is 11.9 
times as high for incubator firms, with less than 25 
employees, as it was for large firms with over 250 
employees. Similarly for Scotland, Cross (1981, Table 
221) found a rate of 7.37, moreover the spin off rate was 
declining continually with size of incubator plant.
4.10
Table 4.5 SIZE OF INCUBATOR ORGANISATION

























































Source: Survey (South to&les, 1985)
Industry Classification used: -
1. Mechanical Engineering, Fabrication/Machinery
2. Other metal goods
3. Textiles and other manufacture




The spin-off rates for the Welsh sample are given in Table 
4.6 , where the base used is the size distribution of 
manufacturing employment taken from the database (SWISS, 
Appendix A). It is clear that the rate of new firm 
founders coming from small firms is out of all proportion 
with the percentage of manufacturing employment in that 
size group. The index of spin-off rates is about 2^ times 
as high as it is for incubator firms employing more than 
200 people.
Unfortunately, direct comparisons are not possible with 
this study because the size bands differ (respondents were 
asked to classify their previous employment into three 
croups small (less than 50); medium (50-200) and large 
(200+). In general, most were unsure of the exact numbers 
employed in the incubator making any further sub-division 
impossible.
Although this is lower than any of the studies previously 
mentioned, this may simply be due to the larger size band 
1-50 used in this study compared to the 1-25 employee 
classification used elsewhere.
Care must be used in these observations since most studies 
have used the size distribution of existing manufacturing 
firms with no account being taken of the service sector as 
a source for entrepreneurs, yet around a quarter of all 
manufacturing founders were previously employed in the 
service sector in Wales to the extent that the service 
sector is concentrated in small firm incubator plants to 
new firm formation may be underestimated.
Table 4.6 also shows a result which is at odds with 
previous studies for the spin-off rates of medium sized 
firms. In fact only 6 of the 54 firms (11.1%) claimed to 
have come from medium sized firms, but employment in this 
size group is about a quarter of all manufacturing
The number of incubator firms classified into size 
groups are divided by the total employment in a region 
in that area to get a rate per 1000 employees. The 
rates are then indexed with 1.00 being the lowest 
(base).
4.12
Table 4.6 NEW FIRM SPIN-OFF RATES BY SIZE OF PRIVATE SECTOR








































Source: (a) Survey {South Wales,
(b) DBase (See Appendix A, Table A.I)
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employment. Even the spin-off rate for the largest firms 
(200+) are 75% higher than those reported for the medium 
sized concerns. Previous studies including those of 
Johnson and Cathcart (19/9), Cross (1981) and Gudgin (et 
al 1979) had shown a continuous decline in spin-off rates 
with increasing size of firm (with medium sized firms - 
26-100 or 101-250 employees having higher spin-off rates 
than the large firm sector).
Apart from the obvious doubts raised by the problem of 
inadequate sampling, there may be good reasons why the 
fertility of this incubator plants might display the 
particular features shown in this study.
The importance of gaining a general overall experience of 
business (suggested as being the main reason for the 
incubator hypothesis) may fall substantially after a 
certain threshold size is reached and thereafter remain 
relatively constant. Other factors to that of practical 
experience may also be related to firm size. For example, 
'frustration' was shown by Cross (1981, p.205) as being 
the second most important reason for founders leaving 
previous employment before setting up. This 'frustration' 
may include the despair caused by the lack of alternative 
employment opportunities (Storey, 1982 p.110), but also 
the caged managers and frustrated projects inherent in 
large firms suggested by Thomas (1984), both of these may 
be thought of as increasing with firm size.
For small firms the level of frustration may be relatively 
insignificant and the 'practical experience' factor is 
likely to dominate the rate of new firm formation. As the 
size of incubator organisation increases, however, some 
threshold point is likely to be reached where the further 
increase in firm size is unlikely to lead to significant 
reduction in environmental business experience and so the 
fall in the number of potential entrepreneurs is less 
rapid, possibly becoming constant if this threshold was at 
the level of employment we call 'medium sized firms', then 
the rate of formation may be substantially lower than for 
small firms.
As the size of firms increase still further, other forces 
than the business experience hypothesis may become 
operative. For large firms this frustration element may 
now be the dominant of the two opposite effects. The rate
of firm formation may then be higher than that for medium 
sized firms because of the frustrated workers and 'caged' 
managers syndrome.
Ownership Status of Jncubator Plant
The incubator hypothesis based on the premise that 'a 
practical experience of entire business' is important to 
new firm founders and that such experience is highly 
concentrated in small firms, will also have other 
dimensions. Cross (1982, p.224) suggested that the 
ownership status of an incubator plant could also be 
important, since the status of a plant could be used as a 
possible indication of the nature of the management 
control and the level of management position with the 
firm. Since independent plants may be expected to have a 
higher number of risk-taking positions than a branch 
plant, then one would expect these independent firms to 
have a greater propensity to foster new firm founders than 
subsidiary plants. Cross was unable to find any evidence 
of this proposition, however, it is important that the 
possibility of an ownership (or status) factor is studied 
in the Welsh context because Wales has become 'a land of 
branch plants'. Only about 30% of private manufacturing 
employment in S. Wales is in independent plants. (Table 
A.I., Appendix A).
Table 4.7 makes a further sub-division of incubator plants 
of the new firm founders in the survey according to its 
status - independent plants and subsidiary plants. The 
percentage in each size group found in the sample are 
given in parenthesis and are compared with the actual 
percentage of total manufacturing employment in subsidiary 
and independent firms taken from Appendix A.
Overall, independent incubators seem to have higher spin- 
off rates than subsidiary plants. Small independent 
incubator plants accounted for about 94% of our sample, 
but only 75% of total manufacturing employment in the 
region. The most significant difference seems to occur in 
the medium sized incubators where medium sized independent 
plants have a higher spin-off rate than their subsidiary 
counterparts. Unfortunately, only about a quarter of all 
firms in the size group (51-200) are independents and this 
may go some way in explaining the low overall spin-off 















































































































































In conclusion, the present survey does suggest tentative 
links between the ownership status of the plant as a 
surrogate for the type of management structure in the firm 
and the efficiency of incubators in 'producing 1 new firm 
founders.
. Experience of Founders i.n a Small_ Business 
Environment
Intimately linked with the incubator hypothesis is the 
experience of new firm founders in a small firm 
environment. This experience will not necessarily be the 
result of working in a small firm immediately prior to 
start-up. Some founders may have worked in small 
businesses and subseguently moved to work in large firms 
before founding a firm. Furthermore, some may have helped 
out occasionally in small businesses run by friends or 
relatives and so experience of business may not simply be 
related to previous employment as such. New firm founders 
were therefore asked whether they considered themselves to 
have had any experience of a small business environment 
before start-up and which had relevance to their start-up 
decision. Interestingly, 3 of the founders who had worked 
in a small firm prior to starting up did not consider that 
as being an experience of a small business environment, 
although overall 45% of the entire sample claimed to have 
such experience.
Finally, of the 38 new firm founders interviewed who were 
not previously employed in a small firm, 12 (32%) had some 
other form of contact or experience in the running of a 
small business.
In terms of previous experience in founding a business, 
Cross (1982, pp.219) in his Scottish survey, found that 
this was rare (88.5% had no direct experience of founding 
a new company before). In contrast Mason (1982, pp.13) 
found that a considerable number (42%) of founders in 
South Hampshire had previous experience of starting a 
business. One quarter of the new firm founders in the 
present study had been previously involved in other start­ 
ups.
4.17
Of the 15 entrepreneurs who had previously started a 
business before the present one only 2 were self-employed 
immediately prior to start-up and the majority of the 
others were last employed in large firms before setting up 
- possibly as a temporary measure in an attempt to build 
up capital to start-up once again.
D - Geographical Mobility of New Firm Founders
Having considered age, sex and educational qualifications, 
it is interesting to review the evidence on the 
geographical mobility of new firm founders. This will 
have a direct bearing on the location decision for new 
firms (which will be discussed in Chapter 7),but for now 
we merely seek to identify the source regions for 
entrepreneurs in Wales.
Cross (1982 pp.227-233) noted that while most of the 
literature had stressed the local nature of new firm 
founding, certain supplying regions (suppliers of new firm 
founders) could be identified, for Scotland, The South 
East and East Anglia alone accounted for over 50% of all 
immigrating entrepreneurs.
Two aspects of 'supplying regions' can be identified. 
First, the immigration of people from the county of their 
birth into a region not necessarily related to the 
decision to start-up and secondly, the movement of firm 
founders immediately prior to start-up (residence). Each 
of these has different implications, but the two are not 
always separated in the literature.
Forty two percent of all entrepreneurs interviewed in the 
present study were not Welsh-born, two founders were born 
abroad, two were Scottish and 19 were born in England. 
(See Table 7.8A).
4.18
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Of the Welsh-born new firm founders there is a strong 
tendency for the initial location of the start-up to be in 
the same county as their birth (overall almost 70% 
displayed this characteristic). however, there is no 
means to identify the importance of moves out cf the 
county of birth and subsequently back to the same county, 
to the extent that this does not happen, however, the 
particular local economic structure may therefore have 
significant influence on the firm formation process.
Of more relevance, however, is the location of new firm 
founders immediately prior to setting up the business. 
Cross found to his surprise that as many as 33% of the 
entrepreneurs in his Scottish survey had moved into 
Scotland in order to start-up (Cross 1981, p.229). In 
Wales the present survey has recorded only 4 out of the 55 
responses (7%) that were moves into Wales immediately 
prior to setting up. (One of these was from France). The 
bottom half of Table 4.8B reveals that within Wales there 
is a strong tendency for the initial location of the 
start-up to be in the same county as the founders were 
residing in immediately before founding the firms (overall 
almost 90% displayed this characteristic) and those that 
did set-up outside their home county travelled less than 
15 miles. Once again certain characteristics of new firm 
founders and the formation process may be significantly 
effected by the particular local (county) economic 
environment.
The most significant problem with assessing the importance 
of this local economic structure however, is the fact that 
a number of the founders may have had work experience 
outside his local environment and so his entrepreneurial 
spirit may have been 'cultured' in a totally different 
environment. For example, if the 42% of founders not born 
in Wales had only moved to Wales after spending some 
considerable working time outside Wales, then the overall 
sample would not be expected to be closely related to 
local industrial structure.
In concluding this section it is obvious that the 
relationships between new firm formation and industrial 
structure are extremely complex and open to a wide variety 
of interpretations with much depending on the exact 
motivations of the entrepreneurs in founding firms. It is 
to these that we now turn.
.20
The Motivations of New firm Founders
The importance of the elements of industrial structure and 
personal characteristics of new firm founders discussed 
above will depend largely on the motivations and 
aspirations of entrepreneurs.
In order to analyse these motivations new firm founders 
were asked to respond to two open questions; firstly to 
explain the reasons for leaving their last position of 
employment and in a separate question they were asked to 
identify the reasons for starting their business. The 
responses in both cases were made in the founders own 
words and were categorised according to a framing 
structure (given in Appendix C) after all the interviews 
had been completed. The resulting.categories are 
discussed in terms of age of the new firm founder, the 
industry type of the new firm and educational 
qualifications attained by the founders.
Reasons for leaving last employment (shown in Table 4.9) 
were the broad 'push' factors of redundancy and closure 
and are shown separately. The other category includes a 
number of miscellaneous reasons, notably including end of 
contract or temporary jobs, students not employed 
previously and people unemployed for over one year.
Taking into account all the 'pushed' out of a job factors 
(redundancy, closure and end of temporary jobs) about 43% 
of all the mentions of reasons for leaving employment were 
of this sort. This is substantially and significantly 
more (at the 5% level) than that reported by Cross (1981, 
pp.211) for Scotland during the period 1968-1977 where 
only 12.2% could be considered push factors.
Thirteen founders (24%) deliberately left their position 
of last employment in order to start-up their businesses. 
Again this seems to be significantly less than that found 
by Cross although not directly comparable, b5% of his 
survey left their previous employer of their own accord 
for reasons of advancement.
The second most important reason given by Cross was 
frustration (frustration with their previous employment 
position and prospects), but only one founder mentioned 
























































































































































































The large differences in the two studies may be largely 
due to the overall trends in unemployment during the 
period of study. The period 1968-1977 covered by Cross 
certainly had much lower rates of unemployment than during 
the first half of the 1980's and associated with this 
would be a relative increase in the emphasis on job 
security, possibly accounting for the larger number of 
founders who were pushed out rather than pulled out of 
employment in the present survey.
Despite the differences, Table 4.9 tends to confirm 
Cross's observation that the desire to start-up 
(advancement) tends to be restricted to those under the 
age of 41. The age factor also showed another interesting 
point, that the push factors (redundancy and closure) of 
last employment increase with age, with these reasons 
being given almost twice as often for founders over 40 
years of age as those aged 30 or less.
It is important to know if any of these reasons are 
concentrated in any particular type of new firm classified 
according to sector. For example it seems that the push 
factors of redundancy and closure are distributed 
reasonably equally across industries of new firm entry, 
however, a different picture emerges when looking at those 
founders who left employment specifically to start-up. 
For the service sector only 2 of the 19 founders mentioned 
this reason compared to over a quarter of founders of 
metal manufacturing and other manufacturing firms.
Finally, it can be seen (Table 4.10) that leaving 
employment to start-up a business as an active move 
perhaps surprisingly does not seem to be related to 
educational qualifications of the new firm founders, 
although the push factors of redundancy, closure and end 
of contracts are heavily concentrated in the non-graduate 
groups, with only one founder with a degree being pushed 
out of his last job (due to the closure of a plant).
The reasons for leaving positions of last employment will 
not necessarily correspond with the reasons for wanting to 
set-up and run a small business. It is from these 
motivations that we can more correctly categorise as push 
and pull factors for entrepreneurship.
4.23
Storey found that only 9% of founders were forced into 
entrepreneurship and this confirms the broader measure of 
reasons for leaving last employment used by Cross who 
found that only 16% were pushed out of employment. In 
contrast to both of these studies, Table 4.11 shows that 
at least 30% of all mentions could be described as pushed 
or forced into entrepreneurship. The specific motivation 
was that there were no other jobs available.
On the more positive side 43.3% of mentions claimed to be 
pulled into entrepreneurship with the largest single group 
in this category being the quest for independence and 
greater financial reward. 15% of all reasons given for 
becoming self-employed were to meet a specific opportunity 
or gap in the market and over 10% claimed that they had 
always wanted to run their own business, but these were 
concentrated in the over 40 age group.
As suggested previously the pull motives, particularly 
independence and greater financial reward, are relatively 
more important in younger (under 30 years of age) firm 
founders and the push factor of not having any alternative 
employment is correspondingly less significant. As a 
broad generalisation younger new firm founders tend to be 
attracted into self employment and those founders first 
setting-up a business over the age of 40 tend to do so 
because they lack any alternative employment.
Table 4.11 also confirms that the push factors are not 
industry specific (industry of new entry) being reasonably 
equally divided between sectors. The most important 
factor mentioned by founders who had set-up firms in the 
metal goods manufacturing industry was the opportunity to 
fill a specific gap in the market, factors relatively 
unimportant in either the service or other manufacturing 
sectors.
Only one of the seven graduate founders (Table 4.12) was 
motivated by the existence of a gap in the market, with 
most resorting to self employment because of the lack of 
alternative employment, notably employment at the level of 
position that they had expected.
Overall the motives for founding a firm reported in this 
study are less reliant on the positive pull aspects of 
entrepreneurship and relatively dominated by the forced-
4 .24
Table 4.10 Mentions of Reasons for Founders Leaving








































Source: Survey (South Wales, 1985)
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Table 4.11 Mentions of Reasons for Starting a Business - 
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Table 4.12 Mentions of Reasons for Starting a Business -





























Source: Survey (South Wales, 1985)
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into entrepreneurship category than either the North East 
or Scotland (regions similar to Wales it only in their 
assisted area status). This, it was suggested may be the 
result of changes in the overall economic climate (the two 
previous studies were for firms founded between 1968-197? 
for Cross and 1973-1977 Storey, compared to the present 
survey 1980-1985) rather than purely geographical reasons.
Even a more recent survey by Mason for manufacturing firms 
in South Hampshire (between 1976-1980) found that ..."new 
firms in South Hampshire have largely been set-up tor 
positive and opportunistic reasons.." (Mason 1982, pp.15- 
16). He reported only three (6%) cases where new firms 
were started because their founder had been made 
redundant, compared to 24% in the present study (and 30% 
because there were no other jobs available). Completing 
the contrast a striking 60% of founders in South Hampshire 
reported motivations for starting a business which were 
basically to exploit a market opportunity. Comparable 
motivations reported in the present survey are only 15% of 
the total sample.
Clearly this survey suggests that unless these striking 
differences can be explained solely in terms of 
differences in location, there was a significant change in 
the characteristic motivations for new firm founders 
during the late 1970's or early 80's.
This has a number of implications not only for the 
effectiveness of Government policy instruments (which may 
in part be the cause), but also for the general 
performance and employment prospects of the firm (these 
will be considered later).
It is possible to make a broad comparison of the firm 
founding motivations of entrepreneurs between V</ales 
(present survey 1985) and several countries worldwide 
(ISBS, 1984). The International Small Business Survey 
(ISBS) provides data on what motivated entrepreneurs to 
start a business 1 . Of the 10 possible responses we
The ISBS study consisted of a standard questionnaire 
with closed responses only. For this reason answers 
are not directly compatible with the present survey, 
although a broad picture is very much evident.
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compare two with the survey for Wales; these are: (a) 
started a business because I became redundant/was 
dismissed or fired; and (b) the company I worked for 
closed down or moved.
In Table 4.13 the two push factors of redundancy and 
closure are shown for developing countries, (Kenya, 
Brazil and Indonesia) and the mature, developed economies 
of the U.S.A., U.K. and West Germany, as well as for Wales 
which we take a representative of a depressed region of a 
developed economy. It is clear that push factors (at 
least as far as redundancy and closure are concerned) are 
much more important in developed economies causing almost 
1 in 5 of all business start-ups in the U.K., U.S.A. and 
Germany, but only fo% in the under-developed economies.
Based on the present survey, however, it seems that many 
more entrepreneurs are pushed out of jobs and into self- 
employment in Wales (and possibly other regions, given 
assisted area status of developed countries) than in 
developed countries as a whole. Even with such a small 
sample for Wales the difference (a factor of 2 above that 
for developed countries) does seem very large and indeed, 
it is statistically significant at the 1% level.
In conclusion, a comparison of reasons for leaving last 
position of employment and the reported motives for 
starting a business reveals three types of trigger for 
entrepreneurship. The first and most obvious is the 
various pull factors of the market leading to about a 
quarter of all founders leaving previous employment 
specifically to set-up. In the other extreme 43% of 
founders were pushed out of employment either through 
redundancy or closure of plants, of these some 70% were 
motivated to start their own business because they were 
unable to find any other suitable job. Finally, the third 
type of trigger lays somewhere between these two, in that 
while they may have been pushed out of employment they 
still had a number of possible alternatives of which 
entrepreneurship was judged for various reasons including, 
"1 had always wanted to set-up a business of my own", to 
be the best option. It is doubtful whether many of the 
new firm founders triggered by the last two methods would 
have become entrepreneurs if they had not been pushed out 
of a full time and relatively secure job.
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Table 4.13 An International Comparison of Redundancy and Closure
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CHAPTER 5
FINANCE - AN ENTREPRENEURIAL SCREENING PROCESS
Having identified a number of the more important 
environmental factors towards new firm formation, 
inlcuding industrial structure and personal 
characteristics of founders, the next stage is to analyse 
the screening processes leading up to the emergence of a 
new business and the nature of these businesses, 
particularly in the coordination of resources, which is 
the very essence of entrepreneurship. (Casson 1982, 
pp.23-25).
The entrepreneur emerging to become a founder and the 
subsequent controller of a firm will have been subjected, 
in his earlier life, to a wide ranging group of 
conflicting influences both on his personality and his 
economic development.
A certain number will come forward and act as private 
entrepreneurs starting and running a firm. Before 
reaching this stage, however, prospective entrepreneurs 
will have gone through a process of screening, this 
screening may simply be self assessment (Stancill 1981 and 
Timmons 1979) but will usually include a third party 
judgement on the entrepreneur and his proposed venture.
The third party screening process is most evident when the 
entrepreneur applies for financial support for his 
project. When this occurs there can be three outcomes; 
(1) application accepted and support given; (2) project 
modifications and (3) complete rejection of project. 
(Even at the stage of acceptance the entrepreneur may 
still not continue the start-up process). In other words 
the filtering down of the number of potential 
entrepreneurs as a result of interactions in the 
environmental stages continue by a further, more readily 
identifiable screening process, that of the availability 
of finance - and all this occurs before the ultimate form 
of screening - which is the reactions of the market to the 
venture.
5.01
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the role of the 
availability of finance in the overall screening process. 
The main limitation in this and almost every other survey 
of new business start-ups, is that the characteristics of 
the business and the entrepreneur will be of those who 
have actually succeeded in passing through the financial 
and other screening processes. (The characteristics of 
those who fail to pass the financial screen would have to 
be the subject of a separate study).
The securing of finance for a new venture is only one of 
the many entrepreneurial tasks that have to be coordinated 
before trading can occur. The very nature of financing, 
however, requires it to be treated as a special case of 
the coordination process.
A number of other aspects of the coordination process will 
be examined in the next chapters, highlighting the nature 
or structure of coordination at the start-up stage and 
changes in attitudes, policies and organisation in 
response to the early feedback of market signals.
When analysing the importance of finance in the formation 
of a new venture it is apparent that the role of the 
entrepreneurial function may become confused with the role 
of the provider of finance. Kirzner (1979, Ch.3) notes 
that economic theory has suffered from a failure to 
identify the entrepreneurial role separately from the role 
of capitalist. In fact it is probably easier to separate 
but by no means independent the two distinct functions in 
theory than in practice.
Most studies (including the present survey) have shown the 
dominant position of personal resources of founders used 
to start a new firm. Unless an entrepreneur is able to 
provide some of his own resources, -if only to demonstrate 
personal commitment to third party financial backers, it 
is unlikely that he will be able to raise finance from an 
external source. (CBI, 1982, pp.20-21), (Mogano, 19BU, 
p.24). In practice then the two roles are intimately 
linked.
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Figure 5.1 THE FINANCIAL FILTERING OF ENTREPRENEURS
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In what follows we will be considering the importance of 
the financial screening process to the supply of new firm 
founders since it is effectively this which ensures that 
the role of the entrepreneur is also, at least in part, 
the role of the financial backer.
The importance of the financial screening process is 
intimately linked with the importance of barriers to 
entry. The larger the initial capital investment involved 
- a function of the type of industry, the more likely a 
founder is to need outside finance of some sort. While 
trying to obtain this external backing an entrepreneur is 
likely to have to satisfy backers on a number of 
important criteria. The criteria involved are the very 
essence of the financial screening process (and will be 
considered in depth later). The screening process is 
effectively a filter, allowing those entrepreneurs with 
'viable, promising' ideas (third party judgement on the 
entrepreneur) to go ahead while 'other' applicants will be 
turned down, probably forced to modify their proposals, 
try for backing elsewhere or drop the project altogether. 
The filtering down can be illustrated in Figure 5.1. toe 
are only considering the financial screening process, but 
it is recognised that potentially the self assessment 
screening process is more important in terms of filtering 
down the total population to the potential entrepreneurs 
seeking outside support represented by the flow X in 
Figure 5.1. We have also excluded from the diagram those 
potential entrepreneurs who do not require financial 
venture backing and therefore do not necessarily go 
through the formal financial screening process.
Clearly , given a fixed supply of entrepreneurs, the 
important elements in the diagram for the supply of new 
firm founders are the relative magnitudes of the flows A,B 
and C. (It is also important to identify the proportion 
of projects not accepted which go ahead anyway). In order 
to get some idea of the importance of the filter (or 
screen) it is, therefore, necessary to analyse the nature 
of the financial screening process, what are the 
organisations involved and the behaviour adopted by them?
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Before discussing these in the context of the present 
survey, some general indication of the degree of filtering 
can be given.
1. In 1982 the Economic Intelligence Unit conducted a 
U.K. survey of the unemployed (EIU 1982) and found 
that a very high proportion (34%) of all unemployed 
persons had thought about setting up their own 
business, suggesting that there were over one million 
potential small businessmen among the unemployed. 
When asked why they had not actually gone ahead to 
become self employed, by far the most important reason 
(72%) was lack of finance, cash or capital. The 
overwhelming feeling was that they would not be able 
to find the money. (EIU, 1982, pp.50-52).
2. The level of refusals for applications of finance is 
quite high, particularly from the private venture 
capital firms, e.g. Timmons (1980) found that only 3% 
to 7% of all proposals to venture capital sources in 
the U.S. for start-up (or ongoing finance) are 
actually funded. Given the increasing difficulty of 
financing start-ups and growth out of personal wealth 
or retained profits, it seems likely that such 
developments will in future depend increasingly on the 
injection of finance from outside to supplement the 
intitial investment of the founders. (Bolton 
Committee, 1971, p.153).
Together, the last two points suggest that the financial 
screening process does have very significant effects on 
the numbers and types of new firms founded and on the 
observed characteristics of the founders themselves.
Start-Up Capital; Size and Sources
Before considering in detail the types of screening that 
can occur in the search for outside finance, it is 
necessary to analyse the initial capital requirements of 
new ventures covered by this survey and the methods and 
sources of financing these.
Cross (1982) obtained data on the size of start-up capital 
for 180 Scottish manufacturing firms. He found that the 
average investment was i.12,856 (ibid, p.242) The 
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however, direct comparisons are misleading for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the present survey includes 17 firms in 
the service sector which in general have lower start-up 
capital requirements than manufacturing firms. When these 
are excluded the mean investment in the present survey is 
£14,443. Secondly, Cross does not seem to have indexed 
the capital investment in real terms (and over the period 
of his study, 1968-77, the RPI rose substantially). 
Finally, calculating his mean figure at 1985 prices we 
obtain £26,344. This compares with real (1985 prices) 
mean investment for manufacturing firms in the present 
survey of £15,8UO. (Clearly there would be an even 
greater difference if the Scottish figure had been 
indexed).
The mean start-up figures, however, do not provide an 
indication of the true picture being distorted by a few 
firms with substantial (£100,000+) start-up investment. 
(Almost 40% of firms in this survey started with less than 
£2,000). Although still a rough guide, the median start­ 
up capital is probably more representative. Lloyd (et a 
1983) provides median figures for start-up capital of 
firms in South Hampshire, £8,487 and the North West, 
£7,072 (both adjusted to present survey, 1985 prices). 
The equivalent figures (medians) for Wales in the present 
survey is only £3,000.
Clearly the start-up capital involved is substantially 
less for new firms in Wales in the 1980's than for 
Scotland, the North West or the South of England during 
the 1970's. While some of this may be due to the high 
level of heterogeneity of business start-ups, other 
reasons such as the relative importance of push factors in 
entrepreneurship between the surveys (see Chapter 4) and 
differences in the availability of finance may be 
important.
Not unexpectedly, Table 5.3 shows that sole trader firms 
generally have lower initial capital requirements than 
partnerships and new limited companies are significantly 
more endowed with launch capital than the rest of the new 
firms.
Interestingly, 3 out of the 9 firms which were 
incorporated at start-up only used one source of finance 
(personal savings), their Limited status obviously not in
5.07
response to increase the avenues for obtaining outside 
finance. On the other hand, all other Limited liability 
used more than 3 sources of finance compared to both sole 
traders and partnerships, where over 50% used 2 or less 
sources.
In light of the above it is most surprising to find that 
there was a larger number of sources of finance used in 
setting up a new enterprise in Wales than in Scotland. 
Cross (1961, p.237) found that almost 44% of his sample 
only used one source of finance. This is significantly 
higher at the 5% level than the 16% of new firms using 
only one source in the present survey. This difference is 
also shown at the opposite end where around a quarter of 
new firms in Scotland used 3 or more sources of finance. 
Mason (1982, p.19) also reported just over half of the 
firms in South Hampshire made use of only one source of 
start-up finance. This suggests that relatively more 
firms in Wales go through the financial screening process 
than those in Cross's Scottish survey, although the 
smaller capital sources involved in new Welsh businesses 
may make the screening process less stringent.
The multiple source nature of new Welsh firms may also 
have important implications for the subsequent performance 
of the firm. Storey (1982, p.152) found that those firms 
in his sample (for the North East of England) with the 
highest employment were the most likely to have started 
with only a single source of finance and those with the 
smallest employment were more likely to begin with 
multiple sources.
Table 5.4 shows the initial capital requirements by the 
labour employed at the start-up stage 
(investment/employment). This effectively shows the 
initial capital intensity of different size (by 
employment) of new firm. This is important because it 
gives some indication of the spreading of fixed start-up 
costs and is significant in obtaining public sector 
financial support, particularly regional development 
grants.
Although the average start-up capital per head is high for 
start-ups involving two labour units rather than one, 
(i.e. the founder), those starts using more than two 
workers have substantially lower initial capital
5.08
intensities. It is notable, therefore, that just over 80% 
of the new firms were started with two or less people 
employed and were not, therefore, generally attempting to 
spread their start-up capital. Clearly a number of other 
factors may be involved, not least of these will be the 
perceptions of risk.
Sources p_f Finance
It has already been noted that since new firm founders in 
the Vvelsh survey tend to use a greater number of sources 
of funding than was found by either Cross or Storey. 
(Table 5.2 confirms this). However, before discussing the 
nature of the screening process it is necessary to look at 
the types of source of finance used in new firm formation.
The most important source of finance for new Welsh firms 
(as indicated by mentions and not the amounts involved), 
was personal savings (Table 5.2). This is compatible with 
most other studies in the U.K. and U.S.A. (See a 
comparison of studies in Cross iy82, p.239). However, 
there is a significant difference in the relative degree 
of importance between personal and outside sources.
In the present survey just over a third of mentions were 
of personal savings compared to 50% and 44% for the North 
East and Scotland respectively1 . More generally of the 11 
other studies reviewed by Cross (ibid.) only one had a 
similarly low dependence on personal savings. 
Correspondingly, although Cross reported that the clearing 
banks play a minor role in supplying finance to new 
companies, 28.28% of firms in this survey used these 
sources. It is also interesting to note that not one of 
the new ventures in this study claimed to have used a 
finance company, i.e. non-clearing bank financial 
institution and only about 1 in 20 new firms seem to have 
used these sources in the two other studies.
An important difference is evident when comparing source 
of start-up capital and finance for existing small firms 
in general. There have been no studies of business start­ 
ups that have noted an important role of leasing or hire




































































































































































































































































































purchase in providing initial finance. This is perhaps 
surprising in the light of the Bolton Committee Report 
(1971, pp.168-171) which found that installment credit was 
an important source of medium term finance for business - 
between 15 to 30% of all finance house advancements were 
to industry.
Confirming this view a study of 189 small, but long 
established firms carried out by the Economists Advisory 
Group (1983) found that 27% of firms used leasing and a 
less popular, but still important 20% of firms used hire 
purchase. In fact the Bolton Committee reported that:-
"Hire purchase business is, however, highly 
competitive and we do not believe that any 
creditworthy firm should fail to find 
accommodation". Bolton (1971, pp.170)
A possible explanation of the difference in importance of 
installment credit to fund start-ups and well established 
firms is that new firms by definition have no profit 
record by which to demonstrate to the finance house its 
ability to generate enough profit to repay the debt.
However, the same argument holds for bank financing and 
yet the banks accepted this position. Probably the most 
important reason is the lack of awareness by new firm 
founders about the possibility of the alternative (non 
bank) forms of finance. (None of the firms interviewed 
reported even attempting to obtain start-up finance either 
through lease or hire purchase).
Clearly the nature of installment credit, i.e. reducing 
initial capital required, is of particular importance to 
new small firms and the wider use of these sources may 
significantly reduce venture funding problems.
Surprisingly the types of sources of funding used are not 
significantly related to the legal status of the business 
at start-up. (Table 5.1 for example). Bank finance 
accounted for 29% of mentions by incorporated businesses 
and sole traders (and was only slightly lower for 
partnerships - 26%). As noted previously the Limited 
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attempt to increase the avenues of obtaining finance, 
however, it is noticeable that the bank loan is only more 
important than the overdraft in Limited companies. (New 
partnerships and sole traders rely very heavily on 
overdrafts as opposed to bank loans).
The only trend noticeable when sources of finance are 
looked at by the initial capital requirements is that the 
larger the start-up finance needed, the less important 
personal savings become.
In summary the size of start-up capital is generally 
smaller, the number of sources of funding higher and a 
lower relative importance of personal savings in new Welsh 
firms surveyed than for either the North East or Scottish 
start-ups.
Although only 28% of the mentions in the survey were for 
outside sources, i.e. clearing banks, this is misleading 
in terms of assessing the significance of the financial 
filtering process since it would suggest that less than a 
third of the projects actually required outside funding 
for which they would be screened by the third party - bank 
manager. In fact exactly 60% of the new firms interviewed 
had approached the banks for either an overdraft or a 
loan, or both. This suggests (with reference to Figure 
5.1), that less than 40% of firms are started without any 
formal screening of their proposals since some of the 
firms which had no outside funding may have approached a 
financial institution and had been turned down. It is 
worth reiterating here that we are by definition only 
studying those firms that actually started-up and had 
survived by the time of interview. Thus, it is clear that 
the financial screening process may have substantial and 
significant effects on the nature and quantity of new 
firms founded.
The next section will attempt to draw more light on the 
relationship between the screening process and eventual 
start-up by describing the problems encountered by new 
firm founders in attempting to raise start-up capital from 
banks.
5.14
Start-Up Finance; The Problems
The problems of financing small firms in general have been 
well aired, Bolton (1971, Ch.12), Bannock (1981, pp.39-4b) 
and Binks (1979, pp.33-45). Binks, for example, argues 
(what Bannock has called Binks law) that the smaller the 
firm the greater the proportionate increase in the capital 
base required to achieve increases in the supply of the 
firm's product and yet, the lower its ability to command 
funding from outside sources. Whilst this may be true 
for most small firms the setting up of a new firm is 
likely to generate even more significant problems for 
founders. However, Mason (1983, p.20) in his study of new 
manufacturing firms in South Hampshire found that only 
21.b% of those firms who had attempted to obtain bank 
finance, had experienced difficulties in obtaining start­ 
up funds.
The contrast between Mason's results and the present 
survey is marked. Just over a half (53.84%) of all the 
Welsh firms responding that had attempted to obtain 
outside finance at the start-up stage reported problems of 
some kind or another. New firm founders were asked if 
they had encountered any problems in raising start-up 
capital from the banks. The results are illustrated in 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
Apart from the 34% of mentions who reported having no 
significant problems 1 , the most common response was the 
lack of guarantees that banks were looking for to hedge 
their risks by seeking security (collateral), even on 
overdrafts. In fact, a further 6 founders (10%) 
specifically refused to offer their houses as security 
even though the banks had initially asked them to do so. 
The importance of providing secure guarantees was also 
noted by Cross (1981) and Storey (1982) incorporates 
owner-occupied dwellings and their average price into his 
index of regional entrepreneurship (ibid., pp.189-191).
The next most common problem reported (14%), was that 
banks lacked confidence in founders business ideas, (they 
had a "lack of belief in my idea"). It was apparent
_—___________—__—__————^__—————————————————————————————
1 About a third of these thought they would have had 
problems if they had not been helped by parents or a 
partner in guaranteeing their loans from banks.
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Table 5.5
MENTIONS OF PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
IN RAISING START-UP CAPITAL FROM BANKS -
BY SIZE OF START-UP CAPITAL AND LEGAL TYPE OF NEW FIRM
(Figures 
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though that this was not banks solely expressing 
reservations about the proposed project itself, but also 
in the ability of the founder to carry it out - however, 
only a few founders mentioned that the banks required a 
track record which they did not have.
Banks may use two methods of controlling the demand tor 
business finance - the method deriving most attention of 
course, is the qualitative restriction, restricting their 
financial backing to those projects which are promising or 
viable, (by whatever criteria). However, financial 
institutions also use high interest premiums to cover 
their perceptions of increased risks and/or to discourage 
less promising proposals. For example, the small firms 
loan guarantee scheme now carries a 5% premium above base 
rate, however, it is interesting that only 3 founders (5%) 
complained of interest premiums being too high, for the 
others the importance of actually getting the backing 
weighed much more importantly than the marginal premiums 
to be paid once they have secured the financing. The 
'other' mentions category in Table 5.5 includes problems 
such as excessive time taken for discussions and 
disillusionment with attempts to obtain a small firm loan 
guarantee.
In order to derive information on the financial screening 
process at work when new ventures require financial 
backing from outside sources, it is important to know if 
any of the problems mentioned by founders are related to 
particular characteristics. Table 5.5 cross references 
the reported problems with initial capital requirements 
and the legal structure of the new venture at the start-up 
stage. Table 5.6 does this by industrial sector and 
previous founding experience of the entrepreneur.
Some points to emerge:-
There is no clear relationship between problems of 
obtaining finance and the initial legal status of the 
firm, although the main problem of a lack of guarantees is 
more significant in sole trader firms than either 
partnerships or limited companies.
There are fewer problems involved in obtaining a 
relatively small start-up capital or a relatively large 
amount of capital than for more typical sums (median).
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Despite the banks asking for security, only one founder 
starting in the £2,500-£10,000 group, claimed that the 
bank had no confidence in his proposal, which is 
substantially less than for founders in smaller or larger 
scale start-ups.
As might be expected there were fewer problems with 
providing guarantees for small sums - less than ±2500 
start-up investment - although even for these relatively 
small sums two founders were asked to give the banks a 
charge on their houses, something they were not prepared 
to do 1 . (In all 13 founders (22.8%) used their homes to 
obtain start-up capital either by mortgage or as 
security).
The firms not reporting any significant problems were not 
industry specific - ranging from 3b% in metal 
manufacturing to 33% in other manufacturing and services. 
While relatively fewer service sector projects were the 
subject of a lack of confidence by the banks (compared to 
manufacturing projects), their main problem was the lack 
of security (44% lack of guarantees and not prepared to 
offer homes as security), probably due to the intangible 
nature of the assets in the service sector in general.
Finally and perhaps most surprisingly, there were no 
significant differences in the problems of obtaining bank 
finance between founders who had previous experience and 
those that had started for the first time. This is 
surprising since Mason (lb>82) notes:
"as a result of having set-up a business before, the 
founders concerned are likely to have certain 
advantages over those with no previous involvement in 
new firm formation posing a greater awareness of 
sources of finance and by possessing a 'track record' 
should be able to convince a bank manager that they 
are competent to run a business". (ibid, p.13)
This compares with typical security ratios of assets 
to borrowing of between 2:1 to 4:1, found in a survey 
of manufacturing firms in Nottingham. Wilson 
Committee 1^79, pp.23.
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Despite this, 14% of the founders who had previously set­ 
up a business, reported banks as not having confidence in 
their projects compared to 13% of founders with no 
previous experience. The only difference of any 
significance was the greater ability of previous founders 
to provide guarantees of some kind.
In summarising this section we make the assumption that 
all those founders who passed through the financial 
filtering process and reported no problems in doing so, 
possessed the characteristics which satisfied the criteria 
adopted by the banks, i.e. they cleaned the filter. A 
third of all new firms were in this category and the 
nature of the filter (suggested by the types of firms that 
cleaned the financial screen) does not seem to be related 
to the industrial activity of new firms, their legal 
structure or the previous experience (at founding) of the 
entrepreneurs.
The larger numbers of firms reporting problems in 
obtaining initial capital of £2,5UO - £10,UOO might 
reflect a higher level of risk in lending these sums and 
indeed banks were generally asking for more guarantees in 
this range.
Similarly, the nature of the financial filtering process 
can also be revealed by the types of problems encountered 
by new firms. It was shown that specific problems, 
notably the availability of guarantees and banks not 
having confidence in founders proposals, were related to 
the size of the investment and possibly the industry 
sector.
It is interesting to know how the firms themselves 
perceived the relationship with their bank at the start-up 
stage. Despite the number of problems mentioned above, 
the general attitude to banks was encouraging. Only 15% 
thought that the banks were 'poor' and three quarters of 
all firms responding thought that their relationship with 
their bank was either 'good' or 'excellent 1 . It is clear 
that despite having problems in obtaining bank finance 
most founders accepted these as valid commercial criteria 
and relations with banks were generally very good. 
(Tables 5.7 and 5.8).
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Table 5.7
PERCEIVED ATTITUDES TO BANKS BY NEW FIRM FOUNDERS
Perceived Relationship with Banks at Start-Up Stage 
Analysis by Capital Requirements and Legal Structure
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Compared to other manufacturing and service firms, those 
new ventures started in metal manufacturing industries 
thought that their relationship with banks was poorer. 
This was also the case for founders who had previous 
experience of starting a business. Of the 11 limited 
companies, 7 perceived banks to be excellent and not one 
thought them poor, whereas 23% of all sole trader firms 
thought that the relationship with their bank at the 
start-up stage was 'poor'.
It is possible to compare the attitudes to banks by firms 
attempting to raise start-up capital with the relationship 
between established firms and their banks 1 .
In general, the attitudes of new firms are significantly 
more polarised than are more mature firms, e.g. only 24% 
of firms thought banks relations 'excellent' in the 
Business Opportunities Project (1986), compared to 49% in 
the newly formed firms reported in the present study.
The Wilson Committee (1979) reported that -
"The banks relationships with the majority of other 
well established customers may be perfectly 
satisfactory, but we are not as confident as they 
themselves appear to be that the number of viable 
enterprises denied access to sufficient funds is 
insignificant." (ibid.)
While we have also demonstrated that banks relationships 
are satisfactory, not only with well established customers 
but also with new firms seeking finance to start-up. It 
is important to note once again that these are the views 
of the people who were actually able to start-up and we 
have no direct evidence on the potentially (viable) 
projects which are effectively blocked by the filtering 
process. In other words, does the financial screening of 
new and small business projects have too fine a filter?
Business Opportunities Project (1986), Mid Glamorgan 
Industrial Development Unit and the Welsh Regional 
Management Centre: Sample details of 208 firms in Mid 
Glamorgan, 50% with over 50 employees, 75% of firms in 
manufacturing.
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Financial Screening; The Banks Point of view
To analyse the nature of the financial screening process 
we concentrate almost entirely on the major clearing 
banks. This is justified for a number of reasons; first, 
less than 2U% of the firms in our sample were incorporated 
companies at start-up, as such the majority of new firms 
did not (were unable to) obtain any 'outside 1 equity 
finance. In fact only one of the 57 firms surveyed had 
obtained start-up capital from a financial institution in 
the form of equity finance. Secondly, leasing and hire 
purchase methods of reducing initial capital requirements 
were not mentioned as sources of finance in this survey 
(Table 5.2) or Cross (1981, p.238), while the main 
providers of these are finance houses and hire purchase 
companies (Bolton, 1971, pp.169-171). Leasing and hire 
purchase is mentioned by most practical literature on 
business financing. (Nat. West. (1984), Ernst and Whinney 
(1984), Mogano (1980, pp.25)). It is perhaps surprising 
that new firms either do not use these methods or do not 
regard them as significant in obtaining outside finance.
Thirdly, every firm using outside finance to start-up had 
either a bank loan or overdraft and more generally -
"The dominant suppliers of external loan finance 
for small businesses are of course, the clearing 
banks". (Wilson Committee 1979 - taken from Binks 
1979, p.36)
Detailed criticisms of the role of banks in financing 
small firms in general can be found in the Wilson Report 
(1979), Bannock (1981) (B), Bannock (1981) (A) and will 
not be repeated here. However, it is worth noting that at 
least two thirds of all small firm funds from 
institutional sources are from the clearing banks, 
(probably much more for new ventures) and recently there 
has been a major increase in interest by banks in the 
small firm sector. (Bannock, 1981a, p.16).
Given the overwhelming importance of clearing banks in 
providing funds to business start-ups, the nature of the 
overall financing screening process will be dominated by 
the nature of the decision making process of banks 
themselves. Further analysis therefore, requires 
information on these decision making criteria and to
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achieve this, interviews with representatives of the banks 
in Wales were carried out during 1984 (see Chapter 2).
The interviews were carried out, bearing in mind the 
assertion made by Bannock
"Banks ...... once vested with discretion and
responsibility are now subservient to regional 
offices that know little about local conditions and 
even less about the borrower's business". (ibid. 
p. 16)
As such the interviews were conducted with the directors 
of the regional head offices of the clearing banks and 
whilst recognising the importance of local branch managers 
discretion in advancing loans, the general policies and 
criteria adopted will be those emanating from regional 
offices.
The Filter; A Set of Criteria
Until now we have not specified the terms filter or 
screeening process. In fact, from the interviews with 
banks it is clear that the filter or screen is made up of 
a number of different criteria, criteria which banks 
generally adopt when assessing an application for start­ 
up finance.
Since the degree of filtering down of applications will 
depend on the characteristics of the proposals and the 
extent to which these meet the filtering criteria, it is 
essential to study the types of criteria involved and the 
importance attached to each of them.
One of the clearing banks has a seven criteria guide which 
it uses to train its banks managers. This guide is called 
the C. A.M. P. A. R.I, factors which stands for Character, 
Ability, Means, Proposal, Amount, Repayments, Interest. 
Although obviously not independent of each other the order 
does generally represent the order of importance of 
individual factors. The other banks also seemed to fit 
this scheme, particularly the importance they attach to
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the borrowers personal characteristics1 . By classifying 
the criteria used to assess financial proposals according 
to the Campari criteria, we will discuss each in turn.
1. Character
The eye to eye contact across the desk will give the 
bank manager a good idea of the level of confidence he 
can put in the applicant. The initial meeting with 
the bankers will demonstrate to them the degree of 
confidence that prospective founders have in their own 
ability. The bank manager is encouraged by a high 
level of determination, energy and drive and 
willpower, but is deterred when the applicant fails to 
show an appreciation of the hard work involved in most 
new businesses. On average new firm founders work 
over 60 hours a week and so must have the temperament 
and enthusiasm to see this through. A keen awareness 
of his own strengths and weaknesses is essential.
In general, these character criteria are those which 
are stressed by "Be Your Own Boss" training courses 2 
and a number of practical guides to starting and 
running small firms, (Perry and Jones (1981), Mogano 
(1980), Nat. West. (1984)).
Since the qualities mentioned are largely the same as 
those involved in the self assessment process 
(stressed by Timmons (1980)), then these 
characteristics go through two major screening 
processes with the financial screening of personal
1 The observations and comments made in this section are 
based on the views of senior bankers. The importance 
attached to each factor will depend on the frequency 
of mention, but more importantly the degree of 
emphasis that they put on them (subjective basis).
2 Examples of training courses which begin with 
character assessment are (a) 'Your Own Business' 
course run by CAVE agency, (b) 'The Graduate 
Enterprise Programme' and (c) 'Be Your Own Boss 1 run 
by the MSC and The Polytechnic of Wales.
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qualities being the second round of filtering, but 
more importantly is an independent judgement on the 
founder. Timmons (ibid. p.199) notes that 
"interestingly enough this process of self assessment 
and open criticism from peers (and bank managers) is 
something the best entrepreneurs seem to thrive on", 
(my inserts)
2. Ability
A common response was that the best projects to back 
were those where the person (potential founder) has 
come from a very good, well paid job. However, these 
cases were not very common-1- and those that did leave a 
good job tended to go into direct competition with 
their previous employer. (It is notable that the 
general feeling among the bankers was that 'most' 
applicants had been unemployed at the time of applying 
for finance).
The four areas of founders ability scrutinised and 
deemed essential by banks were in management, finance, 
marketing and technical skills. If these were not in 
evidence in the founder himself, then they should be 
supplemented by a partner or employee with such 
skills. Although rare in most cases applicants should 
"have the full range of necessary skills".
Another factor recognised by the banks in this group 
is the lack of expertise in setting up business plans 
and formal funding proposals. A 'good many' 
applicants are turned down tor these reasons alone. 
"A well presented proposition cuts a long way" with 
bank managers.
A survey in Spring 1980 by Fortune, found that only 
29% of the random sample of employees would be willing 
to give up a secure job in persuit of an enterprise 
which they thought would make them rich.
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3. The Means
The financial means to obtain further funding is a 
necessary, but not a significant condition for 
acceptance of a proposal, includes both the direct 
personal equity injection and the ability to offer 
securities and guarantees against the loan or 
overdraft.
The personal stake is vitally important since it 
demonstrates commitment - though demonstrations of 
commitment may come from elsewhere, moreover, the 
personal stake is reflected in the level of bank 
'gearing'. While the banks do not have any guidelines 
on the acceptable level of gearing, it is clear that 
as gearing increases the exposure of the banks 
investment increases and interest payments could 
become too high for the business to repay. In 
general, local bank managers use their own discretion 
on the ratio of borrowing to security, but there are 
internal limits set on local managers extending credit 
to any one individual (these limits will depend on the 
experience and seniority of the branch manager).
The banks tended to be wary of the proposals funded in 
part by redundancy payments. The experience of 
one bank involved in the redundancies at Port Talbot 
in recent years is particularly interesting. Very few 
redundant workers used the payments to start a 
business, there were not many good ideas about and 
those that did start a business tended to do so in 
retail, (corner shops and newsagents - increasing the 
number of shops in the area at a time when local 
demand was falling with the redundancies). 
Interestingly, those that did use redundancy payments 
to start a business tended to be those who had low 
compensation anyway.
Even though applicants can put their own money into 
the project they still look at the other criteria, 
"are they the right people to go into that sort of 
business, if at all". The general impression was that 
money demonstrates commitment but it does not have the 
last say. In particular branch managers are told 




Only after vetting the characteristics and abilities 
(both financial and personal) to undertake a project 
is the project itself scrutinised. Banks claim that 
the type of project involved (manufacturing or 
services) has little influence on their decisions. 
What is important in this context is the quality of 
the business plan, outlining the project and the 
proposal for funding.
The banks attitude is that they expect the borrower to 
have done the necessary market research to produce 
cash flow figures based on realistic assumptions. If 
the applicant is judged good enough, based on the 
other criteria, then he should have produced a set of 
cash flow projections and associated business plan. 
In fact, the banks claimed to be torn between two 
forces - (a) the business plan should be produced to 
the standard of an accountant and the proposer should 
have already been in touch with an accountant; and (b) 
the proposer should be capable of doing the cash flow 
and working through the plan himself. If he cannot do 
this it may point to problems in running the business 
later on and especially in providing the banks with 
monitoring information.
Many of those who do prepare a business plan may be 
rejected because of the overoptimistic forecasts made 
in their cash flow. In the banks view the underlying 
assumptions are widely optimistic in these cases.
All the banks and most major accountancy firms produce 
cash flow charts and outline business plans to help 
clients prepare and present a financial case to a 
bank, yet a poor case presented to a bank is likely to 
represent a lack of experience in dealing with 
financial institutions and possibly the neglect of 
detailed financial information which banks both 
require and deem essential for the smooth operation of 
a business.
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5. Amount, Repayments and Interest
The business plan will have indicated the type and 
extent of funding required and this will then be 
compared with the founders own stake (gearing) 
according to his means. The cash flow forecasts are 
then considered - they should have capital repayments 
built into them along with interest payments. After 
accounting for these there must be enough left over to 
provide an adequate living for the proposer and his 
family, including a sufficient cash flow surplus to 
finance further trading.
Finally, using the above criteria; Character, Ability, 
Means, Proposal, Amount, Repayments and Interest 
(Campari), the branch manager assesses the overall 
viability of the project.
To demonstrate that the basic 'Campari' criteria are used 
by other banks the internal training of bank managers in 
another clearing bank involves a discussion of the '3 C 









It can be seen therefore that both the criteria used and 
the importance attached to each are basically the same in 
each of the clearing banks 1 .
In summary, the more important criteria involved in 
assessing applications for bank finance are largely 
subjective assessments by the bankers of the proposal and 
its proposer. They involve judgements on the potential
The 'Campari 1 and 'C.C.C.P.A.R.T.S 1 criteria used by 
different banks are based on a quite strict order of 
importance of individual factors which are similar in 
different banks.
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entrepreneur himself, such as "is he the right type of 
person to go into that sort of business, it at all 1 ? 
Another attitude stated was "it is our business to loan to 
who we feel is right".
It is clear, therefore, that the degree of filtering of a 
proposal will not be uniform over time, across the 
characteristics of firm founders, or even across different 
branches of the same financial institution. Despite this, 
banks are on the front line usually being the last in a 
long line of entrepreneurial screening mechanisms and the 
overall nature of this financial filter (described by the 
Campari criteria) reinforces the self assessment of 
personal characteristics which may or may not occur. The 
preparation and presentation of a business plan may relate 
more to previous employment and education that to overall 
business acumen.
Banks (and other support agencies) can basically make two 
types of errors. (Willmer and Hoggard 1^83).
Type 1 - A person who does not have the required 
abilities for success may be selected.
Type 2 - A person who does have the required abilities 
may be rejected-1-
Both cases result in retarding the creation of new, viable 
businesses, but against these errors banks also prevent 
those proposals which are not viable concerns from 
starting up and may cause many to rethink and modify their 
proposals to increase the chance of success. The basic 
question of course, is:- Are the criteria adopted by the 
banks strongly related to the chances of business success? 
If they are not then the two types of error are likely to 
have significant effects on the supply of viable new 
firms. Related to this, four important points can be 
made:-
Willmer and Haggard used these principally to consider 
the effectiveness of small business courses, but their 
analysis applies equally to financial screening.
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From the interviews with the bankers it was apparent 
that if an application for funding had been initially 
turned down then a large proportion of these 
unsuccessful applicants do not return to that bank 
(whether they try other banks or just fold up is not 
clear). This is so despite the helpful advice the 
banks claim to be giving the applicants about those 
areas of the suggested business that need more thought 
or modification.
Storey (1982, Table 8.6) found that "the clearing 
banks are not particularly good at avoiding 
investments in loss making companies", (ibid, pp.164) 
Despite using bank finance to existing companies 
(rather than start-ups) to compare with profitability 
and growth he found that banks were lending to a 
relatively high proportion of firms that were not 
profitable and lending to relatively few who were 
making large profits.
3. The decision to accept or reject a project on the 
margin may be influenced by the overall position of 
the banks portfolio. There is considerable contact 
between branch managers and regional offices, by which 
general feelings of the banks policy are transmitted, 
specifically does the bank want to make loans at that 
time or not, depending on the overall bank and 
accounts balance sheet policy. As such, certain 
applicants can be rejected for reasons not relating to 
the characteristics of the individual's proposal.
4. Casson (1982) argues that one of the essential 
characteristics of entrepreneurs is that (as a result 
of differences in types and amounts of information) :-
"the entrepreneur believes that he is right while 
everyone else is wrong ..... the essence of 
entrepreneurship is being different". (ibid, 
p.14)
If this is so then significant problems may arise when 
the entrepreneur tries to obtain outside finance. 
Since the banks' main criteria (Campari) are basically
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subjective (Character, ability, project assumptions, 
etc.) and by definition these will be different to 
those of the entrepreneur who sees a profitable market 
making opportunity.
In fact, Casson states - "There is no objective test 
of entrepreneurial ability which can guarantee a high 
degree of accuracy and there is unlikely to be one in 
the forseeable future. ..... Opinions are therefore
likely to differ about whether a given individual has 
entrepreneurial ability. ..... This means that the
identification of an entrepreneur is itself a 
judgemental activity, (ibid. p.329)
Screening Criteria; The Perceptions of the Firms
Given the subjective nature of the financial filters 
(criteria) described above it is likely that the 
applicants who actually successfully negotiate the 
screening process will have particular perceptions about 
the financial criteria adopted and that these will not 
necessarily be the same as those of the banks themselves. 
In order to get a 'second opinion' on the nature of the 
criteria that banks adopt when assessing an applicatation 
for start-up finance, the founders of the new firms in the 
survey were asked what they thought the criteria adopted 
by the banks were. The question was 'open', but the 
criteria mentioned were readily classified into six groups 
(Table 5.9).
Clearly the sample in this case is strongly biased. The 
founders interviewed were those who eventually started up 
and their particular responses will therefore reflect the 
criteria adopted by banks which effected their passage 
through the financial process, e.g. only 10% of all 
mentions of criteria by the founders were specifically 
related to personal characteristics (confidence in 
applicant), but this may be due to the fact that the 
personal characteristics possessed by founders were 
sufficiently acceptable to the banks that they did not 
'make it an issue 1 and so was not persued by founders as 
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(Limited Companies include two cooperatives)
Despite these problems of interpretation it is clearly 
important to see how the firms themselves view the nature 
of the financial filter ana compare this with the criteria 
actually (or claimed to be) adopted by the banks.
It can be seen in Table 5.9 that the most important 
criteria perceived to be used by banks in assessing an 
application for start-up finance is in tact the 
availability of guarantees and security. This received 
36% of all mentions by new firm founders. Next of 
importance was the type and quality of the presentation of 
the business plan. While only 16% mentioned that 
profitability and therefore the ease with which loans 
could be repayed was an important element in the banks 
decision.
The most striking result is that only 5 (10%) out of the 
50 mentions were directly related to the confidence that 
banks had in the applicant himself (personal character). 
The banks themselves generally thought that this was 
probably the most important factor in their decision and 
was certainly the first subject that they considered in 
the decision whether to extend finance or not.
Apparently founders thought that the importance of a track 
record was of minor significance to the bank, (only 6% 
mentioned this) and yet experience and track record are 
strongly related to the 'ability' criteria which banks 
also consider of prime importance.
Those founders who actually started in business as limited 
companies thought that guarantees were less important and 
banks confidence in the personal character of the founder 
more important than either partnerships or sole traders. 
In this sense the banks view of the financial criteria is 
more closely related to the experiences of founders of 
limited companies than those of partnerships or sole 
traders.
The general differences in perception of the criteria 
adopted between banks and the new firms themselves can be 
highlighted in Table 5.10 which summarises rankings of 
importance of each criteria.
5.35




























Source: (1) Survey (South Wales,
(2) Bank Interviews - The Campari Criteria
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Of prime importance to banks is the level of confidence 
they can place in applicants. in contrast firm founders 
thought that the most important criteria adopted by banks 
was the ability to provide guarantees. The personal 
characteristics of founders were only ranked fourth in 
significance.
Effects of Screening; On Actual Start-Dps
The most important effect this financial screening process 
has is probably on the rate at which new projects are 
accepted or backed and therefore, given the supply of 
potential entrepreneurs the supply of actual new firms is 
largely determined. In fact 35% of all new firm founders 
interviewed in the survey said that the availability of 
finance had prevented them from going ahead with some 
other business idea before actually starting their current 
business. This is surprising in some respects since the 
personal character and ability of the applicant to carry 
out a business venture is unlikely to have changed very 
much between the time at which these other projects were 
rejected and the current backed venture set up.
Since these are the two main criteria used by the banks in 
assessing an application for business finance it suggests 
that the projects rejected were marginal cases and 
probably rejected due to the viability of the proposed 
project rather than a reflection on the ability of the 
applicant to carry it out.
The ability to obtain finance also has a number of other 
significant effects on firm formation. Forty six percent 
of new firm founders claimed that their start-up was 
delayed or prolonged directly as a result of the 
availability of start-up finance.
Some of these may not actually have needed to obtain 
bank finance, or the lack of finance may not have been 
due solely to bank rejection of funding applications.
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l&ble 5.11 The Effect of Availability of Finance to New
Ventures By Size of Start-Up
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Table 5.12 shows that founders requiring start-up capital 
of £5,000 or more tend to have a more prolonged start-up 
process than those requiring smaller sums. In fact over 
60% of those who claimed to have a protracted start-up 
process (as a result of needing more finance) also said 
that the size of eventual start-up was smaller than they 
had originally intended. More generally, almost half of 
the total sample thought that the level of financing 
eventually used had a significant dampening effect on the 
size of start-up.
There is no clear relationship between this and the actual 
size of the start-up, but only 22% of firms using between 
£1,000 and £2,500 launch capital thought the eventual size 
would have been larger if appropriate finance had been 
arranged.
5.39
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ASPECTS OF THE START-UP COORDINATION PROCESS
The financial screening process described in the previous 
chapter has a duel role, not only does the availability of 
finance act as a screening mechanism, but is also an 
important part of the coordination of resources that must 
be undertaken by new firm founders.
Even after being screened by a third party and/or self 
assessment criteria, the entrepreneur must act as a 
coordinator of a number of decisions and resources before 
his firm can begin trading and therefore be subjected to 
the ultimate form of third party screening - the reaction 
of the market place to his venture.
The coordination or dynamic management of resources by the 
entrepreneur involves substantial skills; finance must be 
found from some source; appropriate premises negotiated; 
the venture planned; customers identified; suppliers found 
and possibly labour employed. The coordination activities 
continue with conformation to legal restrictions and 
obligations; contact with accountants; local planning 
authorities; public utilities, etc.
All these activities have to be coordinated by the 
entrepreneur in the process of setting up a business and 
it is this which leads Casson (iy82) in more theoretical 
terms to define the coordination process as - "The process 
by which different decisions are harmonised". (ibid, 
pp.41-57)
He continues ...."The concept of coordination captures the 
fact that the entrepreneur is an agent of change: he is 
not concerned merely with the perpetuation of the existing 
allocation of resources, but with improving upon if. 
(ibid. p.24)
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to analyse some 
aspects of this coordination process and to try and 
identify some of the more common problems encountered by 
founders in actually setting up their business. It is 
likely that the problems involved in coordination of
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start-up activities will be related both to the size and 
the legal status of the new firm and to the previous 
experience of the founder. The problems reported by 
founders in setting up their businesses are likely to 
reflect problems of resource and activity coordination at 
this stage.
Setting Up; General Problems of Coordination
Founders were asked to describe the problems they faced 
when setting up their enterprises and as such the 
questions were quite 'open ended' and while a number o± 
problems may have been overlooked, it is possible that the 
most significant problems encountered by founders would be 
reported without prompting.
In fact only 8.9% (Table 6.1) of the responses claimed to 
have no significant problems in setting up (this 
represented 7 of the 57 new firms). On its own the high 
proportion of founders having problems might be expected 
when all the complex coordination activities involved in 
the start-up process are considered. However, Cross 
(1981) found that almost a third of his sample of new 
manufacturing firms in Scotland had not encountered 
problems in establishing a new firm. The difference is 
puzzling especially in view of the lower start-up capital 
generally required tor firms in this study. One 
explanation of course could be that the present sample is 
strongly biased towards those founders who did have 
problems in setting up and therefore needed to go to an 
enterprise agency (from which our sample derives) for 
help. However, examination of the interviews reveals that 
founders who approached enterprise agencies, only after 
they had started up, were just as likely to have 
experienced problems at start-up as those who went to them 
in order to start-up.
The main problems in the present survey and that of Cross 
were those related to finance, 23.2% and 26.9% of mentions 
respectively. Furthermore, it is probable that a number 
of other problems mentioned had their root causes in 
financial matters. The problems of raising outside start­ 
up finance were detailed in Chapter b where it was shown 
that the lack of guarantees (or willingness to give 
guarantees) was perceived as the main problem. Table 6.1
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however, shows that of the general financial problems 
encountered, those related to cash flow (or planned cash 
flow) were most important and this indeed may explain the 
problems related to banks asking for guarantees.
Furthermore, since over 60% of the firms actually required 
outside finance, it is clear that the decisions and 
activities involved in securing bank finance is a major 
part of the coordination process and it is this that 
ensures the majority of new ventures are screened by a 
third party, (banks and financial institutions), before 
actually starting up.
It is, therefore, necessary to discuss in more detail the 
types of financial coordination that a new firm founder 
must undertake. The founder will probably have to arrange 
an appointment with his bank manager and possibly shop 
around different banks or financial institutions, he may 
also need to find an accountant or find a suitable 
partner. If partnerships are entered into, or personal 
assets offered as security, a solicitor may be needed. 
These activities are by no means trivial and may take a 
considerable time to organise, but in principle they 
should be formalised in a business plan.
The business plan serves two main purposes: first, to help 
founders focus their ideas in a logical manner and 
generally formalise the type of problems that have to be 
overcome and the activities that have to be undertaken to 
meet set objectives. Secondly, the business plan is used 
to provide formal proposals for finance from outside 
sources whether it be a loan or equity funding.
It is this second role of the business plan that 
undoubtedly receives most attention and is a role which 
has significantly increased in importance in recent years. 
(Ormerod and Burns, 1^84). In fact almost all major 
accountants and banks produce outlined business plans to 
guide written finance proposals and we have already noted 
the importance attached to business plans by the banks 
themselves. Since properly prepared business plans can 
take a number of months to prepare, this demonstrates to 
the banks the level of commitment necessary before any 
further consideration of the proposal is made.
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Furthermore, the plan should include a description of the 
previous experience of the founder and the attributes and 
skills of the management or ownership team.
Sixty seven percent of all founders in this survey 
actually prepared a business plan prior to starting up 
(Table 6.2) and it is clear, therefore, that the business 
plan is an important element in the start-up coordination 
process, even if only looked at from a financing point of 
view. Not unexpectedly, new ventures which began life as 
incorporated companies have a higher propensity to make 
use of a business plan at start-up (8y%) than either 
partnerships (7U%), or sole traders where only just over 
half prepared a plan.
Almost every founder who produced a business plan also 
incorporated cash flow forecasts and profit and loss 
accounts. The significance of this will be discussed in 
the following chapter, but it can be noted here that the 
64% of founders who prepared cash flow forecasts 
effectively had a method for calculating the net flow of 
income arising from their original start-up investment, 
which in general is significantly more than small firms 
undertaking investment projects.
Once cash flow projections are made it becomes possible to 
estimate the level of funding required in order to trade 
at the planned scale of business and together, with the 
'bottom line' profit and loss, provides the basis of a 
proposal for bank financing.
Some idea of the importance attached to the two roles of 
the business plan is shown in Table 6.2. While banks and 
venture capitalists view the business plan as more than a 
financing device (Timmons 1S»80) and stress its long term 
value providing a medium for the development of a formal 
strategy and allows the monitoring of performance of a new 
venture, new firm founders regard the business plan mainly 
as a mechanism to obtain bank finance with its other roles 
(those which finance organisations regard as most 
important) being demoted to those of minor importance.
Less than a third of all founders who produced a business 
plan had actually used it after they had secured finance 
and interestingly, a much higher proportion of founders 
had used the business plan after start-up who had not
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approached an enterprise agency to start-up and therefore, 
probably had to pay for an accountant's report (costing 
anywhere from £500 to £10,000) than those who actually 
went to an enterprise agency in order to start-up 
(enterprise agencies usually provide free advice or 
actually help prepare cash flow forecasts).
Intimately linked with the cash flows and business plans 
are the assumptions made about the potential market, but 
only 13.6% of all problems encountered by new firm 
founders in setting up their enterprises were market 
related (Table b.l). This is very similar to that 
reported by Cross for Scotland. Market related problems 
were largely founders having difficulty in finding 
customers in practice, rather than broad identification 
problems and some reported that orders were likely to be 
low while they built up a sufficient reputation 
(particularly trust) with clients.
In general, the problems of coordination related to 
markets and finding clients are considerably less 
important than those involved in raising finance.
Much has been made of the high levels of 'red tape' 
experienced in small firms and its role in retarding their 
growth . The Bolton Committee reported that -
"Small businessmen are seriously disturbed about 
the cost of form filling, in terms of executive 
time and the diversion of energies". (ibid. p.25b)
However, while this may be an important problem for 
existing small firms in general 2 , the bureaucracy involved 
at the start-up stage was only mentioned as a problem by 
5.4% of founders. Similarly, only 8.6% of the responses 
found by Cross can be classified as problems with 
bureaucracy.
Also see Bannock (1981, pp.122-123).
A study by the Economists Advisory Group (1983) found 
that between 1977 and 1982, 3% of firms thought the 
attitude of central Government to small firms with 
regard to statistical form filling, etc. actually got 
better, but 37% thought it had got worse.
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Table 6.2
USE OF BUSINESS PLAN A
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It follows that attempts by the Government to reduce the 
bureaucratic burdens 1 will only have a very minor effect 
on the rate of new firm formation, although growth in 
existing small firms may be encouraged.
One of the most surprising results in Table b.l is that 
the most common problems encountered in setting up a 
business in Wales are those associated with general 'lack 
of information' (second only in importance to financial 
problems). While Cross found that a few firms encountered 
problems of this kind, i.e. lack of knowledge of different 
sources of finance, only 4.9% of problems encountered by 
firms in his survey can be classified as 'lack of 
information' - compared to 21.5% in the present survey.
At the start-up stage firms complained of the problems of 
obtaining information on premises in the area on technical 
matters, but most common of all is a general lack of 
practical information about starting the business 
(especially legal restrictions and obligations).
These problems seem to be a more considerable barrier to 
starting a business in Wales in the 198U's than tor 
Scotland in the 1970's, despite the firms in the sample 
having the resources of enterprise agencies (26 of the 57 
firms actually used an enterprise agency) and the Small 
Firms Service. These were not in existence in the 197U's. 
(The role and performance of these support agencies will 
be discussed in Chapter 9).
In summary, the coordination process not only involves the 
physical allocation of resources in order to begin 
trading, but a large part of coordination involves 
acquiring knowledge and information about the potential 
resources at the founder's disposal and the constraints 
within which his new venture will operate. The role of 
information in the coordination process should not then be 
trivialised.
(1985) The Government has announced a ma3or reform of 
small business legislation in a white paper entitled 
'Lifting the Burdens'.
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The Role of the Location Decision in Start-Up Coordination
The decision on where to locate the new business and 
availability of suitable premises is also an important 
part of the start-up coordination process.
When compared to existing firms, large or small, new firms 
may be thought to be significantly more mobile in a 
geographical sense by virtue of the fact that they do not 
have any existing fixed assets. Thus, the predictions of 
crude profit maximising models would suggest that the 
eventual siting of a new firm would reflect the lowest 
point on the spatial cost surface.
A number of empirical studies have shown that the cost 
minimising approach to industrial location to be 
unrealistic, both in terms of its predictions and of its 
assumptions about actual business procedures adopted by 
firms. (Sant (1975), Townroe (1971) and Hamilton (1974)).
In terms of an explanation for industrial location, 
economic geographers have recently begun to concentrate on 
the internal environment and structure of firms as 
deciding industrial location, rather than the purely 
external (cost surface) factors. Humphries (1980) 
believes that only about 30% can be explained by external 
factors, the remaining 70% of the explanation is made up 
by internal factors.
Although these studies were based mainly on large transfer 
and branch plant firms, it could be argued that the model 
is even less relevant to new independent firms than these 
studies suggest. This is so for two main reasons: 
firstly, founders of new firms have so many other aspects 
of firm formation to coordinate and therefore, lack the 
resources and possibly the skills of management teams 
supervising location decisions in larger organisations. 
Secondly, the level of exposure of the entrepreneur and 
his family to the risks of business failure will be 
considerably higher if the least cost site requires a 
family upheaval and relocation along with the new firm. 
As a result the actual location of the new firm may be 
significantly risk discounted.
Interestingly, if this type of risk is important then less 
risk averse entrepreneurs (possibly those who were
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attracted into firm formation rather than pushed) are more 
likely to conform to the neoclassical location theory than 
more risk averse entrepreneurs.
In light of this, therefore, new independent firms 
(although being relatively mobile in the physical sense), 
are not thought to be adequately represented in location 
theory. Mason (1982) found that only a third of all the 
new manufacturing firms in South Hampshire undertook any 
search for premises that were outside the 'neighbourhood' 
or local authority, in which the founder previously lived 
or worked.
Confirming the local nature of location decisions, Storey 
(1982) reports that only 11% of his sample (new firms in 
the North East, independents and branch plants) had 
seriously considered locating in another area. In Chapter 
4 (Tables 4.4A and 4.4B) it was shown that only 7% of new 
businesses were moves into Wales immediately prior to 
setting up and overall 90% of the founders initially set­ 
up their business in the same county of South Wales as 
they lived in immediately before start-up.
This evidence suggests a generally passive role of the 
location decision in the coordination process and indeed 
was not mentioned by any firm as being a problem in 
setting up (Table 6.1). Furthermore, it suggests that new 
firms location decisions are dominated by personal factors 
such as the place of birth or residence of the founder.
In order to shed more light on the location decisions of 
new ventures, founders were asked to describe the reasons 
for choosing their initial general location (as distinct 
from site or premises). Almost a quarter of new firms 
(23%) began in the house of their founders 1 . Of these, 
there were generally two groups:
(a) Those starting at home for convenience, e.g. looking 
after a child, or the nature of the work did not 
require specific premises, i.e. mobile marine crane 
repair contractor.
This is similar to the results of Mason (1982, p.29) 
for South Hampshire and Bannock (1981, p.40).
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(b) Those who argued that using their own home was a way 
of starting with minimum financial risk 1 .
The second group outweighs the other in terms of numbers 
of mentions, but members of both groups also mentioned 
local contacts as being important. The largest single 
group of mentions was typified by the statement - "This is 
my home patch - where I live". 27% of all mentions were 
of this sort, but almost invariably this was related to 
the fact that their home 'patch' gave them access to 
superior personal contacts ana the identification of local 
markets (both suppliers and customers) was made easier 
than a less well known location. Therefore, since many of 
these personal factors, such as the apparent critical 
importance of where the founder actually lives, are also 
strongly related to the proposed new venture especially in 
the cost of obtaining information on suppliers and 
customers. Then the apparent contradiction of 
neoclassical models of location by this evidence may be 
more apparent than real (Devine, et al 1979, p.461), also 
Greenhut (1967) and Machlup (1946).
15.9% of reasons for start-up locations were specifically 
related to being near to markets (not including those in 
previous sections) and a further 7.9% mentioned transport 
accessibility. 5 of the 52 firms responding claimed that 
a lack of competition in the locality was a factor in 
their choice of location, but since this was also in their 
home area it is doubtful that these firms would have 
identified this lack of competition if they had not lived 
in the locality. The 'other' reasons group includes such 
factors as disablement and immediate availability of 
premises in the locality.
Regional Incentives and the Location Decision
Considering that almost all of the area covered by the 
survey has assisted area status (and therefore Regional 
Selective Assistance and Regional Development Grants are 
available), it is significant that only two of the firms
One of these claimed to be the market leader in a new 
business initiative service with no competition in the 
U.K., but as such it was a risky and 'untried field'.
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mentioned grants as a factor in their final decision on 
location (and one of these only located there not to take 
advantage of the incentives themselves, but to be close to 
other firms (clients) who were nearby in the Swansea 
Enterprise Zone).
It seems therefore, that regional policy has had little or 
no effect on the location decisions of new indigenous 
firms. Perhaps even more alarming is that even at the 
time ot interview 49% of the founders interviewed either 
did not know whether they were sited in an assisted area 
(and therefore probably eligible for assistance) or stated 
that they knew, but were actually incorrect. Clearly, 
considerably more than halt of these were unaware of their 
assisted area status at the time of start-up.
The question of assisted areas was then put to the 
founders in a more direct way - "Did you take into account 
assisted areas and their incentives in your location 
decision?" 94% said No. The 3 firms (6%), who claimed to 
include regional incentives in determining their start-up 
location were all founded by graduates and two of these 
required over £50,000 initial capital. It is interesting 
to see the factors that influenced the location of these 
three firms:-
Firm A: Chemical manufacturer - needed to be near main 
customer (BSC Port Talbot). The high start-up 
capital required meant that regional investment 
incentives were important. However, planning 
permission in suitable locations was not given. 
Nearest suitable premises to main customer was in 
an intermediate area.
Firm B: Manufacturer of kitchen units - used Regional 
Development Grants at start-up in workshop units 
at Llanelli. However, this was not mentioned as 
a reason for location to this site. The main 
reason being the central location between its 
main market of Swansea and Carmarthen.
Firm C: Metal parts manufacturer - specifically mentioned 
grants as a major influence on the location. 
Even this firm located immediately adjacent to 
its main customer and regarded road transport 
links as important (2 miles off M4). Firm
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founded with £66,000 start-up capital, with about 
40% of this directly coining from the location in 
an assisted area - assistance which was built 
into cash flow estimates at start-up. £15,000 in 
the form of a European Investment Loan, £10,000 
in Selective Financial Assistance and a further 
£2,000 in Regional Development Grants.
More significant problems encountered in the coordination 
process are those related to premises rather than general 
location decisions. This may be because -
"Firms do not necessarily, or even usually, 
recognise that the locaton aspect is important".
Hamilton in Devine et al (1979, p.461).
But significant problems do occur in the search for 
premises, Lloyd (et al 1983), for example, found that 70% 
of firms which required a search for premises in the 
South East reported that they had encountered 
difficulties.
Once the 'decision' to locate in South Wales is made the 
firm has to find a particular site or premises within the 
locality. In Table 6.1 it was shown that only 8% of 
general problems encountered by founders at start-up were 
specifically related to premises, although this problem 
generally seemed to be a major obstacle among these firms. 
Less than half of all the founders in the sample actually 
searched for alternative sites to the one they eventually 
set up in. Seemingly the very limited search procedures 
undertaken are inconsistent with neoclassical location 
theory. However, if the costs of search are high it could 
explain this observed search behaviour and still be 
consistent with profit maximisation. Table 6.3 describes 
the liklihood of founders searching for alternative 
premises at the start-up stage according to the floorspace 
requirements. It can be seen that the smaller the size of 
the premises required, the less searching (in terms of 
numbers of firms, not length of time) for sites is 
undertaken. Only a third of founders initially starting 
in premises of 500 sq.ft. or less actually bothered 
looking for alternative sites to the one they eventually 
set-up at, compared to the 7O% of founders who required 
premises of over 2500 sq.ft. This lends weight to the 
argument that firms take into account search costs in
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their location decision. For example, if these costs are 
not related to the size of the premises required and yet 
the potential benefits of search is proportioned to the 
size of premises, then it would be expected that the 
smaller the floorspace required the less search activity 
that would take place and vice versa 1 .
Most founders who did actually engage in a search tor 
sites also did cost comparisons between sites (about 42% 
claimed to have done this). However, the general feeling 
was that only the upfront costs of rent and rates were 
included in these cost comparisons. Interestingly, only 
40% of firms starting with premises of over 2500 sq.ft. 
actually did cost comparisons despite 70% of them looking 
for alternative sites, this is probably due to both the 
•suitability and availability' of premises for these sizes 
of businesses generally being more important than 
differences in cost.
Apart from finding premises and finance there are many 
other less emotive activities of coordination that have to 
be undertaken: suppliers found; methods of distribution 
arranged; products marketed and other information 
gathered. Some points to emerge:-
Many new firms are very highly dependent on a single 
supplier of raw materials. The contacts to obtain 
supplies were dominantly derived from the immediate 
locality and a number of firms obtained raw materials, 
initially from wholesalers to the general public, 
rather than negotiate 'better 1 terms with suppliers 
themselves. Around 40% of the supplies at start-up 
were, therefore, obtained from their single largest 
supplier 2 in fact as many as 9 out of the 57 firms in 
this survey were dependent on their single largest 
supplier for over 80% of raw materials purchased.
1 The average floorspace of the new firms in this sample 
is 1911 sq.ft. and is very close to that reported by 
Lloyd and Mason (1^83) for new firms in the South East.
2 This 40% represents a simple average proportion and is 
not weighed according to the level of purchasing power 
in each firm.
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2. A major activity at this stage for the founder is 'on 
the front line 1 - he must sell his product. 93% of 
founders had no other means of selling their products 
or service than doing it themselves. Of the remaining 
4 companies, two were basically marketed by the 
franchise agencies they were involved with and the 
other two, (limited companies) had a manager 
specifically in charge of sales. It is interesting, 
therefore, that at start-up none of the founders had 
outside agents in the local area, let alone in other 
parts of the country (or abroad).
3. Distribution was entirely by road transport (none of 
the firms using rail at start-up). The majority of 
firms had invested in their own transport with only 3 
hiring or leasing vehicles. While many of these 
vehicles may have been secondhand it is probable that 
initial start-up investment could have been lowered if 
founders had been able to obtain lease or hire 
purchase agreements. Moreover, the 'own transport' 
method of distribution implies that delivery may be an 
important founder activity and possibly allows less 
time for production administration or marketing 
efforts. (The average working week for founders 
immediately at start-up is 62 hours).
4. Confirming the importance of information coordination 
at the start-up stage, as many as 41% of founders 
claimed to have attended business courses of some kind 
or another before actually setting up. (At the time 
of interview about a quarter of founders had attended 
a course after launching their venture). Much 
academic work on small business courses tend to be 
involved with rather high level initiatives such as 
Action Learning (Boddy and Lewis 1983), or graduate 
business schools in the U.S.A. However, the majority 
of founders of new firms in this sample attended 
courses of small workshops, possibly run by local 
enterprise agencies and usually only one-off, one day 
courses.
The aspects of coordination that are involved in the 
start-up process all take time. A properly prepared 
business plan may take between 2UU-30U manhours - 
representing several months work (Timmons, 19BU, p.Ufa). 
Securing premises and finance, finding and negotiating
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with suppliers and generally searching tor and 
assimilating information, all this means that the majority 
of tirms are started up only after a number of months in 
planning.
Founders were asked how long it took them from the time 
they had actually decided to go ahead with the venture 
until it first started trading. The results are shown in 
Table 6.4. Almost 70% of all founders had a start-up 
coordination process which took at least 3 months, almost 
a fifth of new firms had taken over 9 months to set up. 
The average time taken at this stage was just over b 
months and 1 week.
It is also apparent that the length of the time required 
to coordinate start-up decisions, information and 
resources is sensitive to the legal status of the new 
venture. On average those tirms being incorporated at the 
outset took longer to set-up than the others, with 2/3rds. 
of limited companies and cooperatives having formative 
periods in excess of 6 months. The coordination period 
does not seem to be proportional to the number of founders 
involved in each start-up, e.g. over halt of the 15 
partnerships were started in less than 2 months compared 
to 28.6% of sole traders, suggesting that the activities 
of the coordination process are being shared among the 
partners and thereby reducing the time taken to start-up, 
however, this is not in evidence for longer start-up 
periods.
Other aspects of coordination are discussed in the 
following chapter where the markets, competition and 
investment of new firms are considered, along with the 
policies and goals of new firm founders. Furthermore, the 
crucial role that information plays in the start-up 
process will be highlighted in Chapter 9 when discussing 
the role and performance of support agencies.
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Table 6 .4 TIME TAKEN TO START-UP BUSINESSES - BY LEGAL TYPE
(Number of Cases)
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ENTRY INVESTMENT AND PRICING
This chapter aims to identify the decisions which 
entrepreneurs have to make at the start-up stage. These 
decisions will be analysed in three groups:- (a) 
investment; (b) the entry; and (c) pricing. For each of 
these, survey data will be presented and briefly discussed 
in the context of relevant microeconomic theories.
By their very nature, these three groups are significantly 
interdependent, for example, the reaction of competitors 
to the new entrant will be related to the pricing methods 
or policies adopted by the entrant, price itself is likely 
to be effected by the level of output and therefore, 
initial investment required, furthermore, the expected 
price and investment decisions of new firms will 
presumably effect existing firms behaviour with regard to 
entry barriers (limit pricing) and especially with regard 
to perceptions by the potential entrants.
Investment: The Start-Up Scale Decision
Assuming a founder has decided what type of business he 
would like to begin, what are the factors involved in 
deciding the scale of entry? The problems of scale 
decisions are normally subsumed within theories of 
investment and are dependent on the various ways in which 
firms actually calculate project viability (if at all) and 
the goals which dominate their behaviour.
Although almost two-thirds of the founders actually 
prepared cash flow forecasts prior to start up, only a few 
used them to do any kind of formal method of investment 
appraisal. The bottom line of the majority of cash plans 
were looked at as actual figures and tended to be compared 
with living expenses rather than rates of return or length 
of payback periods 1 .
1 In this respect, the new firms in this sample are 
substantially less sophisticated in calculating 
investment viability than existing small firms in 
general. Hankinson (1976) found that 88% of firms (of 
less than 25 employees) used either payback or rate of 
return - only 12% used no method at all.
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Table 7.1 details the factors involved in the initial 
scale decision . Clearly a major constraint on the size 
of start-up is the availability of finance (with no 
mention of the cost of that finance in this case) and this 
has implications for the importance of the overall 
financial screening process as a barrier to entry (next 
section). In particular, the availability of finance 
concentrated on the willingness of banks to lend. In 
contrast only 4 (7%) of the sample firms were constrained 
at start-up by initial market size. Two firms were 
actually founded at a size which was specifically geared 
to meet contracts which they had already obtained before 
starting up.
The most significant group of factors in the scale 
decision, however, are those related to the personal risk 
acceptance of the founders, receiving 40.4% of responses. 
The main constraint, therefore, on the initial size of the 
venture is the extent to which founders will accept risk2 . 
In order to reduce the risk to which they would have to be 
exposed, founders plan to start at a size which would 
enable them to test the viability of the enterprise and to 
see if the venture could actually support themselves and 
their families. Three of the 23 firms in this group 
claimed that the size of start-up was determined by the 
amount of financial liability they would have to accept if 
the venture failed. ("A failure I could afford").
At least in principle the importance of risk aversion 
suggested in this sample confirms the approaches adopted 
by Knight (1921) and later by Kihlstrom and Laffont, 
(1979) however, risk implies that there are given and 
known probabilities of different future outcomes and yet, 
uncertainty implies that even these probabilities are not 
known. It can be argued that those founders who were 
testing for the feasibility of their venture by starting
Founders were asked how they decided on the scale at 
which they eventually set up.
It was shown in Chapter 6 that a number of firms were 























































































































































on a small scale were trying to assess likely 
probability distribution, however, to the extent that most 
investment projects are non-divisable, probability ceases 
to have any operational meaning 1 .
The approach adopted by Shackle (1971) seems to have 
particular relevance to new firm investment decisions in 
both theory and in evidence presented here. Shackle 
proposed that the investor's proper task was to find - the 
best whose corresponding worst is not too high a price to 
pay. (Such a concept could be analysed by potential 
surprise functions). The arguments proposed by Shackle in 
favour of such an approach stress the uniqueness of most 
investment projects and indeed, the uniqueness of most 
start-ups, their non-divisable nature and the non- 
observability of outcomes on which to base forecasts. 
Clearly, firms new to particular markets and with new 
organisation are likely to be extreme forms of these 
arguments.
While the exact mechanisms proposed by Shackle's non- 
probablistic view of the investment decision cannot be
verified (and indeed have found little application ino 
microeconomic theory so far ), the basic argument that the
decision-maker asks himself - what is the largest 
tolerable loss he can maintain (and then using this 
constraint goes on to analyse various outcomes) is largely 
supported by Table 7.1. Founders tend to enter markets 
hesitantly with the overriding importance of the "what if 
I fail attitude".
Reaction Barriers to Entry
Bain (1956) identified three types of barriers to new 
competition, these were:
1. The existence of absolute cost advantages
2. Product differentiation
3. Economies of scale
1 See K. Borch (1968) - The Economics ot Uncertainty, 
Princeton 1968.
2 See Hay and Morris (1979, p.411) Footnote.
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The resulting impact of these barriers allows existing 
firms to charge a price which was above that at which 
would prevail under perfect competition, i.e. above long- 
run average costs. However, the incentive to deter entry 
into their market would ensure that existing producers 
would charge a 'limiting price' and therefore this 'limit 
price 1 and more generally the attitude of incumbent firms 
to potential entry becomes a fourth barrier to entry.
Despite the voluminous literature on the subject of entry 
barriers and widespread empirical work, most of the 
studies have focused on the industry's structure (and 
entry structure) and profitability rather than entry 
behaviour as such .
Cross (1981) however, provided empirical support tor 
certain barriers to entry. He found that the cost of set­ 
up in an industry was significantly and negatively related 
to rates of entry 2 . This backs up earlier work by Orr 
(1974) in Canada who found that capital requirements acted 
as high barriers to entry. However, Whittington (1983) 
was unable to find any relationship between barriers to 
entry and geographical differences in new firm formation 
rates.
An alternative approach to the study of entry barriers was 
used by Yip (1982) who noted that there had been two 
stages in the development of entry barrier theory. The 
first stage was Bain's formulation of the concept in 
relation to new-born firms (i.e. the establishment of a 
new firm with new productive capacity). The second stage 
included existing firms as potential entrants. Yip 
proposed a third stage which allowed for heterogeneity in
See Yip (1982, pp.35-37) - "Theories of barriers 
should be confined to the proximate issue of entry 
behaviour rather than the second order issue of 
profitability".
Cross (1981, pp.165-168) also found a significant 
relationship between plant dominance and entry rates, 
suggesting that a high minimum efficient scale of 
production was an important entry barrier.
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both products and strategics - his approach was to 
provide direct questionnaire data on the entrants. The 
approach adopted here is similar in that it belongs to 
this third stage (business policy orientated), but differs 
in two aspects:-
1. Yip's adoption of a corporate strategy perspective 
required him to rely entirely on entrants being 
existing firms, therefore, entry was either direct 
cross entry or by means of acquisition.
2. The behaviour of the entrants was recorded by sampling 
the incumbent (existing) firms rather than the 
entrants themselves.
The present survey samples wholly new enterprises and so 
data is obtained from the perspective of the entrant 
himself 1 . Specifically, new firm founders were asked four 
questions:-
1. Were you aware of any significant obstacles to your 
setting up in this industry as a result of existing 
firms products, prices, policies, etcV
2. Did existing firms react noticably to your entry?
3. If they did react, in what way?
4. Did you expect (before setting up), existing firms to 
react in any way?
The results are shown in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4.
It is important to note that the results shown here are 
based on entrants perceptions of barriers to entry and 
reactions of incumbants, however, while perceptions can be 
argued to be more relevant than amassing statistical data
A review of published literature was unable to locate 
any other study which provides direct information on 
both barriers to entry, investment and pricing policy 
of new firms themselves.
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Table 7.2 PERCEIVED EXISTENCE OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND COMPETITORS
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Table 7.4 PERCEIVED EXISTENCE OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND COMPETITORS REACTION
ANALYSIS BY SIZE OF START-UP
Number of Cases
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on barriers, the limitations of interview techniques 
particularly in documenting people's perceptions must be 
borne in mind 1 . One final point of clarification is that 
barriers to entry should be strictly those barriers or 
disadvantages that the entrant has against existing firms, 
in principle therefore, these barriers are separate from 
any disadvantage size may have treated on its own. As 
such the main purpose of this section is to identity the 
importance of competitors reactions as a barrier to entry.
Slightly over a third (3b%) of respondents claimed that 
they had been aware (pre-entry) of significant problems to 
entry which were the result of the behaviour of existing 
firms in their eventual market of entry2 .
Of course the height of entry barriers is strongly related 
to the various market structures and indeed the perceived 
importance of reaction barriers is industry specific (see 
Table 7.2). Only one founder in the 7 wood/furniture 
manufacturing industry claimed to be aware of such 
obstacles, in contrast to the 57% who identified entry 
problems (specifically related to existing firms 
behaviour) in the business services sector. More 
generally the final goods markets, particularly in the 
'other' services sector were significantly less aware of 
obstacles than intermediate markets.
The definitions of 'significant obstacles' and 
'noticable reactions' were left to individual founders 
to define (no guidelines were given), despite this it 
was thought that the responses were a general 
indication of 'significant' barriers to entry.
This does not mean of course that only a third of new 
entrants had encountered (but by definition overcome) 
'barriers to entry 1 because a number of problems in 
setting up the business may have directly reflected 
specific barriers to entry, particularly the 
availability of finance (see latter).
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Bain (1956) classified the cases of entry barriers into 4
*• * »V%^N ft -^ • __types :-
1. Easy entry
2. Ineffectively impeded entry
3. Effectively impeded entry
4. Blockaded entry
By definition, however, the perceptions of entry barriers 
detailed in this survey cover only the first two cases and 
yet the other cases, also, although not sampled, crucially 
rely on perceptions of barriers to new firm formation.
In effect there are two barriers to entry which derived 
from the behaviour of existing firms. The first is the 
behaviour of firms in terms of pricing, product 
proliferation and marketing in general under the threat of 
entry. The second is the perceived behaviour or reaction 
of incumbent once entry has taken piace^.
In fact different assumptions about what the entrant 
expects to happen if he enters the market leaas to very 
different outcomes.
In Bain's model for example 3 four cases can be identified:
1. Entrant expects incumbants to keep their prices at the 
pre entry level.
2. Entrant expects incumbants to keep their output 
constant.
3. Entrant expects incumbants to partly decrease output 
and partly to allow prices to fall.
1 See also Hay and Morris (1979) Ch.9.
2 The perceptions of the entrant or prospective entrant 
are the important concerns here.
3 See Koutsoyannis (1975) pp.296-3UU.
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4. Entrant expects established firms to increase output 
(forcing price below L.A.C.)
The first two cases basically are dependent on an expected 
passive reaction of the incumbent, the entrant would not 
expect a reaction from existing firms. The last case is 
one where a specific reaction is expected by the founder 
and case 3 is an intermediate position. In order to 
provide some indication of the perceived importance of 
expected incumbents reactions as barriers to new firm 
formation. Table 7.2 shows the number of new firms who had 
expected (before start-up) a reaction from competitors 
when they entered the market for the first time. 
Furthermore, since reaction patterns are likely to be 
industry specific, the ctata is presented at the industry 
level.
The results show that 47% of respondents 1 had expected a 
reaction of some noticable kind from existing firms, 
suggesting that about half of the sample could be 
represented by either of the first two cases, i.e. Sylos 
or Bertrand postulate) and the other half were represented 
by cases 3 or 4.
20% of founders in metal manufacturing industries had 
expected a reaction from competition (yet bu% actually 
experienced a competitive reaction after start-up), 
whereas as many as 83% of new firm founders in the 'other 
services' sector had expected some form of incumbant 
reaction.
The actual, as opposed to expected reaction, was only 
slightly underestimated by certain founders with 57% of 
new firms noticing a significant reaction of incumbant 
companies (compared to 47% expecting a reaction). The 
only survey available with which to make comparisons is 
that undertaken by Yip (19fa2, pp.118-119). He found that 
the response to entrants by existing firms was 'virtually
Data was obtained on only 34 cases for the question. 
Expectations of specific expected reactions were not 
required in interviews.
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non-existent* being around 10 to 20% of firms responding 
competitively. Yip argues, therefore, that extensive 
reaction in the light of entry is not well supported by 
his evidence .
The considerable differences in the importance of 
incumbant reaction patterns between the present survey and 
that of Yip can probably be accounted for by the 
differences in entrant samples since Yip's data was for 
entry by existing firms (either direct or by acquisition).
The evidence based on these two surveys suggests that the 
reaction pattern is virtually non-existent for acquisition 
entry, generally low for direct cross entry and 
considerably more significant for wholly new independent 
firms (as in Bain's original case) than for existing 
firms. In other words reaction barriers to entry are 
generally higher for new independent firms than other 
modes of entry.
Table 7.4 analyses the perceptions of the founders and 
competitors reactions according to the size of initial 
start-up measured by both capital employment and labour 
involved.
There appears to be no strong relationship between 
awareness of obstacles to entry and eventual size of 
entry. A relationship between size and expectations of 
incumbant reactions is, however, noticable with only a 
third of all sole traders (and no other employees) 
expecting a reaction compared to all firms starting with 3 
or more employees (and just over half with 2 people 
employed). As the initial scale of start-up increases, 
therefore, barriers to entry as a result of expected 
incumbants reaction increase.
Actual reactions of existing firms were closely related to 
initial size and overall, tended to be closely 
approximated by expectations of reactions. Interestingly, 
founders starting with £l,oOO or less capital tended to 
overestimate incumbant reactions at start and those with
Yip was unable to obtain data on the perceptions of 
incumbants reactions by the entrants themselves.
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over £10,000 launch capital tended to slightly 
underestimate the level of reaction likely.
The most important single reaction of existing firms was 
to cut their prices (mentioned by over a quarter of the 
firms which reported competitive reactions). Other 
aspects of the marketing mix were used against a number of 
entrants with founders reporting an increase in the 
competitors advertising and offering better terms such as 
support servicing in 17% of cases. Such reaction patterns 
are those predicted by standard barrier theory, however, 
around 40% of the reported reactions to entry were largely 
miscellaneous with previous employers threats against the 
new founders, threats of court actions and even physical 
violence and slander from existing firms. In addition to 
this, almost 1 in 5 founders reported that their 
competitors were putting pressure on mutual suppliers to 
offer less advantageous terms to the new entrant. This 
supplier pressure was only evident in final goods 
industries and seems to be an important technique of 
limiting entrants behaviour in these cases. However, it 
is doubtful whether this type of reaction would have been 
forseen by potential entrants and so is unlikely to be 
reflected in the height of reaction barriers to entry, 
even in the final goods sector.
Barriers to Entry and the Screening Process
Whatever the cause of barriers to entry into particular 
markets the basic mechanism by which these barriers are 
assessed (as a whole) is the financial screening process . 
Proposals for funding made to third party financial 
institutions (usually one of the clearing banks) are 
accompanied with discussion on the feasibility of the 
project in general, based on the assimilation of
1 The financial screening process was discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5. The two fundamental screening 
processes are of course: (a) the personal assessment 
screen and (b) the third party assessment screen. We 
concentrate on the latter particularly financial 
screening since over 2/3rds of new firms actually went 
through this process. However, a practical discussion 
of self assessment criteria can be found in Stancill 
(1981) .
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information on individual characteristics, potential 
markets, types of product, competition (including 
competitors reactions), advantages and disadvantages of 
new firms compared to existing firms and products 
culminating in the cash flow and profit and loss accounts. 
That is all the various barriers to entry are assessed by 
the financial screening process and therefore this stage 
becomes the effective mechanism by which barriers to entry 
are formulated and evaluated in the last resort (see 
Figure 7.1 .)
The important point to make is that these barriers (what 
may be called primary barriers) are then effectively 
weighted according to the importance attached to each of 
the criteria adopted by the screening process itself. In 
other words further research on entry barriers to new 
competition might beneficially aim to study the screening 
filter as such and to identify how the various primary 
barriers are modified, assessed or weighted according to 
this process which itself becomes a secondary barrier to 
entry.
Consider the case where the primary barrier to entry is 
mainly due to start-up costs. If these barriers are high 
(as opposed to low) then one may expect a lower rate of 
entry, this however, may be due to either:-
a) The nature of the financial screen is uniform 
(according to the importance of criteria assessed) 
over all sizes of funding required, then lower rates 
of start-up will be observed since a higher proportion 
of founders will require to obtain outside funding 
(and therefore, risk being turned down).
b) The nature of the financial screening process is not 
neutral over all sizes of funding required, 
specifically that the criteria becomes more stringent 
as larger sums are required, therefore, the rate of 
acceptance and eventual entry (due to this secondary 
barrier) will be reduced.
In practice actual barriers are likely to fall somewhere 
between these two cases and therefore, becomes necessary 
to analyse the relatonship between the screening process 
and primary barriers to entry. Such analysis could be the 
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TWO further points to emerge about barriers to entry are:-
It will be shown that a significant number of founders 
regard their entry as basically a differentiated 
product from their competitors. This suggests that an 
analysis of barriers to entry should include 
strategies in spatial competition (e.g. Hay, 1976). 
Probably more appropriate however, is the distinction 
made by Caves and Porter between fringe and core 
groups within markets. In this view it will be easier 
to enter fringe markets than the core, typically the 
fringe is composed of small specialist producers. 
This frequent entry of minor competitors does not 
indicate low barriers for firms wishing to become 
major competitors (in the core), (Yip iyb2, Chapter 
2). Caves and Porter suggest that new firms tend to 
enter the competitive fringe of markets, whereas 
existing firms tend to enter the oligopolistic core.
This view is supported by the evidence of this survey, 
since it could be argued that almost all of the new 
indpendent firms sampled had entered a type of fringe 
group in their various markets.
Table 7.3 shows the perceived existence of barriers to 
entry and competitors reactions for the 15 firms who 
specifically entered the market by undercutting their 
competitors prices. A lower proportion of founders 
adopting this aggressive stance were actually aware of 
obstacles to their entry due to existing firms pricing 
policies than for the sample as a whole. While it is 
also noticable that few of these firms actually 
expected a reaction from their competitors, it is 
most surprising to find that this group experienced 
less incumbant reaction than for those entrants 
pursuing less aggressive policies. The explanation of 
this apparent paradox probably lies in the extent to 
which product differentiation plays a part in pricing 
decisions at start-up. It is to these pricing 
practices that we now turn.
7.16
The Pricing Decisions of New Firms
An extensive search of the literature has revealed that 
one of the least researched aspects of new firms is the 
methods of pricing used in practice. This is most 
surprising for at least two major reasons:-
1. The extensive literature on the theory of limit 
pricing and potential competition in general is 
concerned with the interdependence of the new entrant 
with the existing firms in the industry. 
Specifically, certain reactions are postulated, the 
extremes of these are, of course, the Sylos postulate, 
where the entrant expects the established firms will 
continue to produce the same level of output after his 
entry and the Bertrand postulate where the rival will 
keep his price constant irrespective of his own 
pricing decisions.
Both of these mean that the pricing decisions of new 
firms when they first enter the market are of vital 
importance to the pricing policies adopted by existing 
firms in various market structures. Despite the 
importance to theory it seems that there have been no 
studies of how new firms actually price their products 
on entry into a particular market.
2. Although not directly mentioned by new firms as a 
specific problem, particular neglect of pricing and 
pricing methods can be the very root of evils which 
are observed or mentioned. For example, Jackson et al 
(1979) quotes a study of small businesses in New ^ork 
State which found that business areas which are 
determined by the entrepreneur himself tend to receive 
only a residual attention, whereas those problems 
which could be argued to be externally imposed 
consumed most of the attention of the businessmen in 
the sample. In the present survey Table 6.1 (Chapter 
6) shows that almost 40% of the problems encountered 
by new firms were directly market or finance related, 
but a significant proportion of these could have their 
root cause in inappropriate pricing policies adopted.
The neglect of pricing policies by the literature is not 
confined to the 'special case' of the new firm, but is 
also apparent in the literature of small firms in general.
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In the U.S. in 1979, Jackson, Hawes and Hertel undertook 
an extensive search of literature on the subject of 
pricing in small businesses and concluded that:-
"The literature on small business pricing and 
advertising practices is nearly non existent", 
(p.22)
They quote a survey carried out by Haynes on the pricing 
practices of 88 medium sized firms in Kentucky in the 
early 60's, but continue -
"The present authors were unable to locate any 
other reported study of small business pricing 
practice in the literature". (p.23)
Confirming this view it is noticable that the Bolton 
Committee (1971) made no reference to the potentially 
important role of pricing policies and problems in small 
firms.
Oxenfeldt (I960) points out that - "a significant gap 
exists between pricing theory and pricing application". 
Furthermore, this gap is likely to be larger for the vast 
majority of firms (small) than for the large firms pricing 
policy which has been the subject of considerable 
theoretical study. Taking this one step further the 
pricing of new firms products both in theory and practice 
is a significant gap in the literature and an area which 
can potentially have implications for existing industrial 
pricing theory, for limit pricing theory, for entry 
mechanisms and for the role and significance of new firms 
to local, regional and national development. Before 
these are discussed in more detail it is necessary to 
briefly review some of the most important theories of 
pricing behaviour for firms in general.
Pricing - A Brief Review
There is no widely accepted view on how firms actually 
make their pricing decisions. The price of a product is 
generally to be taken as only one element of the 
'marketing mix 1 and combined with the large number of 
possible situations in which pricing decisions have to be
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made , it is possible that for some purposes at least it 
is not necessarily useful to generalise about pricing 
procedures^.
However, the role of pricing has been central to 
microeconomic analysis since Adam Smith exposed the 
'Invisible Hand'. The neoclassical economic theory from 
the profit maximising assumption and the continuous 
functions of cost and revenues allow the techniques of 
differential calculus to be used to derive a firm's 
price/output levels. Marginalism was capable of being 
applied even in extremes of market structure and the early 
structure - conduct - performance paradigms were derived 
from comparing idealised monopoly with perfect 
competition.
Marginalism implies that profit maximising firms would 
calculate the marginal cost of output at different levels 
and set it equal to the marginal revenue obtained at each 
unit of output. If firms did not hit on the right 
combination of price and output then it was assumed that a 
process of iteration would occur - iteration itself being 
the practical method of incremental or marginal costing by 
which profit maximisation could be obtained.
The development of models to explain the instances of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures 
introduced the idea of interdependence to varying degrees. 
Despite this considerable complication the basic 
incremental approach to price or output decisions was 
still assumed to be the dominant underlying mechanism.
The publication in 1939 of a study of interviews with 38 
businessmen by Hall and Hitch began what is now known as 
the 'marginalist controversy'. Their study showed that 
firms were not using the marginalist principle (MC = MR) 
and therefore did not attempt to maximise short run
A.M. Alfred - Comparing Pricing Policy, JournaJL o^ 
Industrial Economics, No.l, November 1972.
D. Hay & D, Morris - lndu£tri.al Economi.cs Theory and 
Evidence'(1978), p.13.
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profits. 30 of the 38 businessmen arrived at a price by 
calculating (or guessing!) unit costs and adding to tnese 
a profit margin which was - (a) desired; (b) normal, or 
(c) conventional. This was the average cost pricing 
principle.
Two basic reasons for average cost pricing methods were 
suggested:
(a) firms having very little idea of their demand curve 
and so are unable to identify marginal revenue 
schedules and even marginal costs are not easily 
identifiable 1 , so that the basic lack of information 
on both sides prevents the application of the 
marginalist principle.
(b) firms (at least in interviews) reported that the cost 
plus price is a 'fair' price.
A review of the empirical evidence on pricing is provided 
by Hay and Morris (1978) who quote studies by Fog (19bU), 
Fitzpatrick (1964) and Skinner (1970), all of which had 
the same general conclusions to the Hall and Hitch survey. 
While the dominant method of pricing does seem to be that 
based on average cost, the interpretation of this for 
marginalism is to say the least ambiguous.
The next significant development was the recognition of 
potential competition - something neglected in the 
neoclassical theory of the firm. The theory of limit 
pricing of Bain, Sylos Labini, Modigliani and others 
effectively predict that in certain cases price (which 
Hall and Hitch reported to be the main preoccupation - not 
output) would be below the level where MR = MC in order to 
make entry less attractive to potential competitors.
As Koutsoyannis (1975, p.274) notes, the average cost 
pricing has a strong link with entry preventing behaviour. 
Existing firms in the industry who intend to stick (rather 
than snatch) will ensure that abnormal profits are
Sizer (1966) reviewing the accountants contribution to 
pricing decisions notes that the 'run of the mill' 
accountant provides cost data more relevant to full 
cost than marginal costs.
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insufficient to attract new entrants, to do this they will 
be observed to be setting average cost close to price 
(average revenue) plus some margin which will include the 
traditional normal profit. According to Koutsoyannis price 
determination is made up of two distinct stages:-
1. Firm finds its 'desired' price level - a reasonable 
profit subjectively determined.
2. Firm compares this desired price with entry prevention 
price depending on the heighth of barriers to entry.
In order to derive a subjective estimate of price, it is 
necessary to standardise fixed costs at a budgeted level 
of output. Average fixed costs can then be calculated and 
these have to be included in the gross profit margin along 
with the firms desired net profit margin to cover risks 
and yield a fair investment to capital employed. The 
gross profit margin is then added to the average variable 
cost curve to obtain the desired price.
In the second stage of the decision, however, this desired 
price will be compared to the level at which the entry 
from potential competitors may occur. If barriers to 
entry are high a price allowing abnormal profits to be 
made may be charged. If, however, entry is relatively 
easy the gross profit margin would be cut from the desired 
price to a lower price. Koutsoyannis notes that - 
"the average cost pricing model apparently discards 
demand curves" (p.275), but it must be notea that the 
gross profit margin and therefore price (at the 
standardised output) will be competitively determined by 
potential new entrants.
It should be noted that the approaches to pricing methods, 
as described, have one thing in common - profit 
maximisation. Other developments in the theory of the 
firm set up very different objectives to that of profit 
maximisation. The behavioural models characterised by the 
Cyert and March model treat the pricing decision as a tool 
for obtaining certain goals and aspirations of members of 
the firm - while emphasising the satisficing of these 
goods (not maximising) - no exact predictions can be 
derived from these models.
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Most of the so called managerial theories of the firm also 
have little say on the pricing decision. Marris for 
example takes the price as given for his model and treats 
price as a parameter tor his model and not an actual 
policy variable of the firm (Koutsoyannis, p.357), the 
exception is Boumol's theory of revenue maximisation. 
Since price will be set at a level which maximises sales 
(or a constrained level of profit) and so will be set at a 
level where marginal revenue becomes zero and is therefore 
at a price below that found by firms pursuing profit 
maximisation.
The aims of the rest of this chapter are:-
1. To review the limited number of studies reported on 
pricing practices in small firms.
2. To present the findings of the present survey on 
pricing practices in wholly new independent firms:-
a) at start up
b) currently
3. To discuss whether any of the pricing models discussed 
above can be used to explain pricing policies of new 
firms.
Pricing and the Small Firm
Despite the proliferation of research into the small 
business sector in recent years, the published literature 
on small business pricing is very limited. Only 4 studies 
have been found relevant to pricing methods in small 
firms 1 .
The study by Haynes in the early 6U's for the U.S. was 
mainly tor medium sized rather than small firms. He 
found that cost plus was less rigidly applied than 
earlier studies had suggested and show some adaption 
to market condition over time. (pp.21-23 Jackson et 
al, 1979).
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Ford and Rowley (1979) undertook a survey of small U.K. 
industrial firms in order to examine the use of marketing 
concepts and ideas (from the marketing literature) by 
smaller companies. They state:-
"Pricing was less aggressive in owner managed companies 
(than professionally managed counterparts), with prices 
normally following costs, plus a reasonable profit margin, 
with some consideration to competitors pricing. There was 
little differentiation in pricing of different types of 
product sold or to different customer groups served ..... 
The professionally managed companies tended to be more 
flexible with margins varying according to each market 
situation and there was a general willingness to negotiate 
with each major customer, rather than apply a fixed 
pricing structure".
(ibid p.152)
Kinsey (1983) reported the findings of a survey into the 
marketing methods of 50 small manufacturing firms in 
Scotland and found that price tended to be based on a cost 
plus approach and that price was "considered one of the 
most important elements of the marketing mix". (ibid 
p.12).
With both these studies the study of pricing methods was 
only secondary to their main focus of attention and so 
their observations were not fully discussed and indeed, 
give very little detail to small firm pricing practice.
The aim of the third study by Jackson, Hawes and Hertel 
(1979) was specifically aimed at identifying how small 
business persons set their retail prices (and advertising 
practices). Their survey was based on 107 tourist 
oriented gift shops in the western part of the U.S. in the 
mid-1970's. They found that:-
1. 86% of retailers indicated that price changes by 
competitors did not affect their own price.
2. Of those retailers effected by competition prices, bO% 
indicated that their price changes were a retalitory 
price (defensive) cut.
7.23
3. 40% regarded their prices as being essentially the 
same as their competitors, 30% thought that they 
actually charged less than competitor retailers and 
only 1 in 10 had no idea what their competition was 
charging.
4. Supply or cost based approaches to pricing dominate 
the various methods used by small retailers (demand 
orientated pricing approaches were used by only about 
13 to 23% of the respondents).
5. Only a few firms used any form of objective assessment 
of their costs in order to calculate the cost plus 
price. Most of the cost based approaches were in fact 
rather arbitary. ibid p.28.
Jackson et al conclude that their survey confirms recent 
data in the widespread use of cost plus pricing and as 
many as 86% of firms followed "fairly rigid" patterns in 
pricing which de-emphasise demand based factors.
In order to derive a more comprehensive picture of the 
dynamics of the pricing process in new firms a distinction 
is made between the methods and practices adopted by the 
firm at the start-up stage itself and at the time of 
interview. In the former case founders were asked to 
describe their pricing practices when they first started 
trading. By the time of interview founders will have had 
considerably more experience in their relative markets and 
will have assimulated and probably reacted to the initial 
reactions of their clients to their early pricing (and 
marketing in general) policies. Comparisons of these two 
situations offer a unique opportunity to analyse the 
dynamics of pricing in small firms in their infancy.
Pricing and the New Firm
A survey of accounting procedures in recent Scottish 
start-ups, undertaken by Arnold McCulloch (1983) is the 
only one so far traced that provides data on pricing 
methods in new firms. His results can be summarised:-
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Source: Adapted from McCulloch (1^83, p.5 and p.lU).
Despite the very small sample this suggests that market 
based systems are more important in recent start-ups than 
those found by either Jackson et al for small retailers in 
the U.S. or Ford and Rowley for small U.K. manufacturers. 
The implication of this is that firms on start-up conform 
more closely to the market based pricing theories than 
they do after some experience in the market, i.e. become 
existing small firms. However, such conclusions cannot be 
made from this data, since the pricing methods reported by 
McCulloch were those currently being adopted by the firm 
and not the pricing methods practiced at start-up, in 
other words there does not appear to be any study of 
pricing 'policies' adopted by new firms when they first 
start trading.
The various base models of pricing decisions are derived 
largely from the different goals which are assumed to be 
the main objective of the firm. Before discussing actual 
pricing behaviour, therefore, it is necessary to review 
the stated objective of the firm founders at start-up.
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Table 7.6 lists the responses of firm founders 1 . At first 
sight it seems that the variety of goals - the market 
share goal, the profit goal and the importance of the 
satisfactory profit goal strongly support the behavioural 
theory of the firm developed by Cyert and March. However, 
only a small minority of firms mentioned more than one 
goal and apart from the profit goal the most important 
objective of these firms at start-up was not surprisingly 
- survival. (30% of mentions).
Apart from the possible difficulties of bias inherent in 
such a small sample, difficulties of interpretation may be 
even more significant. Hay and Morris argue that many 
responses to questions on objectives of firms tend to be 
almost public relations exercises - providing 'acceptable' 
answers . Indeed responses with words like 'maximisation' 
were minimal. Only two founders claimed to be pursuing 
profit maximising objectives, but overall the profit 
motive (to maximise or satisfice) was the most important 
single goal. B'inally, 20% of mentions were specifically 
that pricing policies were aimed at securing a certain 
market share.
How then do new firms actually price? Each founder was 
asked to explain in his own words how they set a price to 
their product or service when they first started trading. 
(The responses were categorised and the coding frames used 
can be seen in Appendix C). The results are produced in 
Tables 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9.
Taking the responses of the entire sample, Table 7.7 shows 
that the most widespread idea behind start-up pricing is 
what may be called 'benchmarking'. This is where founders 
specifically take competitors prices as a starting place 
or benchmark and then either decide to charge the same 
price or undercut that price. There were no instances of 
benchmarking and then charging a higher price. Taking
1 It must be emphasised that this question received a 
low response rate - only 25 out of the 57 firms seemed 
to understand the basis of the question. (Further 
prompting by the interviewer would have reduced the 
confidence of the results even more).
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PERCENTAGES ARE VERTICALLY PROVED
together the pricing methods which can be subsumed within 
•benchmarking 1 it can be seen that 44.4% of all mentions 
were of this type which means almost 60% of firms in this 
survey used this method.
Of firms benchmarking their prices the numbers actually 
aiming at undercutting competitors were slightly less than 
those who decided to charge the same price.
Bearing in mind the 'open' nature of the question it was 
most surprising to find that of the 23 firms that said 
they aimed at charging the same prices as their 
competitors, 19 also stressed that their product or 
service was better or different to their competitors 
anyway. This suggests a pricing model based on product 
differentiated characteristicss may be of relevance to 
start-up pricing practices.
Cost plus pricing does appear to be important to new 
firms; between a third and a half of all firms used some 
variant of the approach, but only 18.9% of mentions by 
founders used cost plus which did not relate to 
benchmarking, the remainder calculated their cost base but 
their margin was almost totally determined by their policy 
on undercutting or equalling competitors (sometimes 
distant competitors) prices. In general, it seems that 
the cost plus approach is significantly less important for 
pricing decisions of wholly new firms than either small 
firms in general (Jackson et al) or industry as a whole 
(C.F. Hall & Hitch, Fog, or Akin & Skinner, 1^76). 
Furthermore the mark up margin varied considerably - two 
firms who thought they had very little or no competition 
doubled their costs (P = Cost + 100%) to derive initial 
price while an engineer working from home at start-up 
charged only his costs with no mark up whatsoever.
Finally, 10% of mentions stated that their prices were 
generally set by a third party (such as a franchise or set 
by a supplier) and were not, therefore, a policy option at 
the start-up stage. The 'other 1 group is a catchall tor 
specific mentions such as a constant price guarantee, 
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Standard price theory predicts that prices will depend on 
the various forms of market structure, since it is not 
possible to classify these objectively, however, Table 
7.8 shows the initial pricing methods used by new firms 
classified by broad industry sector.
The practice of initial benchmark pricing dominates the 
'other manufacturing' sector, 55.8% of mentions compared 
to 39.3% in service sector and only 33.4% in metal 
manufacturing. This last figure is partly explained by 
the low element of product differentiation in the metal 
manufacturing sector as shown by only 3 firms claiming a 
different or better product to the competition. It is 
also noticeable that initial prices in the metal 
manufacturing sector have an important element of 'no 
policy' or crude guessing involved with them.
Alfred (1972) argues that consumer goods will require a 
different pricing procedure to industrial goods. The 
distinction made here is between final and intermediate 
goods (Table 7.9). There are no striking differences in 
both the practice of benchmarking makes up around 4U% of 
mentions. Although product differentiation is used 
relatively more as a basis for same pricing policies in 
final goods than intermediate products.
As Kinsey reported, price was considered to be the most 
important element in the marketing mix. Specifically, 
firms were asked to identify the nature of the comparative 
advantage they have (if at all) over the competition. 
Sixty percent of firms identified price, i.e. 31% of all 
mentions - multiple responses were permitted. Second in 
importance was the quality of the product (Table 7.10) 
with 16% claiming that additional customer service, 
including after sales, was an important source of 
competitive advantage. Again, the main sources of 
comparative advantage (and 52 of the 57 firms thought they 
had some form of advantage) were not correlated with the 
types of product or service. It is noticeable, however, 
that new firms producing final goods relied more heavily
Benchmarking includes: (a) undercutting competitors; 
(b) same price; and (c) same price but better product 
- different product. (See Tables 7.6 and 7.8).
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on location and delivery as sources of advantage than 
those producing intermediate goods. For this last group 
personal contacts were perceived to be a more important 
element of advantage 1 .
Theory and Evidence
The nearest the pricing literature comes to explaining the 
determination of price in wholly new firms is the 
literature on new product pricing. Of course, a new firm 
is not necessarily the same thing as a new product, but it 
is helpful to review some of the arguments put forward to 
explain the process of new product pricing.
Dean (1950) argues that the strategic decision in pricing 
a new product is the choice between -
(a) skimming: a policy of high initial prices that skim 
the cream of the demand
(b) penetration: policy of low prices from the outset in 
order to penetrate deeply into the market place.
Gabor (1977) following Dean, classifies new products 
according to their degree of substitutability. New 
products can be - (a) functionally identical; (b) 
functionally similar; and (c) functionally unique, (ibid 
p.212). Each of these cases would require a different 
approach to pricing.
Functionally unique products should generally have a 
skimming price with initial price being approached from 
above, however, the very nature of the unique product 
means that pricing must be largely based on intuition with 
no obvious benchmarks available. The only exception to 
this is where the new product results in an identifiable 
cost saving to customers. In such a case a sharing of the 
saving can be used to set ranges for the price of the 
unique product.
1 Based on this empirical work Appendix D provides a 
conceptualised model of new firm pricing in the 
representative new firm.
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Of the 57 firms surveyed only one could be classified as 
providing a functionally unique service. This company 
originated what it calls a business incentive scheme - 
essentially it coordinates and markets management perks 
for personnel departments of large companies (such as 
special holiday breaks for meeting production targets). 
There was no competition of this kind operating anywhere 
in the U.K. at the time of start-up. The actual pricing 
practice adopted was, however, in no sense of the word a 
skimming price, the price was not in fact set by a typical 
cost plus method with a mark up of 25%. When asked how 
they charged their prices at the time of interview, the 
founders admitted that the prices charged at start were 
significantly lower than they could have charged with 
hindsight (even to the point where customers were 
suspicious about their low prices). The margin has risen 
so much that prices charged have risen over 50%, a real 
increase of 35% in less than two years. At the time of 
interview this firm knew of at least two (London) 
competitors offering the same service. Obviously their 
low price, while not deliberately set to prevent 
competitors entry and could not be regarded as a 
penetration price, did not do so anyway and it seems they 
have lost much of their scope for skimming demand.
The price of both the functionally identical and similar 
products will be more or less determined by the price 
structure ruling in its market and most call for a 
penetration pricing policy. Gabor notes that - "the 
proper process with a new brand (of this kind) is to 
choose the price first and derive from it the appropriate 
limit for cost of production", (Gabor, 1977, p.227), i.e. 
cost plays only a limited role in new product pricing.
Of the 57 firms in the survey only 4 could be classified 
as functionally similar. These were a computer generated 
cartoon designer; a fibreglass modular building 
manufacturer; a Welsh crafts brass rubbing designer and a 
manufacturer of mini-commercial auto cleaners. In view of 
the nature of these products it is surprising that the 
cost plus method predominated despite having few near 
competitors, only one charges a significant premium.
The remaining 52 firms products could not, however, be 
classified as, of the functionally identical class. The 
vast majority of them not being new products or services,
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but may be differentiated from the competition by quality, 
service or price. Clearly then, the literature on new 
product pricing can only have bearing on a limited number 
of new firms and does not appear to explain actual 
practices even in these cases - another example of the 
•significant gap' between pricing theory and pricing 
application (Oxenfeldt).
Development of Pricing Practices in Small Firms
Dean (1950) suggests that new product pricing should be 
adjusted throughout the life cycle of the product. In the 
early life of a wholly new product, markets are hesitant 
and unexplored, then comes market acceptance of the 
product and soon after, competitive encroachment results 
in a narrowing of pricing discretion.
The approach adopted here, however, is not the adjustment 
of pricing practices as a result of movements along the 
products life cycle, but along the life cycle of the 
firm. The two are not necessarily the same since the time 
related feedback of information from customers and the 
learning curve of founders (decision makers) are likely to 
be highly significant in the first tew months after start­ 
up and yet - (a) the product may still be in its initial 
stage; and (b) most new firms do not begin with a product 
which is in the infant stage of its life cycle.
After setting a price for their product or service, 
according to the methods outlined above, founders will 
receive various market reactions, policies may be changed 
and in general, a process of continal interaction will 
occur between the firm, its clients and suppliers. The 
developments of pricing practices in particular are likely 
to reflect this type of learning process inherent in the 
infant stage of the firm's life cycle.
Goals and practices of firms at the time of interview (a 
snapshot view of a small firm), will be compared with 
those prevailing at the time of start-up. Referring back 
to the goals mentioned by new firm founders, (Table 7.6) 
it can be seen that the right hand column details the 
goals which firms claimed to be pursuing at the time of 
interview. Surprisingly, the average number of goals 
'stated' tell rather than increased as behavioural
7.36
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theories of the firm would predict. Apart from this the 
most noticeable change or development is the significant 
reduction in the importance of the survival goal 1 , (it now 
ranks along with profit or revenue maximisation).
Table 7.11 describes the current pricing practices of the 
firms in the interview and should be compared with the 
methods recorded at the initial start-up (Tables 7.6 and 
7.8).
Some points to emerge:-
The largest single category (apart from the grouped 
practice of benchmarking) at start-up was 'crude 
guesses with very rough and ready price 
discrimination'. It includes responses like - "off 
the top of my head for each order". At the time of 
interview this group is still (joint) the largest 
classified, however, one major difference is concealed 
within its grouping. The crudity and unsystematic 
guessing of pricing had given way to almost formal 
types of price discrimination^.
1 We repeat the need for extra care in interpreting 
Table 7.5 due to the low informed response rate and 
closed nature of questions.
2 The case of a saw mill set up in the North of Mid 
Glamorgan is an excellent example. At start-up there 
was no competition with a 20 mile radius and yet 
charged the same prices as their competitors arguing 
that their flexibility and service offered a 
'different product'. Current pricing has developed to 
basically a cost plus method, but the margin is 
flexible according to the volume of the order. In 
addition, prices quoted are standard according to 
location, but delivery is free. In effect this means 
that customers relatively close to their site are 
charged a higher effective price than those further 
away (but closer to competitors). A locational price 
discrimination is, therefore, implicit in their 
pricing structure.
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2. The specific intent to undercut competitors is 
generally less important, particularly for 
intermediate products (or services). Correspondingly 
these firms tend to move trom undercutting towards 
equalising prices.
3. The reported emphasis on product aifferentiation 
declined as a basis for charging prices equal to the 
competition, but this may have been due to the fact 
that founders considered they had already made their 
point about their product being 'different' and did 
not find it necessary to restate it again.
4. Cost plus methods are generally more important than 
they were at start-up, particularly in the case of 
intermediate products. However, within this group 
firms reported that margins are no longer dependent on 
their competitors as they were at start-up. In fact, 
10.1% of mentions at start-up were of the cost plus 
kind, but with prices eventually reached which were 
'not so dependent on competitors'. At the time of 
interview 25.7% of mentions were in this group.
5. Since the start-up only 37% of the firms had attempted 
to 'experiment' with the prices they charged - in the 
majority of cases, therefore, prices were only charged 
within rather narrow ranges and tended to be 'sticky'. 
The understanding about concepts such as the 
elasticity of demand functions certainly not being 
improved by the limited experimental pricing 
activities 1 .
The results on small firms pricing policies described here 
generally conform to other studies in the emphasis put on 
cost plus approaches 2 . However, a number of significant 
differences are apparent - first, none of the firms in 
this study reported attempting to achieve a target profit 
rate as Lanzillotti (1^64) found. Secondly and perhaps
^ _. __ -— _ _ _ -„ _•_ _ _ — - _ ,_ __ ^f ^ _ _ ._— — —» •— — — -» — •— — •*•"• ^ -™ ~~ ~™ ~~ ~" "™~ ~~ •"• ^ ~" "~ ~~ *"" ~"~ *"~ *"* ~"" ~~ """ ~~ ~" ~~ ~" ^ """ *™ ~"
1 Note, the proportion of firms experimenting with 
pricing levels was almost identical for both 
intermediate and final goods producing firms.
2 C.F. Ford & Rowley (197*0, Kinsey U9b3), Jackson, 
Hawes & Hertel (1979), Arnold McCulloch (19fa3) and 
Lanzillotti (19b4).
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more significantly, none of the other studies on small 
firms pricing have recognised the apparent importance of 
price discrimination (of any form whatsoever). Related 
to this is the significant number of firms which 
recognised and stated that their product (or service) was 
either better or different (or both) than the competition. 
Again, previous studies have not reported these, 
presumably important characteristics of small firm pricing 
methods.
Price Changes
Changes in the methods of pricing adopted by firms may be 
expressed by changes in the actual prices charged. Moreau 
(lyau) argues that many small firms tend to underprice 
their products although such statements generally require 
subjective assessments of a more 'correct price'. If this 
view is correct then given the nature of the pricing 
policies adopted at start-up would imply that prices would 
rise as the learning process gathers momentum relatively 
soon after start-up.
In more general terms it has been argued that since small 
firms generally lack market power, they can have only 
limited effects on changes in the general price level. In 
other words, the establishment of a thriving, small 
business sector may be one way of achieving relatively 
inflation free growth.
Only 14 of the 57 firms charged a higher price in real 
terms 2 at the time of interview than at start-up. The 
remainder being more or less evenly divided between falls 
(21) and remaining the same (22) as the price index. 
Despite the significant numbers whose prices had risen 
less than the rate of inflation none of the firms in 
actual (or nominal) terms reduced their prices after 
start-up. 17 firms charged exactly the same price as they 
did when it was 'calculated' by pricing practices adopted
1 See Bannock (19&1, Chapter 1)
2 Indexed by R.P.I. (1^85).
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when they first started trading. (In real terms the 
prices charged by these firms obviously tell). However, 
there was no evidence of any of the sampled firms 
practicing a skimming price policy and only one example of 
anything more than an unintentional penetration price. 
(In this last case prices have risen from substantial 
undercutting prices to become equal with competitors 
prices).
Abstracting from changes in pricing practices as the firm 
develops and from individual fluctuations in demand, 
strict adherence to average cost pricing with fixed 
margins would imply price increases proportional to the 
increase in costs, i.e. assumed to be the retail price 
index, that prices would remain the same (as 39% did). 
Furthermore, the large number of firms experiencing real 
price falls could be due to - (a) falling average costs on 
which the costing of the standardised level of output is 
based; and (b) reductions in the percent mark up applied 
by firms who therefore absorb some of the cost lead price 
increases. However, analysis of initial and subsequent 
pricing practices according to actual price changes 
reveals that:-
1. Firms whose prices had risen in real terms tended to 
pursue undercutting pricing practices at start, but 
who subsequently realised they were underestimating 
market value with those based on cost plus adding 
substantially higher margins and often an extension of 
the cost base to include all overheads rather than the 
more direct costs.
2. For the firms whose prices had either remained the 
same or decreased in real terms, initial undercutting 
was slightly less important (than for firms whose 
prices rose). Cost plus methods dominated and 
although firms generally noted increased competition 
most claimed to be charging higher gross profit 
margins than they did initially - suggesting that 
tailing costs over the (generally) increasing output
The difference between undercutting and penetration 
pricing is largely a matter of degree, but can be 
approximated by the intentions of the policy.
levels are more than sufficient to offset rising producer 
prices and at the same time charge higher margins without 
eroding their competitive stance, i.e. prices remaining 
constant or even falling in real terms.
3. The firms who produce a product which they regard as 
'different' usually 'better 1 than the competition (and 
yet charge initial prices based on their nearest 
competitors), might be thought to raise their prices 
subsequently as they gain more information on the 
market's assessment of their product - assuming that 
the product is better in the customer's view and not 
just that of the founder. Surprisingly, therefore, 
most of the 'better' product firms were in the groups 
which did not experience a real price rise, suggesting 
that firms were either fooling themselves about what 
Stancill calls the "Cadillac Syndrome" 1 ("we're the 
best in the field"), or that they were not pursuing 
'appropriate 1 pricing policies for profit 
maximisation.
New Firm Pricing Practices and Price Theory
The neoclassical theory of the firm based on a number of 
basic assumptions among which is that the entrepreneur is 
also the owner of the firm. Since every firm in this 
survey was of this type then it may be argued that 
neoclassical theory is more relevant to new and small 
firms than to large concerns where ownership is divorced 
from control. In terms of actual pricing practice, 
however, the marginalist principle is of no real use.
None of the general approaches to the theory of the firm 
offer an adequate explanation of pricing in new firms in 
particular (and they were not developed to do so). The 
behavioural models of Cyert and March offer no practical 
approaches to pricing policies and are basically models of 
large multi-product corporations where management and 
personnel conflicts of interests result in a satisticing 
behaviour.
1 Stancill, Nov. - Dec. (1*81), H.b.R. p.<>«
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A similar approach is adopted by Liebenstein and his 
writings on the X-efficiency theory ot the firm, but which 
is not dependent on the divorce of ownership from control. 
The interesting implication ot the X-inefficiency is that 
costs themselves (notably those related to direct labour 
inputs) are not likely to be uniquely related to output 
levels.
Since labour production costs (and less quantifiable 
aspects such as quality) are related to effort on the part 
of labour which itself is the result of motivations, job 
security and supervision etc. - in other words the cost 
base itself used for average cost pricing may be a 
variable and not an easily identifiable or even consistent 
base on which pricing decisions are made.
Although models based on sales revenue maximisation also 
depend on the divorce of ownership from effective control, 
the general approach may have some relevance for new and 
small firms. Boumal argues, for example, that banks will 
be more willing to finance firms with growing sales, more 
so than profit. Furthermore, growing sales or market 
share may give significant management or entrepreneurial 
prestige - again more so than profit. The goals of firms 
reported in Table 7.6, show that together, market share 
and revenue goals are almost as important as general 
profit goals (although both less than the survival 
motives) and tend to increase in importance as the firm 
develops.
None of the firms at start-up mentioned potential 
competition, so apparently any methodss used are not 
related to potential competitors. Those using cost plus 
did not set gross margins in recognition of potential 
competition at all. This alone does not, however, imply 
that limit pricing is ot no relevance since the majority 
of firms practiced some form of benchmarking where their 
price was set against the benchmark of their existing 
competitors which were predominantly other small firms 1 . 
If these small firms practiced a form of limit pricing, 
new firms would unintentially be charging prices which
1 The 'main 1 competition of 29 of the bl firms surveyed 
were other 'small' firms.
7 .44
were aimed at reducing the rate of new entry. However, 
even the current price policies of new firms described in 
Table 7.11 do not reveal any recognition of the importance 
of potential entrants. Indeed, this is confirmed by other 
studies of small firms pricing practices since none of 
these make any mention of potential competition.
The new firms surveyed here have by definition recently 
come through the start-up process and are, therefore, 
likely to be aware of the 'entry mechanisms' that 
potential competitors can adopt, despite this they are 
obviously not paying much attention to possible new 
entrants particularly with regard to their pricing 
practices. Indeed the small size of the new independent 
firms at start-up makes a nonsense of many of the limit 
pricing theories which assume that the minimum efficient 
size of production in the industry is so large that entry 
(and therefore expansion) will effect the overall demand 
and price for the product. Limit pricing would only have 
a role in this case where products were sufficiently 
differentiated so that entry to 'one part' of the industry 
will have substantial effects on sub-industry or even 
localised demand for the 'product'.
Cost plus approaches to pricing are widespread, both at 
the initial start-up stage and in small firms in general. 
However, start-up pricing methods generally reduce this 
approach to little more than a rough guideline with the 
gross margin being largely dictated by the policy adopted 
with regard to benchmarking ("Do I set a lower price or a 
'higher' price than my competition"?). As firms develop 
in their infancy cost plus policies generally become more 
important in that the margin is less related to 
competitors prices particularly with the adoption of some 
form of price discrimination. In general the evidence 
presented here conforms with numerous other studies which 
have noted that changes in demand and competitive 
conditions do have considerable impacts on the margins 
employed 1 . This means of course that marginal rules can 
still be used in theory to predict directions of changes 
of prices, but the application of the marginalist
A review of these studies, mainly tor large 
corporations can be found in Hay and Morris (IST/y, 
pp.119-126).
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procedure is of no use in explaining how new or small 
firms actually derive prices for their products.
Based on the empirical evidence on new firm pricing 
methods presented in this chapter, a representative model 
of new firm pricing is suggested, and is found in Appendix 
D.
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CHAPTER 8 
INFANT FIRM DEVELOPMENT
development of. Business From Start-Up Coordination 
Stage To Young, Small Firms
Previous chapters have been mainly concerned with the 
process of firm formation itself, up to and including the 
first tew weeks of trading. It was shown that the 
activities involved in start-up coordination are usually 
complex, but more especially are largely predetermined.
Once start-up has occurred, however, the coordination 
activities undertaken by the founder change significantly. 
The actions of the founder will take place (at least 
conceptually) within a framework of the new entity 'the 
firm' and rather than being predetermined, the types of 
coordination required to be undertaken will depend almost 
entirely on the 'feedback' or the initial reaction to his 
entry into the market. The feedback from customers, 
suppliers and competitors resulting from start-up 
coordination and policy decisions, will require the 
entrepreneur to react in what he regards as an appropriate 
way in line with his goals and motivations, thus begins 
the coordination of resources and decisions which may be 
termed continuous interaction. During this process, 
however, the activities of coordination become more 
dynamic (responsive), rather than predetermined and will 
continue through the infant part of the firm's life cycle.
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the 
more important changes that occur in the coordination 
process which becomes one of continuous interaction. How 
do the founders perceptions, goals ana attitudes change in 
response to initial feedback? How does this effect the 
policies adopted and, therefore, the development of the 
firm? Essentially we will be analysing the very early 
part of the firm's life cycle - its infancy (rather than 
birth).
Of course, during this stage a number of new firms may 
tail. By definition, however, the firms interviewed were 
the survivors and it is from the data derived from these 
that changes in the representative firm in the infant 
stages of life cycles will be evaluated.
8.0
The previous section on pricing included the developments 
in pricing practices ot tirms from the time ot start-up to 
interview stage. It was argued that the changes in 
pricing methods were likely to reflect the learning 
process inherent in the infant stage of the firm's growth, 
it is therefore, necessary to view the whole range of 
changes that take place in the development of new tirms as 
symbiotic.
It will be recalled that the survival goal of new firm 
founders tended to be less important at the time of 
interview than it was at the start-up stage (Table 7.6) 
and this was mirrored by an increase in the importance of 
those goals which could be directly related to growth.
This is the type of behaviour which might be predicted by 
the various biological theories of the firm which draws an 
analogy between the firm and the life cycle, ot living 
organisms, birth, starting small, maturing, producing 
offspring and eventually dying. (Curwen, 1976, p.24).
Biological theories may have particular relevance to the 
infant firm since these theories assume that tirms have to 
adopt to their environment, whereas larger firms are in 
the Galbrathian sense able to actually change their 
immediate environment, small and particularly new firms 
have to take it as given and adopt the best they can.
Such theories predict that firms aim for stability 
(homeostasis) and adapt to disturbances in order to 
maintain a desired 'state' (ibid. p.123). To do this, 
firms deciae a set of norms which can be copied from other 
firms, such norms may be a particular relationship between 
cost and price for example.
Similar predictions can be made from models based on 
satisficing behaviour if they are extended to include a 
survival goal explicitly rather than implicity assumed. 
When there is general concern for survival (as at initial 
start-up), then firms may make decisions which are aimed 
at achieving a safety margin (between price and average 
cost), in order to allow for unexpected occurrences. (See 
Curwen, 1976, pp.137-138).
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As the firm develops in its infancy and survival goals 
become less important attention may then turn to growth 
objectives, thus, once a minimum level of turnover is 
achieved that is regarded as 'secure', then the firm may 
be tempted to go for growth. (See also Wildsmith, 1973, 
p.84).
The Growth of New Firms;
The growth of infant firms is not well represented by the 
literature on the growth of the firm. Most of the 
literature deals with the growth of large firms which are 
characterised by the divorce of ownership from control ana 
the existence of multi-product, multi-plant operations. 
In such cases traditional economic theory is unable to 
describe the limits to the size of the firm, but limits 
may exist to the rate of growth of firms. What then are 
the limits to growth of infant firms who generally do not 
have limited liability and who are not in a'position to 
replicate plants, or undertake mergers and takeovers and 
ownership is almost always synonymous with control? 
Before examining the limits to infant firm Development it 
is necessary to see how the 'representative 1 infant firm 
actually grows.
The average size of firms at start-up was slightly over 2 
full-time workers, (the founder and one employee). Median 
turnover was £47,400 resulting in sales per labour 
employed of £22,900. At the time of interview 1 the 
average firm had increased its employment to just over 5 
people (an increase of some 254%), but with turnover 
increasing more rapidly resulting in sales per labour unit 
employed of £ 3 4 , 7 1 2 2 probably due to increased 
specialisation and learning process.
A cross sectional analysis of firm size by age is provided 
in Figure 9.1 where the simple average was taken of firm 
size for those which were still in existence at each time 
period. Although the overall trend is towards significant 
growth, 10 of the 57 firms experienced no change in the
1 Average age of the firms was IB months - 2 years




















































size of their business measured by employment but only 2 
actually reduced their size (both due to a break-up of 
partnership).
At the end of the third trading year the average size of 
these surviving firms was slightly over 10 employees - a 
5-fold increase since birth 1 . Firms setting up in the 
metal goods manufacturing sector tend to be slightly 
larger, on average and increase more rapidly in the second 
year than either the other manufacturing or services 
sector . (The latter starting up smaller and growing less 
rapidly). Other developments associated with this growth 
in the infancy period will now be discussed.
Educational Qualifications of Founders and Growth Rates of 
their Businesses
Storey (1^82) examined the relationship between education 
of entrepreneurs and the development ot their businesses. 
He hypothesised that founders with formal educational 
qualifications would run firms that would grow faster, 
have a higher profitability and be less likely to fail.
However, he found no association between educational 
qualifications and the employment size of the firm and 
only in the manufacturing sector was there a possible 
relationship between education and profitability.
Finally, Storey was unable to show any relationship 
between turnover and qualifications. He concludes that 
the successful running of a business requires personal 
skills which are not necessarily associated with 
intellect. In contrast Gudgin (et al 1ST/9) had found that 
those firms run by people with degrees or equivalent 
qualifications had begun with larger amounts ot capital 
and had achieved the largest average size.
1 It is important to note that this sample average is 
swelled by three firms who had more than 2U full-time 
workers.
2 There was only one service firm in the sample which 
three years old and so averaging is not possible.was
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Storey accounts for the lack of any relationship in his 
study as being due to the sampling process, since 
unsuccessful new firms were obviously not in his sample. 
Probably more significant is the fact that he was unable 
to distinguish between true rates of growth, measured by 
turnover, profitability or employment. Each firm in his 
sample was less than 8 years old, but the above variables 
used were measured at one point in time and so he was 
comparing firms of less than 1 year old with those over 5 
years old.
In order to examine the relationship between educational 
qualifications and new firm development, we will 
disaggregate growth rates to a common variable in order to 
partially overcome the problems encountered by Storey.
Storey argues that the distinction between those 
entrepreneurs with, and those without qualifications, is 
too crude and suggests that this is also a possible 
explanation of the lack of association (between education 
and performance) found in his research. This association 
may only be between founders with the highest academic 
qualifications and development of their firms. Thus, for 
this study, educational qualifications will be classified 
into three groups: (a) degree and professional 
qualifications; (b) other qualifications and; (c) no 
quali fications.
As Gudgin (et al) had found for the North East, those 
founders in this study with degrees had considerably 
higher average start-up capital. The seven firms founded 
by graduates had an initial capital of over £32,UOO, while 
the average start-up capital for founders with other 
qualifications was £4,675 and £4,418 for non-qualified 
entrepreneurs. While graduates may have greater 
accessibility to financial sources (Gudgin et al p.13) 
this may be reflected in the size of initial capital 
required. There is clearly less of a distinction between 
Welsh entrepreneurs with other qualifications (trade 
certificates, HNC's, etc.) and those with no 
qualifications at all.
Previous studies (Gudgin, Brunskill and Fothergill 197y 
and Storey 1982), suggest that performance in early years 
is strongly related to educational achievement, but failed 































































































































































































































































































development of the firm. This was because of the failure 
to take into account the initial employment and turnover 
of new businesses and their overall age. In other words, 
by concentrating on a single 'snapshot' year the growth of 
firms was not adequately measured. To overcome this 
difficulty we use a method ot netting out growth rates 
according to the age (in months) of the business to 
provide an index for the average rate of growth per year. 
This is shown in Table 8.1.
Although only a small sample, firms founded by graduates 
tend to significantly out-perform their less qualified 
counterparts, while graduate founders initially start with 
an average of 1.3 people working in the firm, by the time 
of interview an average of over fo people were employed. 
By adjusting for the age of the firm this represents a 
simple average growth rate of 326% per annum (within the 
first 5 years of life). Both other groups also show 
considerable net rates of growth with employment more than 
doubling in any year.
For founders with other qualifications the actual net 
rates of growth in employment were in fact lower than 
their non-qualified counterparts, although the average 
size of businesses owned by non-qualified founders is 
smaller.
The same analysis can be made for growth rates as measured 
by turnover in the new firms and a similar picture emerges 
(Table 8.2). Again the highest average rates of growth 
occur in those firms founded by graduates (note: the much 
reduced sample size due to: (a) firms not being old enough 
to record annual turnover figures; and (b) refusal to 
answer). However, those -firms founded by other qualified 
people have similar high rates of growth of turnover and 
considerably more than those founded by non-qualified 
entrepreneurs. Having said that even these firms on 
average were experiencing a doubling of their annual 
turnover.
It is important to put these results into the context ot 
the sample, e.g. Storey had shown that the new firm 
founders with a professional qualification were 
concentrated in the professional/business services sector. 
It, therefore, this sector is experiencing relatively more 

































































































































































































































































































be seen to have faster rates of growth simply because they 
are concentrated in a tast growing sector. In contrast to 
Storey, however, of the seven graduate founders 
interviewed, only two were in business services and there 
are not any significant concentrations of any educational 
groups in particular industrial sectors, although all 
firms in the business services sector were established by 
entrepreneurs with some qualification or other.
The results of a sample of this size will always remain 
tentative (especially since holding variables such as 
industry constant substantially reduces degrees of 
freedom). However, although the relationship between 
educational and early performance is unclear when broad 
classifications (qualifications or no qualifications) are 
considered, those firms founded by graduates do seem to 
show higher rates of growth, particularly in terms of 
employment. Furthermore, a higher proportion of new firm 
founders have a degree (14%) than other studies have shown 
and Wales as a region has the highest proportion of school 
leavers going onto degree courses of any other region in 
the U.K.
Legal Status
At start-up only 11 of the b7 firms surveyed had limited 
liability status. Over half were in fact 'sole traders'. 
By the time of interview, however, the vast majority had 
not changed the legal status of their business, only one 
of the sole traders had registered as a limited company 
and 6 of the 17 original partnerships had now gone 
limited. The only other developments to take place were 
the break up of three partnerships. In each case one 
partner continued in business as a sole trader. Although 
slightly over a third of businesses were now limited 
companies (compared to the 20% of start-up), it is clear 
that the infant stage of the firm's life cycle is 
characterised by firms which do not have limited liability 
and in particular by sole trader ownership.
8.10
Finance
At the time of interview only 4 firms did not have any 
loan or overdraft facility with a bank (and these were 
less than a year old). The main difference between 
methods of financing the start-up and financing the 
development of the business was obviously the existence of 
retained earnings, but apart from that there seems to be a 
significant increase in the use of bank overdraft. (77% 
of firms compared to 47% at start-up). Four of the 
thirteen founders who allowed banks to take a charge on 
their house at start-up had reduced this liability by the 
interview, presumably generating enough on-going cash flow 
to be able to do this.
Finally, the use of grant aided finance was of minor 
importance (in terms of numbers of firms mentioning it), 
in the developing infant business - even less than at 
start-up where at least some founders were able to obtain 
the Enterprise Allowance Scheme.
Overall the perceptions of founders of their relationships 
with their bank, which were already highly satisfactory, 
tend if anything to improve with over bU% claiming that 
they were either excellent or good - only 3 of the 57 
firms thought they were poor.
Marketing Mix
The types of competitive advantage that founders claimed 
to have over their competitors are detailed in Chapter 7 
(Table 7.10), where price and quality were the main 
sources of differentiation. How then did they market the 
advantages of their product and how has it changed since 
start-up?
Distribution was not seen as any particular importance to 
most firms 1 and there was almost no change at all in the 
method of distribution used at start-up compared to those
1 In contrast to the importance put on distribution by 
small firms in a Scottish survey undertaken by Kinsey 
(19b3), this may be explained by the more mature 
nature' of the firms sampled by Kinsey - who were, 
therefore, further along the firms life cycle as a 
whole.
. 1 1
























































used at the time of interview. The firms own road 
transport dominated (b»U%), but with some use of hired 
vehicles and carriers.
Table 8.3 shows that the founder himself was also the 
salesman for his firm's product at start-up in almost S*5% 
of the cases, only 2 firms specifically had a sales 
manager as such and a further 2 had help from their 
franchise network in obtaining orders. The development of 
infant firms seems to be associated with the introduction 
of external agents as salesmen, although these were 
concentrated in the final goods sector and the original 
founders continue to be the main salesmen during the 
infant stage of development.
Compared to the 41% of firms specifically undertaking 
market research at the time of start-up, the initial 
stages of business development are not associated with 
particular marketing plans or further market research 
(less than 16% of firms did so). This has also been 
pointed out by Barnes (et al, lb»82) who argues that the 
lack of time and money prevent more widespread uses of 
market research for their businesses.
Table 8.4 shows the methods of advertising used by new 
firms, but the most striking feature is that over bb% of 
the entire sample did not advertise during, or immediately 
before starting up. The development of infant businesses, 
however, shows a considerable increase in both the extent 
and level of advertising used.
The use of mail shots which Willis (lb)86) argues to be one 
of the most effective marketing tools for small 
businesses, increases substantially after start-up, but 
relatively passive methods such as Yellow Page 
advertisements still dominate. The most popular form of 
advertising, both at start-up and since, is usually the 
local press.
It is clear that the approach to marketing adopted by new 
firms is unsophisticated to say the least and only shows a 
slight improvement in the infant stage despite the rapid 




The practices of book-keeping and financial control are 
significantly less sophisticated than even those 
documented by Arnold McCulloch (1983) in his survey of 
accounting practices in recent Scottish start-ups. In the 
present survey 50 of the 57 firms interviewed had their 
routine book-keeping done by the founder or spouse, the 
remainder by an employee or friend. In addition to this, 
however, the limited companies and all the partnerships 
also had their books checked by an accountant from outside 
the firm, this was not the case for almost bO% of the sole 
trader businesses.
More significantly though, 82.1% of all firms sampled 
admitted that book-keeping and accountancy information was 
only used for company tax and VAT purposes. Only 10 
(17.9%) of founders claimed to use such information in 
running the business. This is significant in that it 
implies that there is very little management control 
information available, let alone used by founders, with 
the time, effort and expenditure on accounting control 
being dictated to by legal requirements and little else. 
Indeed, during the interviews, new firm founders seemed 
generally unconcerned about the fact that financial 
information was not used in running the business. It 
suggests that most had no idea of the potential benefits 
of management control information, let alone how to use it 
- and yet the costs of providing this, particularly in 
terms of time and effort on the part of the founder 
himself are readily identifiable.
The contrast between new Welsh firms and small firms in 
the International Small Business Survey (ISBS, 1984) is 
marked 1 . The firms in the ISBS survey were not 
necessarily young and a number were, in fact, large firms.
Of these, however, 85% claimed to use accounting 
information in running the business as well as for tax 
purposes. This is almost a complete reversal of the 
picture described above where over 80% of the new firms in
__ _ fi± ^ ,^ __ _.„ ^ _ . ~_ — ^ — — — — — •"• *• ~~ "•" *™ ~* ~* —" ~~ *" "™* "*** ~~ ~~" ™" ™~ "~ ""™ "~ "™ ~~""" ~~ ~~ ~*
1 For an international comparison the following question 
was taken from the ISBS survey: "Do you use 
accounting information only for tax purposes or do you 
use it in running your business?"
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this survey actually used accounting information for tax 
purposes only. The very early stage of life of a new 
business does not then seem to be associated with the 
sophistication or even awareness of management control 
techniques and information and is something that is 
clearly seen to be important in larger and older firms. 
The question to arise, is of course: Are these firms 
bigger and older (survivors) because they recognised the 
need for good and updated control information on the state 
of the business? Or does this come as a natural 
progression as the infant firm expands and/or ages?
It could be reasonably argued that those firms using 
financial control would be able to identify more quickly 
potential problems and be able to take corrective action, 
than those that do not. Thus, the survival rate of new 
businesses is likely to be higher in those that adopt some 
more formal management control system since all firms 
interviewed were still in existence it was not possible to 
test this, however, we can relate this to firm growth arid 
profitability.
Firms claiming to use book-keeping information in the 
running of their business (as opposed to tax only 
reasons), tend to start up at a slightly larger scale in 
terms of both capital and labour employed 1 . Furthermore, 
at the time of interview these firms had grown 
substantially more than for the sample as a whole, 
although these firms were generally older, this only 
partially accounts for the current average size of 11.3 
employees. (A factor of 2 above sample average).
Surprisingly, however, reported firm profitability and 
sales per employee were lower in this group than majority 
tax only group. It is not possible to determine 
causality, however, since it is possible, although 
unlikely, that these firms have adopted management 
controls as a response to relatively low profitability2 .
Average employment, start-up size was 3 compared to 2 
for the sample as a whole.
More likely however, is the fact that many founders 
found it difficult to express profitability, however, 
defined as a % on sales.
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Investment in infant business (relative to start-up), is 
not accompanied by any increase in the extent or 
sophistication of accountancy functions or financial 
control in general, this may be because banks regard 
overdraft facilities as largely self monitoring. 
Nevertheless, it is noticable and worrying that the 
significant growth of infant firms is not accompanied by 
any increase in formal management/financial control. 
Indeed to the extent that most of the founders who were 
'forced' to produce a formal business plan at start-up did 
not continue to adopt financial plans or even use their 
original cash flow again, then the development from birth 
to infancy is associated, if anything, with a reduction in 
the extent of formal management control.
Limj.ts to Infant Growth
The limits to growth of large firms in general have 
important implications for the development and growth of 
small firms. This is so for more indirect reasons than 
there being similar constraints on growth in small and 
large firms. In particular, Penrose (195^, pp.215-225), 
argues that since the rate of growth of individual large 
firms is limited, then an expansion in the economy may 
create opportunities for firm expansion, but at a faster 
rate than large firms can take advantage of them. This 
then leads to what Penrose terms Interstices in the 
economy, within which existing small firms may take 
advantage and grow, or if existing small firms are 
themselves limited in their ability to grow and fill all 
of the intersticies then there will be scope for the 
creation of new firms. In other words the various 
financial risks and managerial constraints of existing 
firms will at least in part effect the limits to the 
growth of demand for small and new firms.
Indeed the size of the market is the major constraint on 
the growth of infant firms who are quite clearly unable to 
undertake extensive diversification or grow by 
acquisition. (42.b% of mentions of factors stunting the 
growth of the firms surveyed were strongly market- 
related). In contrast only 10.1% of mentions were related 
to management resource - particularly the founder's own 
time and effort, although this did seem to be the most 
significant problem faced by firms mentioning this. The 






















































































































































was second only in importance to market factors, but 
Penrose (1959, pp.37-38) argues that this a function of 
fund raising ingenuity of entrepreneurs and indeed the 
same could be said of market making expertise. In such 
instances the managerial or entrepreneurial constraint on 
growth, although not explictly reported, may be the most 
important limit to growth on infant firms as Penrose 
asserts it is for large multi-plant corporations.
To further discuss the growth of new firms, Table 8.5 
shows the level of capacity 1 used at the time of 
interview. Overall, firms were running at only 66% of 
capacity (a simple unweighted average), but there were 
significant variations around this figure.
Ten of the 45 firms responding were operating at less than 
4U% capacity, yet ten were operating at full capacity. 
Substantial differences in capacity utilisation also exist 
between broad industry groups with half of the firms in 
textiles and 'other' manufacturing operating at 100% 
capacity, but only one of the 9 mechanical engineering 
businesses achieving this level. What then are the main 
constraints on growth since in most cases there is plenty 
of spare capacity in physical assets.
The factors that limit this level of capacity are analysed 
according to the number of mentions they received by 
founders and are cross referenced by the capacity 
utilisation groupings. (See Table 8.6). The main 
limitations to increased output for those firms operating 
at high capacity is labour and in particular labour with 
the right skills and quality of work and which founders 
feel they can trust. Despite the very high levels of 
unemployment in their local areas, it seems paradoxical 
that finding labour should be a major concern and problem 
for growing infant businesses. Indeed a number of 
instances of employee poaching were reported and this 
confirms the findings of O'Farrel (et al, 1986), that
1 Founders were asked to express as a % of total 
potential output their current production of goods or 
services - defined to be with existing resources and 
working standard working hours. Data was obtained in 
4b cases.
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finding labour is a significant problem for small and 
medium sized companies in the regions of the U.K. 
Furthermore, the labour problem is compounded by the fact 
that the founders themselves are largely responsible for 
'bedding in* and possibly training new employees. This 
further exasperates the managerial constraint of Penrose.
Significantly, the immediate market size is the single 
most important constraint overall, but this is heavily 
concentrated into the group currently utilising less than 
4<J% capacity, with every single firm in this group being 
constrained by the largely external market forces. Since 
the growth of these firms is primarily limited by the 
market and to some extent the motivation of the founders 
to grow, they have not been able to get to the stage where 
labour becomes a problem as it is where market size is of 
considerably less importance and capacity utilisation 
correspondingly higher. finance is a constraint to some 
extent on all firms, but is usually of secondary 
importance.
A further understanding of the perceived limits to 
production of infant firms can be obtained from Table 
8.7. Clearly the problem of recruiting suitable labour is 
almost entirely a manufacturing industry phenomenon and in 
particular in the mechanical engineering sector.
Market size tends to be more of an important limiting 
factor on the growth of service firms than those in 
manufacturing, probably because of the limited 
geographical area that they cover. The limits to market 
size may suggest that new firms enter the market with 
products which allow them to trade in pockets of product 
characteristics space and their growth is constrained by 
overall market growth in scope and the actions of existing 
firms. The limits to market size in particular 
intersticies of characteristic space probably account for 
the surprising fact that as many as two-thirds of all the 
firms interviewed were already looking to diversify their 
business even at this very early stage of the business 
life cycle (less than 1 in 10 of these however, were 
thinking of moving into a completely new line of 
business).
The constraint of space is only a major problem in 
















































































































































































firms as being a significant limit to further growth, 
almost half (47.5%) of the firms thought that they would 
be moving premises in the near future and while this may 
cause significant problems in the availability of 
industrial premises in S. Wales, it suggests that most of 
the moves will be in response to differences in costs or 
image of premises rather than space constraints.
Further Development
Despite the perceived limits to growth outlined, only one 
of the 57 firms surveyed did not expect their sales to 
increase in the next year, with expectations of future 
sales, particularly buoyant in the other manufacturing 
sector. Overall most firms were highly optimistic about 
future development with 54% of respondents expecting 
turnover to 'increase considerably'.
Also shown in Table a.8 is the expected charge in 
employment in the firms interviewed over the next 2 years. 
All sectors show a significant expected increase in labour 
employed. If this is realised then these average infant 
businesses will, over the next 2 years, increase by some 
74% over current employment. The actual growth recorded 
in Figure 8.1 is likely to continue if plans are realised, 
but with a significant increase in the rate of employment 
growth of young service firms (who tended to be less 
inhibited by the lack of skilled labour), although this 
maybe due to some extent to the service firms catching up 
so to speak the other firms since they tended to be 
slightly younger overall at the time of interview. The 
metal manufacturing sector who had experienced the most 
difficulty in finding available, trustworthy and skilled 
employees, expect employment to grow at a lower rate on 
average than other sectors, but an increase of 53% or 5 to 
6 jobs in the representative firm over the next 2 years is 
by any standards significant growth.
Five firms specifically said that they wanted to remain at 
the same size in terms of employment, but to increase 
profitability, possibly reaching a target size. ine 
majority of remaining firms were looking to expand and 
given the constraints of current production by existing 
markets, firms were attempting to provide better services, 
or increased product ranges. If this can be called
8.23
Table 8.8
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diversification then it is so in its narrowest sese with 
most firms looking for new custom, but this was usually 
within different subsections of existing market types.
If future expectations of employment growth are linked to 
the limits to current production in the infant business, 
then no simple relationship is apparent (Table 8.9), 
although firms not expecting to increase employment in the 
next 2 years are dominated by the available size of 
market. While for those businesses expecting to increase 
employment, but by less than 5 people, market size is far 
less important and problems of labour availability and 
finance are considerably more important.
Profitability
Two aspects of profitability were obtained during the 
interviews. The first was a subjective assessment of the 
profitability of their business made by firm founders, the 
second was a quantitative response based on a percentage 
of turnover. In the first case founders were asked to 
classify their perceptions of business profitability by 
the classification shown in . Clearly, founders tended to 
dislike words like - 'very profitable' or 'considerably 
profitable 1 and responded in terms of moderately or 
slightly profitable. The four firms who were not 
profitable were all less than 1 year old (as were most of 
those reporting break-even figures) and so rather than 
suggesting imminent business failures are simply too young 
to have reached the break-even point on their cash flows 
as a result of absorbing initial fixed costs of set-up.
For the sample as a whole, average profitability of firms 
in the infant stages of their life cyle was almost 22% of 
total sales 1 . For founders claiming to have a very 
profitable business, the figure was 36.6%, moderately 
profitable 23.5% and slightly profitable 8.1%. Thus, 
while individual entrepreneurs perceptions of what % 
profitability corresponds to subjective descriptions, it
Not all firms were able, or willing to disclose 
figures on profits or turnover. This figure 
represents only those firms that provided both and the 


































Source: Survey (South Wales 1985)
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was felt by the interviewer that a number of founders had 
little idea of what exactly profits mean, usually 
confusing them with their own wages and having problems 
distinguishing between pre and post tax profits. For 
these reasons the confidence placed on the profitability 
figures is greatly reduced and the subjective assessment 
of profitability is probably the best guide 1 . In fact, 
this classification of entrepreneurial opinion on its own 
profitability was used by the International Small Business 
Survey (1984, ISBC) and the results can be compared with 
the present survey.
Those entrepreneurs reporting moderately profitable 
businesses were the largest group in both surveys. (47.1% 
for the 11 separate countries surveyed by ISBC and 42.9% 
for Wales). Next in order of importance, again in both 
surveys, was the 'slightly' profitable group. However, it 
is important to note the differences in the sample of the 
surveys. The ISBC study was of small firms and it is this 
that probably accounts for the remaining difference. Only 
4.1% of the firms in the international survey reported 
being not profitable and yet, 23.2% of the Welsh firms 
were either at break-even or making losses. Again, this 
seems to be the result of the very young firm surveyed 
here having yet to reach break-even. On the other hand, 
it suggests that new firms reach the 'normal 1 rate of 
profit (of small firms in general), as early as the second 
year of business life.
This is so for two reasons: Firstly, founders were 
more willing to answer the subjective question that 
specify rates of profits and secondly, from the point 
of view of the theory of the entrepreneur it is the 
perceptions of the founder that are important and may 
take into account non-monetory factors in answering 
the question.
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NEW FIRMS, JOB CREATION AND THE ROLE AND
PERFORMANCE OF SUPPORT AGENCIES
Having analysed the start-up process itself and the infant 
development of new firms at the micro level, it is now 
possible to make some estimates of job creation in new 
firms at the aggregate level. Such estimates have been 
the major focus of attention of a number of studies, which 
in particular, have aimed at identifying the contribution 
of new and small firms to job generation in local, 
regional and national economies.
No such estimates currently exist for the Welsh economy or 
even at more local levels within the Principality. 
Despite this the number of support agencies for new and 
small firms has mushroomed in the last years, primarily in 
response to the potential employment opportunities ottered 
by this source.
Without some indication of the magnitude of job creation 
potential, even measured without regard to secondary 
effects, it is difficult to justify the existence of some 
of these support agencies and schemes on a national or 
regional basis.
The aims of this chapter are twofold; firstly to provide 
estimates of job creation in new independent firms in 
Wales during the 1980's and to compare these with overall 
employment, unemployment and redundancy figures tor Wales 
in order to assess the relative magnitude of gain. It is 
estimated that new manufacturing firms starting up in 1S>83 
in Wales have created 3,800 new jobs within three years of 
birth and in manufacturing arid certain service sector 
trades together, over 10,000 jobs have been created 
within two years of birth, i.e. by 1*85. Secondly, the 
role and performance of support agencies and schemes 
available to new Welsh firms will be discussed in an 
attempt to assess if they make any difference to the 
start-up process itself and, therefore, the ease of start­ 
up and possible future job creation.
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Job Creation in New Firms
Inevitably the main focus of attention on new and small 
firms is related to their job creation ability when 
compared to other sectors of the economy.
Despite much research effort there is still considerable 
disagreement on the role of small firms in job generation 
let alone that of new firms in particular.
Storey1 (1980) undertaking a review of studies on the role 
of new manufacturing establishments in the U.K. estimated 
that not more than 15% of gross new manufacturing jobs per 
decade are created by wholly new establishments and is 
likely to be lower still in the assisted areas. In terms 
of net job creation, however, new firms can be seen to be 
major creators of jobs mainly as a result of the general 
decline in employment of larger firms in the economy.
It is worth noting, however, that almost all of the U.K. 
evidence is based solely on the manufacturing sector of 
the economy and little is known about the importance of 
service sector births in the dynamics of job generation. 
Even manufacturing sector studies have tended to 
concentrate on the long term impact on employment, usually 
of between 10 and 20 years. (See for example, Fothergill 
and Gudgin 1979, Firn and Swales 1977). While this allows 
the long run impact to be assessed it is not possible to 
identify trends over shorter periods and in particular is 
unable to provide a role for the transitory nature of many 
of the jobs created during the period studied, but which 
did not exist by the end of the period. (The contribution 
to employment in new firms which have closed down even 
after a number of years trading is not taken into 
account).
Storey D.J. (March 1980), Job Generation and Small 
Firms Policy in Britain. Policy series 11 (pp.b-7).
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Since this research is only concerned with the start-up 
and very early stages of firm life an attempt will be made 
to estimate the job creation potential of new firms only 
in the short term (within the first three years), but more 
importantly, estimates for periods within this will be 
made. The absence of a comprehensive industrial 
establishment database on the Welsh economy prevents a 
direct method of estimating new firm job generation.
However, another approach is available and although a 
number of assumptions have to be made it does seem to be 
the most reliable, if not the only way to approach job 
generation in new firms in the Welsh economy.
From the survey we can estimate the average size of start­ 
up of new independent firms in manufacturing and business 
services sector, furthermore the average rate of growth of 
each sector within 6 months, 12 months, 24 months and 36 
months of start-up were also obtained. These provide us 
with the basis on which to calculate employment in new 
firms in Wales.
Appendix fi provides a detailed account of the method used 
for estimating the dynamics of employment change in the 
infant period of newly formed firms. Basically, business 
start-up figures are obtained on a county basis within 
Wales from VAT registrations (published by the Department 
of Trade and Industry) and from the same source, but for a 
different period, it is possible to calculate approximate 
rates of failure of new firms according to their age. 
(See Appendix E).
In the manufacturing sector it is estimated that 1 in 20 
new firms will fail within their first b months of trading 
and almost 1 in 8 will have closed down within the first 
year. Within the 3 years following start-up 3b.7% of 
firms will have ceased to trade. These figures are used 
to calculate the numbers of surviving firms in any time 
period after start-up and the loss of jobs due to failures 
is estimated according to the average size of firms at the 
time of failure.
Estimating the numbers of jobs created directly in new 
firms over any time period causes problems of the 
identification of the source of the jobs from new firms of 
different vintages. In order to make the results more
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clearly identifiable it is useful to isolate the changes 
that occur as a direct result of new firms setting up in 
any one year only. Jobs created during that period by 
other new firms starting up in earlier years are ignored 
as are jobs created in new firms setting up in future 
overlapping periods.
This base year is taken as 1983 for the estimates for 
Wales. This is convenient since it is overlapped by the 
period covered by our survey and by published VAT 
statistics. During 1983 some 513 manufacturing firms 
registered for VAT purposes for the first time and some 
2,500 registrations were recorded in the selected service 
trades1 .
These figures represent the annual average start-ups over 
the period 1980-83 and should, therefore, be regarded as 
representative estimates of jobs created by new Welsh 
firms starting up in any one year in the early 198O's.
The final estimates for jobs created by new firms in Waleso 
are given in Table 9.1 . Some explanation is required.
Assume for simplicity that all the firms starting up in 
the base year do so on the first day of 1983. Immediately 
there is an increase in employment in the region of almost 
5,000 jobs in new firms setting up in the selected 
services and manufacturing industries. (See bottom left 
hand cell of Table 9.1). These are made up of 1180 
manufacturing jobs created by the 513 new manufacturing 
establishments and 3,744 service jobs created in 2,547 new 
service sector firms. (Note these figures represent full- 
time or equivalent jobs). (The first column provides 
corresponding data on a county basis, in Gwent for 
example, almost 100 manufacturing firms were set-up which 
immediately provided 225 manufacturing jobs to that 
county).
_ _ —._ __ _ — __ — —-. — — ————————————— — — — — — — —_ — -, — — 
— — — — — — — — — — — — -*_ — — — ~ _.
1 To ensure compatibility with the sampled service 
firms, selected services include: professional and 
business services, transport and communication, 
catering and other services, but excluding retail 
distribution.
2 The assumptions (as listed in Appendix E) on which 
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By the middle of 1983, i.e. fo months after start-up, a 
number of the original firms will have tailed, leaving 
only 488 surviving manufacturing firms of the original 
513. However, the surviving firms have grown sufficiently 
even within the first 6 months to more than offset the 
gross job losses and net employment in the new 
manufacturing firms has increased to almost 1700 jobs by 
this time. Within the first year, however, it is the 
service sector which has proved the really significant job 
generators, so much so that by the end of 1983 new firms 
as a whole were employing around 10,000 new employees 
(including the founders themselves), which represents a 
doubling of the total at start-up itself.
The general trend in employment for Wales is shown 
graphically in Figure 9.1 Manufacturing firms, although 
providing a smaller number of jobs at this stage, show a 
continuous net increase in employment over the three 
years, while service sector employment actually declines 
slightly during the second year. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to provide reliable estimates for the third year 
of life of new service firms because of the lack of 
service firms over 2 years old in the survey itself.
While Table 9.1 shows the general trends in new firm 
employment and the magnitudes of the gain tor each of the 
Welsh counties, the underlying factors at work can be 
identified in Table 9.2 which show the dynamics of new 
firm employment change for Wales as a whole. The net 
change in employment in any period is the result of job 
losses due to failure, these include failed entrepreneurs 
and redundant workers and the jobs gained or vacancies 
opened as a result of the overall growth of surviving 
firms.
For new manufacturing firms it can be seen (Figure 9.2), 
that vacancies in each period more than offset failure 
losses, although the slower rate of growth of new 
manufacturing firms during the first year of life causes a 
dip in the number of vacancies available. The second year 
of life of manufacturing firms, however, shows a sharper 
rise in employment growth causing an increase of almost a 
thousand manufacturing jobs during that year alone.
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The trends in new service firms (Figure y.3) show a 
different picture, although failure rates are similar and 
show a continual increase in job losses due to closure (at 
least in the first two years). The slower rate of growth 
of surviving firms in the second year of life results in a 
slight net reduction in total employment during the second 
year. Despite this, however, it is clear that slightly 
over 4,000 service jobs are created in Wales between the 
time of start-up and the end of the first year of trading. 
This is mainly the result of the sheer number of new 
service firms being formed compared to those in 
manufacturing, although it is still surprising that so 
many jobs are being generated at such an early stage of 
business life.
Further analysis of Table y.2 reveals the possibility of 
quite a significant number of people working in new firms 
moving between firms as some firms fail and survivors 
grow. Interestingly, a number of these 'job hoppers' 
could actually be failed entrepreneurs, since it can be 
seen that within the three years since starting up, around 
one and a half thousand entrepreneurs will have left the 
ranks of the active entrepreneur group. Some undoubtedly 
attempt to start-up again, others may try for jobs in the 
surviving enterprises who are certainly looking tor the 
right kind of labour (see Chapter 8), although this may be 
a hard pill to swallow for those whose main motivation of 
becoming self-employed was independence.
With the problem that many new manufacturing firms had in 
finding suitable labour, it is probable that a very high 
proportion of those workers made redundant from tailing 
firms will be quickly re-employed in the surviving firms, 
who even then will be looking for labour from other 
sources to fill the vacancies. During the third year, for 
example, 546 manufacturing workers will be made redundant 
(including previous founders) and yet, 1,426 manufacturing 
vacancies will be created within the same period.
While it may be predicted that people employed in these 
new firms will be more likely to start up their own 
business than their counterparts in large firms (incubator 
hypothesis), it is also true that this may not be the case 
for those who had been employed in an infant firm before 
it had tailed. Many of these may have become 
disillusioned with entrepreneurship after experiencing
9.07
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first hand firm failure. Working in the opposite 
direction, however, are the people who are employed in a 
surviving firm that is growing quite rapidly - such people 
may be even more likely to leave and set up after being 
encouraged by business success. This suggests that an 
approach adopted by Willmer and Hoggard (1983) may be 
useful - they treat entrepreneurship as a disease which 
can be disseminated as an epidemic process. As a result 
the attitudes of people to starting out on their own is 
not static, but is seen as part of a dynamic process, 
responding to the success or failure of firms they have 
contact with.
The relative magnitude of the jobs generated by the new 
firms can be seen when they are compared to the numbers of 
confirmed redundancies occurring in Wales. During 1984 
and 1985 the average number of confirmed redundancies per 
year was roughly 13,000 . It can be seen that these were 
largely offset by the 1U,7UU new jobs created in firms 
which were started up in 1983 and which were 2 years old 
by 1985. It is possible, of course, that some of the 
confirmed redundancies were actually caused as a result of 
the new firms and while we are unable to assess the full 
significance of this it is important to note that the 
estimates for new firm employment are direct estimates and 
do not include the multiplier effects that would occur in 
other new or small firms in the region.
Disaggregating the redundancy figures to make them 
directly compatible with the survey estimates, it can be 
seen that the contribution of new firm employment to 
offsetting redundancies shows a strong sectorial bias. In 
the manufacturing sector, within 2 years of birth (in 
1983), some 2,8UU jobs had been generated in Wales, 
whereas there were around 5,500 confirmed redundancies in 
the manufacturing sector alone (excluding energy, water 
and extractive trades). Even on this simple basis where 
not all redundancies occurring are actually measured, 
2,700 manufacturing jobs were not replaced by new firms.
































































































































































































The contrast between this and the service sector is 
marked. There were, on average, only 2,1UU reported 
redundancies in the service sector in Wales over the 
period 1984-05 and yet, new firms starting up in 1983 had 
within 2 years created almost 8,QUO service jobs (and this 
excludes retail distribution), suggesting that much ot the 
increase in the employment in the service sector (compared 
to manufacturing) is due to new openings, rather than 
expansions of well established service firms.
Another approach to provide some indication of the 
importance of the estimates of new firm employment is to 
compare them with the effects of traditional regional 
policy. Previously estimates of the employment effects ot 
regional policy measures have been based on rather crude 
'shift share 1 approaches. However, new changes introduced 
in November 1984 require claimants of regional grants to 
estimate the number of actual jobs to be created as part 
of a project. (These estimates are rigourously checked by 
the Department of Trade and Industry since they represent 
the basis for calculating the grant entitlement). As a 
result it is now possible to provide direct figures on 
grant aided jobs.
Between 30 November 1984 and 30 June 1986, 14,281 new jobs 
had been grant aided under the Regional Development Grant 
scheme alone, however, of these, only 981 were in the 
service sector. (Table 9-3).
It is noticable that two-thirds of all new manufacturing 
jobs recorded under the scheme were created in small 
firms, i.e. the entire organisation including associated 
companies employing fewer than 200 people.
Although there is likely to be some overlap between new 
independent firms and those claiming regional development 
grant (see below), it can be be seen that, overall, on an 
annual basis, new independent firms create as many ir not 
more jobs than traditional regional policy instruments. 
These new jobs, however, are predominantly in the service 
sector whereas the main thrust of regional policy is in 
manufacturing. Roughly 8,000 manufacturing jobs were 
reported created during 1985, helped by regional policy, 
yet over the same period we estimate slightly under 3,OOU 
manufacturing jobs in new independent firms will have been 
generated, i.e. as a result of start-ups in 1983 alone
q. 13
Table 9.3
Jobs 'promised 1 by 
Regional Development 
grants - 29 Nov. 
to 30 June 198b
Estimated jobs created 
in new tirms starting 
in 1983 by 2nd. year 















within 2 years of business life. In other words, the main 
effect of regional development grants seem to be in aiding 
the creation of new jobs in existing manufacturing firms 
via expansions or in-moves, rather than the creation of 
new jobs in new independent (largely indigenous) firms..
The Regions
By using the same methods outlined above and making the 
major assumptions that the average start-up size and 
employment growth rates of new independent firms are 
consistent across regions of the U.K. and are assumed to 
be identical to those in the survey - it is possible to 
make very approximate estimates of jobs created in new 
manufacturing firms in the U.K. as a whole.
Table 9.4 details the estimates by the 11 standard regions 
of the U.K. Of the 16,200 manufacturing firms setting up 
in 1983, immediately providing 37,000 manufacturing jobs, 
only 10,400 were still in existence in the third year 
after start-up, but these had provided a total of almost 
121,000 badly needed manufacturing jobs. The estimates 
are made for each of the regions and are compared with the 
total manufacturing employment base for each in Table 9.5. 
Overall, new firms starting up in 1983 will have created 
slightly over 2%% of manufacturing employment (in 1983) 
within 3 years of life.
The contribution of new firms to job creation vary 
significantly across the regions and indeed highlight the 
warnings given by Storey that policies on a national scale 
designed to raise the rate of new firm formation risk 
being regionally divisive (Storey and March 1980, p.10). 
Since such policies are likely to bring a larger response 
from those living in the South East where the neea to 
create new employment is least. At the same time the 
assisted areas are likely to respond only on a lower 
scale. New firm policies adopted on a national scale, 
therefore, appear to work in the opposite direction to 
traditional regional policy.
Table 9.5 shows that the main effect of new manufacturing 
employment is in the South Last with all the other regions 
significantly behind. The contribution of new firms to 
total manufacturing employment in Scotland is only 40% of
9-15
Table 9.4
Estimated Job Creation in New Manufacturing Firms in the U.K.
(Figures 
in parenthesis are numbers of 
firms, 































































































































































































































































that in the South East. The estimates for all the 
assisted areas are below that of the national average, but 
the North of England and Scotland are particularly low. 
The rankings in Table 9.5 show, perhaps surprisingly, that 
Wales is ranked fourth with regard to the contribution 
made by new firms to manufacturing employment as a 
percentage of the total. The 3,818 manufacturing jobs 
created within 3 years by firms setting up in 1983 is 
almost 2*2% of the 154,071 manufacturing jobs in the region 
(1983). Apart from the South East, only the South West 
and East Anglia perform better than the new manufacturing 
sector of Wales.
It is difficult to put these estimates in perspective 
because we don't know what is happening to other sections 
of the economy, the rate of growth or contraction of new 
firms after the initial 3 years, or the effects of other 
new firms setting up in earlier periods. Nevertheless, 
the approach adopted here seems to offer a very lucrative 
source of information on the dynamics of new firm 
employment change and it is recommended that a number of 
surveys of new firm employment size with the age of the 
firm should be undertaken for the regions of the U.K. and 
also provide employment data beyond the first 3 years of 
trading. A large sample on this basis would greatly 
improve the confidence of the estimates made here and 
indeed the analysis could be extended to the cumulative 
effect of successive years of business start-ups.
Role and Performance of Support Agencies
With the aim of achieving new employment and self 
sustaining regional growth, a large number of support 
schemes and agencies have been set up in recent years. 
Many of these pay particular attention to new business 
ventures and the vast majority deal mainly with small 
businesses however defined.
By reducing the various frictions involved in new firm 
formation, particularly at the start-up coordination 
stage, it is hoped that there will be an increase in the 
start-up rate, which will (other things remaining the 
same) result in a larger number of jobs being created. 
Table 9.1 shows, for example, that on average tor Wales 
during the early 1980's 3^ full-time jobs were created
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within 2 years for every new business starting up (in base 
year) and in the manufacturing sector within 3 years 
almost 7^ jobs were created for every new manufacturing 
firm setting up1 .
Clearly if these various support agencies can actually 
reduce the start-up frictions sufficiently to increase the 
rate of new firm formation, then at least in the medium 
term there will be a favourable impact on the labour 
market.
Most support schemes are available on a national level, 
but most support agencies are regional in outlook, indeed 
during the last 3 years there has been a significant trend 
towards local initiatives. The WDA has recently been 
decentralised into a series of 8 regional offices, the 
percentage of local councils in Wales who provide grants
for business start-ups is higher than that of any other
p region and the rapid growth of local enterprise agencies
throughout the U.K. demonstrate this localisation of 
support agencies.
It was shown in Chapter 6 that one of the most important 
group of problems encountered by new firm founders in 
starting their business was that of a lack of information 
in general. Information about financial support schemes, 
premises, suppliers, legal obligations, obtaining finance, 
etc. The primary role of most of the support agencies is 
in fact to fill this information gap. The Small Firms 
Service is almost purely an information provider and in 
particular acts as a signpost directing business queries 
to the relevant authorities.
1 These figures are obtained by dividing the estimated 
number of jobs created after 2 years by the numbers of 
new firms actually starting, they are a net estimate 
taking into account firm failure and firm growth.
2 See Association of District Councils (1*83). p.10.
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This section, therefore, examines the performance of these 
support agencies and enterprise agencies in particular. 
Does the provision of information in fact effect in any 
way the ease of starting up the business? Are the 
characteristics, policies or attitudes of entrepreneurs 
significantly different tor those firms seeking help to 
start their business?
The sample was deliberately designed so that there were 2 
groups; the first was made up of firms whose founders had 
not had any help from the enterprise agency at all at the 
start-up stage and probably did not even have contact with 
one (post approach). The second group was made up of 
firms whose founders contacted the enterprise agency for 
help in setting up his business (pre approach).
An analysis of the 2 groups should show up the effect that 
enterprise agencies actually have on the start-up process, 
but because members of both groups had contacted an 
enterprise agency either before or after start-up, it is 
not possible to make comparisons of growth or general 
business development.
While there have been a number of other studies on the 
performance of support agencies, in general they rely on 
the views of the clients themselves, rather than testing 
for differences in actual characteristics and showing 
exactly what (if any) differences exist as a result of 
contact with an agency.
A report on the clients views of enterprise agencies was 
published by the Department of the Environment in iy84. 
The major findings were:-
(a) 45% of clients visited the agency at least 2 months 
before setting up in business and a further 15% at 
about the same time they set up.
(b) Most (65%) were looking for general information about 
setting up, especially financial advice.
(c) 65% of clients said the advice they received 
significantly helped. However, a quarter of clients 
said the advice was of no real assistance.
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(d) 25% of clients contacted enterprise agencies only and 
did not seek alternative help or advice.
(e) 85% of clients said that they would recommend others 
to visit the agencies.
Clearly, local enterprise agencies are in a unique 
position to encourage business start-up and in particular, 
growth of indigenous firms, indeed of all the support 
agencies they have significantly better relationships with 
new firms. Table 9.6 shows the ratings given by founders 
interviewed in the present survey to 'support agencies' in 
Wales.
It is not possible to determine the liklihood of new firms 
actually contacting enterprise agencies, however, it is 
clear that about two-thirds of founders thought that the 
service enterprise agencies (largely free) gave were 
either excellent or good, significantly higher than that 
of the other agencies shown.
The Small Firms Service was second in the ratings, but 
over two-thirds of all firms did not have any contact 
whatsoever with them.
The agency with the highest profile was the W.D.A., with 
almost ~/0% of new firms contacting them for start-up 
advice. However, the vast majority of these firms were 
clearly not satisfied with the service obtained from the 
W.D.A. 69.4% of firms who actually had contact with the 
W.D.A. thought they were 'poor' and together, B3.b% 
thought that they were poor or just reasonable, likewise 
only 1 of the 36 tirms thought that the service of the 
W.D.A. was excellent. In general, considering most of 
this advice is free, the performance of support agencies 
in the view of their new firm clients leaves a lot to be 
desired. The one exception seems to be enterprise 
agencies, but even these get labelled 'poor' by about one 
fifth of their clients.
On balance, new businessmen tend to be overwhelmed by the 
number of support agencies available for them to contact. 
42.8% of founders thought that there were too many
9.21
different sources of advice 1 , many telt that they were 
simply being passed around from one person to another and 
sometimes were being lead on, with very little prospect of 
any practical help. A small number of founders were, in 
fact, highly critical of certain agencies (the W.D.A. in 
particular), to the point of hostility and bitterness. 
Some had been misinformed and regarded time spent in 
interviews with some agencies as time wasting. perhaps 
the most general criticism was that advice and information 
on particular schemes or particular problem areas was not 
volunteered and to get anything out of the agencies you 
had to know exactly what to ask for. (This was 
particularly true of grant aided schemes). These problems 
mean that 49.1%^ of all respondents thought that in 
general the standard of help available from agencies as a 
whole was 'poor'.
From the above it can be argued that enterprise agencies 
have a more significant, positive impact on the process of 
firm formation than that of any of the other support 
agencies.
An attempt will now be made to identify the nature of this 
impact to see what enterprise agencies actually achieve in 
attempting to further new business development in their 
locality. The main problem in comparing subgroups within 
the overall sample is the need to control, for other 
relationships in such a small sample, rigorous controlling 
would make like pairs so few in number that the level of 
confidence attached to the results would be very low. 
However, there are no readily identifiable biases in the 
sample of firms approaching enterprise agencies before or 
after start-up (no obvious spurious relationship exists).
The main differences in the 2 groups which cannot be 
related to the timing of their approach to an enterprise 
agency are those in motivations tor becoming self 
employed. Table 9.8 shows that firms approaching 
enterprise agencies for help after they had started their
1 42.8% thought too much help available
40.0% thought enough help was available
17.2% though that not enough help was available















































































































































































































































































































































































business were more likely to have left the position of 
last employment as a result of closure and redundancy than 
those who obtained significant help from enterprise 
agencies in order to start-up. This latter group left 
employment for numerous other reasons, ranging from 
getting the sack to being long term unemployed. In 
relative terms, twice as many of the post start-up 
approach group left employment specifically 'to start-up 1 , 
than the group of pre start-up approaches. This is to 
some extent reflected in the reasons given by founders for 
starting a business (Table 9.7), where fewer of the former 
groups started because there were no other jobs, although 
the same proportion of each group claimed they 'had always 
wanted to start their own business'.
Start-ups aided by enterprise agencies actually started at 
a smaller size in terms of employment than those who were 
not helped by them (1.7 compared to the average of 2.4 
full-time employees) .
There is practically no difference in the legal structure 
of businesses between the before and after approaches and 
yet the length of time taken to start-up does vary, on 
average it took slightly over t months from the time it 
was decided to go ahead with the project until trading 
first took place, tor firms who took advice from 
enterprise agencies. The firms starting up without help 
from an agency actually took less time (about 2 months 
less on average) to start the business.
This suggests that enterprise agencies may be stressing 
caution and increase planning, whereas a number of firms 
who set-up without this advice did so almost on the spur 
of the moment (6 firms were founded within 4 weeks). 
There is no evidence that those people who went to an 
enterprise agency for help in starting up have more 
problems than new firms in general, at least in terms of 
the number of problems (see Table 9.9), although it was 
not possible to measure the relative importance of 
individual problems. Because of the difference in timing 
of the help received from an agency we are unable to
The average rate of growth of post start-up approaches 
was slightly higher than the other group even allowing 
for their older age on average.
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Table 9.7 Reasons Given by Pounders for Starting a Business;






























Source: Survey (South Wales,
9.25
T&ble 9.b Reason Given by Founders for Leaving Employment;
By Approach to Enterprise Agency
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9.9 General Problems Encountered in Setting Up
the Business; By Approach to Enterprise Agencies
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identify whether the general problems mentioned were in 
fact caused by the agencies or were in evidence before 
actually contacting them.
Those seeking help tended to have less problems in finding 
labour initially, although this may be due to the lower 
start-up size on average rather than anything the 
enterprise agency was able to do. Problems of finance and 
in particular, problems associated with the lack of 
information, were more significant in the group who 
obtained start-up help than those that did not and indeed, 
these were the major reasons for approaching an enterprise 
agency, as reported by the Department of the Environment 
(1^84, pp.b-7). Since we are unable to draw any firm 
conclusions from the mentions of problems at start-up, we 
now look at individual features of businesses to identify 
the effects of support agencies in general.
With many firms seeking help from enterprise agencies, 
specifically on financial matters, significant differences 
are likely to be apparent. The average start-up capital 
of firms receiving help from enterprise agencies was only 
slightly over £8,000 which was only half that required by 
firms who had started up. Despite this, significantly 
less use was made of bank finance (either loan or 
overdraft) than the group who received start-up help 
(Table 9.10). While the importance of personal savings 
was roughly the same in both groups, those firms starting 
with no agency help relied more on loans or gifts from 
friends or relatives and especially on obtaining further 
funds from a financial partner.
The main difference between the 2 groups with regard to 
the problems of obtaining bank finance was that banks 
seemed to have more confidence in the projects proposed by 
enterprise agency clients than those who were starting up 
on their own. (Table y.ll). As such, banks were asking 
for guarantees that this latter group were either unable 
or unwilling to provide. It can also be seen that a 
higher proportion of founders who aid not obtain start-up 
advice actually had problems in obtaining outside finance, 
although this may be due to the higher start-up sums 
involved, rather than the effect of enterprise agencies in 
overcoming financing problems of new firms.
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Table 9.10 Financial Characteristics of New Firms
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Those firms that did obtain advice from enterprise 
agencies, generally did more preparatory work in the 
planning of the start-up than other firms and indeed, this 
may account for the larger periods taken tor these to 
start their business. Table b.2 shows that relatively 
more firms receiving start-up help had produced a formal 
business plan, but this was particularly the case with 
regard to market research where 57% of this group 
undertook what they regarded as significant efforts on the 
market research front, compared to less than a third of 
those firms which had been set-up independently of any 
advice. Interestingly, however, it is clear that those 
firms who had a cash flow plan produced for them, usually 
free of charge by the enterprise agency, very rarely used 
this as a monitoring or updating device (only 15% used 
their business plan again), in contrast those firms which 
did not receive the benefit of free business plans and 
cash flow forecasting, although slightly less likely to 
have a plan, were more likely to use them again after the 
start-up itself (43% did so). Perhaps this group valued 
the business plans produced initially more than the group 
being helped by enterprise agencies either because they 
had to pay expensive accountants fees in their preparation 
or because they more readily identified the importance of 
management control and planning information.
However, it is noticable that there was no difference in 
the use of book-keeping and accountancy information 
between the two groups, in both cases around 8O% said that 
this was used for tax purposes only. Clearly enterprise 
agencies have little effect on the sophistication of 
accounting procedures adopted let alone on the recognition 
of the need for such basic information. Pricing methods 
of members of both groups were, in general, quite similar 
with slightly under 50% in both groups deriving a price 
based on the benchmark price of nearest competitors. 
Cost plus pricing was applied equally between both groups. 
The main difference in initial pricing methods was that of 
the group of firms setting up without agency contact. 
About 20% relied on crude guessing (usually of some 
unsystematic price discrimination), whereas only 5.5% of 
mentions of the enterprise group were of this type. This 
may partly be explained by the lower proportion of these 
firms producing formal business plans and so have little 
to go on when setting a price.
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Since the main role of an enterprise agency is that of an 
information provider, it is necessary to test whether 
there are in fact significant differences in awareness and 
use of various schemes between those firms receiving help 
at start-up and those that do not.
Perhaps most surprising of all is that only 48% of firms 
seeking initial advice for enterprise agencies actually 
knew if they were in an assisted area or not. This is 
slightly lower than for the sample as a whole, but the 
difference is not significant, bearing in mind the 
sampling error involved. While an analysis of firms which 
had never approached an enterprise agency at all may 
discover an even lower awareness of the assisted status of 
business location, it is obviously tar from satisfactory 
that half of the firms who were clients of enterprise 
agencies either did not know or were wrong about the 
assisted area status of their business.
Table 9.12 provides further evidence on the awareness 1 and 
use of financial support schemes.
Only one third of the aided group of firms actually looked 
around for alternative sites compared to the 48% of other 
firms. The difference is largely explained by the 
existence of start-up units available to clients of most 
enterprise agencies which offer very advantageous 'fast 
in, easy out' rental terms.
The level of awareness of the different schemes vary 
considerably, but are generally higher than that reported 
by the Economists Advisory Group in June 1983 (pp.2b-27). 
They found, for example, that only 36% of small firms in 
their survey were aware (after prompting) of the small 
firms loan guarantee scheme. Twice as many firms in the 
present survey (Table 9.2) were aware of this scheme.
The awareness in Table 9.2 refers to awareness after 
prompting, the basics of the schemes were explained to 
founders during the interviews, since they tended not 
to know schemes by their names.
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Table 9.12
AWARENESS AND USE OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT SCHEMES
Figures 
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Taking each scheme in turn:-
The small firms loan guarantee scheme is available on 
a national basis with few other restrictions, in fact 
53 of the firms in this survey would be eligible and 
although most firms were aware of this scheme, only 3 
actually made use of it. At first sight it is 
surprising that a lower proportion of firms seeking 
advice from enterprise agencies, actually knew about 
the scheme, however, enterprise agencies in general 
were dismayed at the lack of readiness of banks to 
support a Government loan guarantee. Because of this 
they may have decided not to inform clients about the 
scheme in an effort not to raise their hopes of 
obtaining a loan especially since on average each 
enterprise agency had only used the scheme a handful 
of times.
The business expansion scheme formerly called the 
business start-up scheme is only available to limited 
companies and although only 9 firms in this survey 
would have been eligible, many more could have been it 
they simply became incorporated. The practical 
problem with this scheme is that only slightly over a 
quarter of firms (even after prompting) were aware of 
its existence. None in fact used it.
Regional development grants were known to over 80% of 
the firms in the survey, although we have seen 
previously that only around half knew if they would, 
in fact be elgible. Since only manufacturing firms 
were eligible pre 1985, a maximum of 39 new firms 
could have received financial support for capital 
investment, of these only 9 firms actually applied tor 
a regional development grant and surprisingly these 
were mainly firms who had not had any contact with 
enterprise agencies at the start-up stage. This group 
in fact were significantly more aware of development 
grants than those who received help in starting up.
4. During interviews with representatives of the 
enterprise agencies in Wales, it was clear that they
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regarded regional selective assistance (now selective 
financial assistance) as being tor large projects 
rather than new indigenous firms. As a result only 4 
of the 26 firms who approached enterprise agencies 
were aware of this assistance. Twice as many of the 
other group of firms knew of regional selective 
assistance and indeed, 4 of the 5 firms receiving 
these grants had not approached agencies at start-up.
By far the most used of these schemes was the 
enterprise allowance scheme which is an allowance of 
£40 per week for the self employed for the first year 
of business life. The scheme is nationally available 
with few restrictions. 51 of the 57 firms in this 
survey were eligible for this, however, the scheme had 
not started up when some of the firms were being 
formed and the scheme is not retrospective. Because 
of this, awareness the scheme is of major importance, 
since applications cannot be made after trading has 
taken place - this in fact proved to be a major cause 
of hostility among some founders who either had not 
been told or were misinformed about the scheme. 
Awareness of this scheme was significantly higher 
among firms seeking help trom enterprise agencies and 
in fact, half of all these obtained a place on the 
scheme, compared to only 1 in 10 of those who had not 
approached the agencies.
It is difficult to draw conclusions from this, although 
general awareness of schemes is less for those firms who 
were clients of enterprise agencies at the start-up stage. 
It seems that this is not so much a failing on the part of 
the information providers, but that they were being highly 
selective in the information that they gave, probably to 
avoid confusion - while this may be a good thing at the 
start-up stage it results in a low general awareness of a 
number of other schemes that firms could potentially make 
use of. On the basis of this evidence the hypothesis that 
clients of enterprise agencies are significantly more 
well-informed than other firms in general, remain unproven 
and indeed, it is not possible to reject the opposite case 
that they are in fact less well-informed particularly 
about support schemes than other firms who had not 
received start-up advice.
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Table 9.13 Perceived Relationship with Banks;














1 Excellent Good Reasonable Poor
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1 15 b 2 2
1
1
1 (6U.U) (24. 0) 18.0) (8.0)
1
I 11 83 b
1
1
1 (40.0) (28.6) (10.7) (21.4)
1 2b 14 5 8
(49.0) (2b.4) (9.4) (15.1)
Source: Survey
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The most noticable effect that enterprise agencies have on 
new firms is however, intangible. After receiving help 
and advice from a local enterprise agency the 
relationships with other bodies seem to improve 
significantly, other support schemes seem to take more 
seriously referrals from enterprise agencies and banks in 
particular seem to be able to put more confidence in the 
prospective new firm founder who has done his homework and 
obtained advice from an agency. Table y.13 shows that 
founders thought that the relationship with their banks at 
the start-up stage were better than those who had not come 
after an enterprise agency counselling session. This is 
clearly an important advantage to have during the complex 
activities of the start-up coordination process.
Referring back to Table 9.6, attitudes to support agencies 
in general are more favourable if founders had visited an 
enterprise agency. (The exception is county councils, but 
these have an important role in sponsoring enterprise 
agencies anyway). It seems that again, enterprise 
agencies were selecting the information about relevant 
agencies to give to their clients since contact with 
outside agencies are lower for those firms being helped by 
enterprise agencies than those who were not. As a result 
more favourable relationships exist, although these remain 
far from satisfactory, considering the counselling is 
supposed to be free of charge and helpful. For example, 
almost two-thirds of firms who had approached an 
enterprise agency still thought the W.D.A. was 'poor'.
The Scope for Small Firms Policies in Wales
It was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that there is potential 
scope for small firm policies in Wales. It was shown that 
overall rates of start-up in Welsh manufacturing and 
service sectors were significantly below those of the U.K. 
as a whole.
Table 9.14 shows the actual numbers of business start-ups 
as measured by V.A.T. registrations. These are compared 
with the number of start-ups that would be expected if all 
counties of Wales had the same rate of new firm formation 
as the U.K. average. Thus, if some small firms policy was 
available in the Welsh region that was able to raise the 
rate of firm birth to that of the U.K., then another 214
9.37
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(b) LE£Brtnent of Tracte and Industry, Aelysis of Sectors of Ejsiness 
by Gtxnties for ]i«>-19B3, British RfrinpRS, ISfclS, 18th Cbrtary.
Notes: (1) Ejpected figures based on U.K. averaga start-up rate.
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sinpLe average per anrun.
(3) Within 2 years of start-tp (Sse ^pandix E).
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manufacturing and almost 700 service sector firms being 
started up in Wales as a whole would provide an estimated 
3,000 jobs within the first two years of start-up in 
industrial South Wales alone. Mid Glamorgan would be the 
principle beneficiary of such a successful policy with 
almost 1,000 new jobs being created in that county (split 
30%-70% between manufacturing and service employment 
respectively).
A method for partially analysing the scope and impact of 
small firm policies is provided in Appendix F. Based on 
for foregoing analysis and the review of the financial 
screening process in Chapter 5, a simple simulation model 
is outlined. By simulating successive applications for 
financial backing it is possible to begin to examine the 
effect of various policies designed to increase the rate 
of new firm formation.
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It has been shown that the birth of new independent firms 
in Wales has proved to be an important source of new 
employment during the early 1980's and small firms 
policies which are successful in being able to increase 
the rate of business start-ups in Wales to that of the 
U.K. as a whole may further increase the importance of 
this source of new employment. However, an important 
warning must be borne in mind when drawing conclusions 
from this and all other studies of new firm formation 
which are quite understandably dominated by supply based 
factors (the supply of entrepreneurs).
Research has shown that the rate of new firm formation is 
effected by a whole range of factors, the size 
distribution of existing firms, the industrial structure 
at regional and sub-regional level, the occupational 
structure of the workforce, the stability of local labour 
markets, mobility of labour, regional differences in risk 
aversion and wage rate differentials. The most striking 
observation about these explanations is, however, that 
they all affect only the supply side of the new firm 
formation analysis. Policies which take these into 
account without consideration of the underlying demand 
factors may simply result in higher failure rates, lower 
profitability and entrepreneurial apathy.
The problem of course, is that determining a 'demand for 
new firms' function is almost an impossible task 
especially at the high levels of sectorial and spacial 
aggregation with which most studies deal. The problem of 
identification (of the demand elements) on the part of the 
researcher does not of course mean that they can be 
ignored or that they are unimportant. For service firms 
in particular the demand for new firms will depend on the 
level of aggregate demand at their local level and for the 
economy as a whole the demand for new firms will be 
related positively to the rate of economic and technical 
change (both at the commodity and factor market level), to 
the level of demand and potential demand (for products and
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services not yet on the market) to the ease of 
substitution between products of existing firms and new 
firms and to the limits to growth of the existing stock of 
business in the economy.
Due to the obvious problems involved in the measurement of 
these influences it is possible that further research into 
the theory of new firm formation may be better devoting 
its effort to more theoretical rather than applied 
approaches adopted so far.
The process leading up to the formation of a new firm was 
viewed as a series of filters, with the numbers of 
potential entrepreneurs decreasing as each filter is 
passed. Although the importance of the personal 
assessment filter was recognised it is the financial 
screening process which was analysed in depth.
The financial screening process was shown to have 
significant effects on both the number and type of 
business start-ups. Almost half of the founders thought 
that the availability or otherwise of finance had actually 
effected adversely the size of eventual start-up (in terms 
of capital and labour employed) and around a third claimed 
that the lack of available finance had prevented them from 
proceeding with other business ideas.
With at least 2/3rds of all founders requiring banks 
financial backing, it is clear that understanding the 
nature of the financial screening process is vital to the 
study of the new firm formation process. It was shown 
that the financial screen can be viewed as a set of 
criteria which reduce to a largely subjective assessment 
of the founder and his project. Research into barrier 
theory and limit pricing may, therefore, be usefully 
directed at the nature of the financial screen as a 
secondary barrier to entry since it effectively 
synthesises and evaluates independently the significance 
of the various primary barriers to entry.
The study has provided information 'first hand 1 so to 
speak on barriers to entry and in particular, barriers as 
a result of existing firms reaction patterns. It was 
found that new firms in the final products (and business 
services) sector tend to be more aware of obsticles to 
starting up (as a result of existing firms practices) than
1 0.02
those in intermediate product groups. Overall, almost 
half (47%) expected a reaction from incumbent firms in 
response to their entry to the market and slightly more 
(57%) actually experienced a significant incumbant 
reaction. The most important reaction of competitors was 
in fact to reduce their prices and increase their 
advertising or 'servicing 1 activities. Finally, despite 
being considerably smaller in terms of entry size, 
reaction patterns seem to be higher for new firms than 
other modes of entry such as direct acquisition.
An extensive review of the literature has revealed that 
this study is one of the few to actually look at how new 
firms actually set a price for their product or service in 
practice, both at the time of initial trading and 
subsequently. It has been shown that existing theories of 
product pricing were inappropriate for the rather 
specialised, if not unique, problem of new firm pricing 
decisions.
The widespread practice of benchmarking at least in the 
early stages of trading invalidates the concept of 
elasticity in an operational sense. (Indeed, only a few 
firms had actually attempted to experiment with price 
changes). The section on new firm pricing practices casts 
considerable doubt on the widespread validity of the cost 
plus or full cost pricing principle. While some firms 
undoubtedly use this principle, almost any price however 
determined could be seen to be made up of a cost element 
and a profit element. Thus, studies of pricing practices 
tend to look at the process after the decision is made and 
so the price derived can most easily be explained as a 
cost plus some percentage mark up. This, however, is a 
description of what the price is, but not how it is 
arrived at.
The model of new firm pricing suggested in this study 
argues that price itself is in fact set before costs are 
even calculated. The initial price is benchmarked against 
the new firm's nearest competitor in both spacial and 
product characteristic terms. A decision is then taken 
either to charge the same or a lower price with the 
widespread recognition of product differentiation. For
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many new firms the model suggests that it is cost and not 
price that is the variable and the size of the margin 
between the two is an important element in the founders 
assessment of the risk of the venture and thus to initial 
size and even its overall viability.
The infant stages of business life are associated with 
rapid growth in employment, almost doubling in size by the 
end of the first year alone. Despite this growth, 
however, there is very little increase in the 
sophistication of marketing approaches or of accountancy 
and management information systems. (If anything the 
latter actually deteriorates to little more than 
compliance with legal requirements).
The limits of growth of these new firms are dominated by 
demand factors. However, these are heavily concentrated 
in those firms who are currently operating at low levels 
of capacity. The most important constraint on the growth 
of those firms currently running at high capacity levels 
is not market related, but is the problem of finding 
skilled and trustworthy labour.
One further implication for further research into new 
firms in their job generation guise can be derived from 
the methods employed in this study to estimate the job 
creation potential of new firms in Wales. A large scale 
survey of employment growth in new and young firms in the 
U.K. (even based on a simple telephone survey) and its 
regions and which covered both manufacturing and service 
sectors would allow far more acurate estimates to be made 
of gross job creation in new firms. This along with new 
and updated V.A.T. statistics on business births and 
lifespan would greatly improve our knowledge of the 
dynamics of change in new firm employment, without 
encountering the problems associated with the components 
of change change approach at the aggregate level. Thus, 
although the actual estimates made here must remain highly 
tentative (based on such a small sample) the approach 
adopted seems to offer a cost effective method to estimate 
the importance of new firms to the job creation process.
Overall rates of business start-up in Wales (1979-83) were 
12.6% below the national average. Furthermore, each of 
the counties in Industrial South Wales have start-up rates 
lower than that for Wales as a whole. Start-Up rates are
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particularly low in the professional and 'other 1 services 
sector, but also in wholesale and manufacturing. The 
latter is almost 30% below that of the U.K.
Despite this, it is estimated that new independent firms 
setting up in Wales during 1983 had provided over 10,000 
new jobs within 2 years of start-up - about a quarter of 
these were in the manufacturing sector.
This particular sample suggests that the effects of 
regional industrial structure on new firm formation, 
although important, are generally less significant in 
Wales than for other parts of the U.K. The exception to 
this is the ownership status of incubator plants where the 
dominance of 'medium sized 1 branch plants seem to have 
adverse effects on the rate of firm formation.
The proportion of school leavers going on to degree 
courses in Wales is the highest in the U.K. It seems that 
new Welsh entrepreneurs in the 1980's are more likely to 
have degree qualifications than those in the North region 
or the South Coast of England. This may be a particular 
advanatage since firms owned by graduates are seen to out­ 
perform other new firms in terms of growth in both 
employment and turnover.
The motivations of founders of new firms in Wales in the 
1980's seem to be less reliant on the positive pull 
aspects of entrepreneurship than studies for other areas 
in the 1970's have suggested. In fact, at least a third 
of all reasons for becoming self-employed in Wales are the 
result of being pushed or forced into entrepreneurship. 
The specific motive being the lack of available 
alternative employment.
Unless these differences in reported motivations for 
founding a business can be explained solely in terms of 
regional characteristics then it appears that changes in 
the overall economic climate during the last 15 years may 
have had significant effects on the factors underlying the 
decision to start-up a new business.
1 0.05
APPENDIX A
The following tables are derived from our own database 
(SWISS) which is itself based on Mid Glamorgan's 
Industrial Development Units, INDIS DATABASE.
For each of the following tables, the figures in 
parenthesis represent the number of firms in each 
classification and size band (based on number of 
employees). Other figures represent the total number of 
employees employed by firms in each classification.
Tables A.I - A.5 show the size distribution of 
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Size distribution of manufacturing firms










































Size distribution of manufacturing employees in





Size distribution of "independent" manufacturing
firms in four counties of South Wales Jan. '86
Source: SWISS
Figure A.A
Size distribution of "independent" manufacturing






SMALL FIRMS START-UP QUESTIONNAIRE
Small Business Unit W. R. M. C.
1. (a) Was approacn to Enterprise Agency made betore or after 
start-up? ..............................................
(b) Name of interviewee ....................................
(c) Date of interview ....................................
(d) Duration of interview ..................................
Characteristics of Entrepreneur
2. Entrepreneur: Male ( ) Female ( )




50 + ( )
4. How many OTHER start-ups have you been involved in? { )
5. Any experience of a small business environment before start­ 
up? (Is Yes, please specify) Yes No
( ) ( )
6. Previous employment (Yes) (No) and position held
( ) ( ) ..............................
7. How many jobs prior to start-up? ( )
(a) Was last job in a Small Firm ( ) 0-50 employees
Medium Firm ( ) 51-200 employees
Large Firm ( ) 200+ employees
(b) Nature of business of last employer ....................
(c) Name of Company of last employer .......................
(d) Location of Head Office of last employer ...............
B.01
Questionnaire (cont/d)
8. Reason for leaving previous employer prior to setting up your 
own business:
9. County of Birtn .....................
County of residence prior to start-up
10. Education: Number of years at school ( )
Further Education (specify) 
Certificates/Diplomas, etc.
11. Number of hours worked:
Currently Start-Up
Hours per day 
Days per week




13. Name of this business ......................................
14. Did you (a) found this tirm yourself ( )
(b) found this firm with others ( )
(c) buy this firm ( )
(d) inherit ( )
(e) other (specify) ( )
15. Date of start-up ...........................................
16. Location of start-up ......................................
	NOW START-UE
17. Legal form: Sole trader ( ) { )
Partnership ( ) ( )
Cooperative ( ) ( )
Public (quoted) limited Co. ( ) ( )
Private (unquoted) limited Co. ( ) ( )
Unlimited Co. ( ) ( )
18. Nature of business ..........................................
19. How long did it take to set up this business? ...............











Sub-contract workers Male (
Sub-contract workers Female (
B.03
Questionnaire (cont/d)
22. Within the next 2 years, do you expect to change employment?
Take on ( )
Make redundant ( ) (Nos.) 
Same ( )




Increase considerably ( )
24. (a) Why did you decide on this location for start-up?
(b) Do you expect to move?
25. Is this site (Excellent) (Good) (Reasonable) (Poor)
26. Are you located in an assisted area? (Yes) (No) (Don't Know)
27. When deciding on this location did you take account of 
assisted areas and their incentives?
( Ye s) ( No) 
If Yes, please give details:
28. Did you look at alternative locations or sites? (Yes) (No)
29. Did you look at cost comparisons between sites? (Yes) (No)
30. Approximate size of floor space: ..




32. Source of Finance for start-up:









33. Number of sources of finance used:
























36. List the major problems encountered 
outside finance:
by trying to raise
B.05
Questionnaire (cont/d)
37. When starting up did you prepare a Business Plan?
Yes No
If Yes, (a) Did you conduct market research? ( ) ( )
(b) Did you produce cash flow forecasts? ( ) ( )
(c) Have you used this business plan? ( ) ( )
(d) Comments:
38. Please indicate: Yes No 
Are you aware of:
Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme 
Did you make use of it? ( ) ( )
Enterprise Allowance Scheme 
Did you make use of it? ( ) ( )
Business Expansion Scheme 
Did you make use of it? ( ) ( )
Regional Development Grants 
Did you make use of it? ( ) ( )
Selective Financial Assistance 
Did you make use of it? ( ) ( )
39. What criteria do you think Banks use in assessing 
applications for Finance of a business start-up?
B.06
Questionnaire (cont/d)







41. Did the availability of Finance:-
smaller than you intended
(c) prevent you from proceeding with other 



























































( ) ( )
42. Who does the book-Keeping?






















43. For what purpose do you use book-keeping?




44. Percentage change in the price you charge since start-up
45. How did you determine the price at which you sold your 
product or service when you first started trading?
46. How do you determine prices now?
47. Have you experimented with changing your prices? Yes No
48. If there was a fall in demand for your product would you say 
that your major reaction would be to:
reduce output ( )
reduce prices ( )
remain the same ( )
B.08
Questionnaire (cont/d)
49. What goals do your pricing/output decisions aim to achieve?
	Start-Up Now
survival ( ) ( )
satisfactory profit ( ) ( )
profit maximisation ( ) ( )
revenue maximisation ( ) ( )
market share ( ) ( )





50. At start-up did you plan ahead? Up to 12 months ( ) ( )
Over 12 months ( ) ( )
Not at all ( ) ( )
51. Do you currently plan ahead? yes ( )
Not at all ( )
52. (a) At start-up what % of capital spending was for 
secondhand equipment? ( ) %
(b) Currently ( ) %
53. How did you decide the scale (output/service) at which you 
started up?
54. What % of any investment you intend would you class as:-
Replacement investment ( ) % 
Active investment ( ) %
55. When studying worthwhile investment
Yes No
(a) Do you/have you made detail cash flow
forecasts for investment ( ) ( )
(b) Do you use any of the following (descriptions given)
payback period ( ) ( )
rate of return method ( ) { )
discounted cash flow ( ) ( )
none ( ) ( )
trial and error ( ) ( )
B.10
Questionnaire (cont/d)
56. Vvhen considering any investment in physical equipment do you




Interest rates ( )
Depreciation ( )
57. Given your current facilities, wnat level of capacity is 
currently being used (% capacity utilisation)?
58. What limits your production to this level of utilisation? 




59. If you had competition at start-up, were you aware of any 
obstacles to your entry into their market? Yes No
Yes No 
If Yes, did the competition react to your entry? ( ) ( )
(a) Did you expect them to react? { ) ( )
(b) How did they react? (specify) ( ) ( )
60. Do you consider your firm to be innovative? Yes No
(a) at start up ( ) ( )
(b) since start up ( ) ( )
61. How has your business developed compared with your 




62. At start-up what proportion of tne following were in each 
area?
Local 
(30 miles) Regional U.K. Abroad
All supplies 
Service inputs
^» «—"»"•• ^»«"»^» "» ^ ̂  ̂»———— ^ ̂  -» .»^B«B •* ..____ ____ ~v ____ ___ ^M
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63. What proportion of the following is currently in each area?
Local 
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All products/services 
Fixed investment







65. Who sells your product? (a) At start-up ...............
(b) Now .......................
65.1 How did you find out where to obtain local supplies?
65.2 How did you identify potential buyers?
65.3 How did you find your largest customer?
66. How do you distribute your goods?
Start-Up Now
Own Transport ( ) ( )
Road ( ) ( )
Air ( ) ( )
Hired vehicle ( ) ( )
Rail ( ) ( )
67. (a) What proportion of your total sales are accounted for by 
your largest customer?
(b) What proportion of your total raw materials are 
accounted for by your largest supplier?
68. Is your main competition from:
Imports ( )
Small firms in U.K. ( )
Large firms in U.K. ( )
B.U
Questionnaire (cont/d)
69. If you have a competitive advantage does it lie in:
Price ( )
Quality/Precision ( )




Locational factors ( )
70. Do you advertise? Yes ( ) No ( )
71. If Yes, in what form? Start-Up Now
Trade journals ( ) ( )
Leaflets ( ) ( )
Press ( ) ( )
Yellow pages ( ) ( )
Mail shots { ) ( )
T.V. ( ) ( )
Radio ( ) ( )
72. Have you conducted market research since start-up?
Yes ( ) No ( )
73. What exactly have you done?
74. Have you thought of: Yes No 
(a) Diversifying ( ) ( )
(b) Moving completely into another
product/service area ( ) ( )
75. Are you looking for new opportunities to move into?
Yes ( ) No ( )
76. Do you looK for changes in technology which may affect your
business?




77. General problems encountered in setting up your business;
78. Name/list agencies who could help at start-up and in the 
initial years:
79. Name agencies actually contacted: 
(a) at start-up
(b) since
80. What do you think of the amount and standard of help 
available to start-up situations in general? 
(Rate amount of help - too much, enough, not enough)
(Rate standard of help - Excellent, Good, Reasonable, Poor)




82. Turnover now ......................
Turnover in first year of start-up
83. (a) In your opinion, how profitable is your firm? 
(as a percentage of turnover)
very profitable ( )
considerably profitable ( )
moderately profitable ( )
slightly profitable ( )
not profitable ( )
(b) If possible give exact figure (%)
84. Has the growth of the firm been stunted because:
(a) difficult to obtain finance Yes ( ) No ( )
(b) other (specify)
85. Have you attended any courses on business development?
Yes No
(a) Prior to start-up ( ) ( )
(b) Since start-up ( ) ( )
Would you be interested in attending courses?




86. What advice would you offer to an entrepreneurial minded 
young person who would like to start their own business?





1. Reason for Self Employment
a. No other jobs
b. Always wanted to
c. Money/become rich
d. Independence
e. Gap in market or opportunity - idea/innovation
f. Finance available
g. Hobby/interest
h. Motivation, particular skills
i. Other





e. Left specifically to start-up
f. previous business problems





3. Problems in Obtaining Outside Finance
a. None needed
b. No problems
c. No collateral or security
d. Not prepared to risk house
e. Timescales for funding decisions
f. Interest rates too high
g. Banks lack of belief in idea
h. Problems with Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme
i. Women having to have husbands collateral
-j. Other




d. Profitability and potential
e. Track record experience











f. Higher profile - better servicing
g. Physical threats, court actions, etc,
h. Previous employer pressure
i. No reaction - were too small
1 . Other
6. Pricing Methods
a. Price set to undercut competitors cost plus 
margin
b. Costs only, no markup
c. Price to cover living expenses
d. Price derived from business plan estimates
e. Our product is better/different from competitors:
(i) charge same price as them
(11) undercut them 
f. Set elsewhere - supplier or franchise
C.03
Coding Frames (cont/d)
g. Cost plus - not so dependent on competitors
h. Price haggling - bargaining
i. Price discrimination
j. Crude guess - price feels right
k. Price set to equal existing firms
1. Other




d. Static - stable size
e. Offer better service
f. Improve stock levels - product range
g. Move premises
h. Expand market share - employment to grow
i. Other









g. Own time, effort
h. Seasonal demand
i. RISK (courage)
j. Faith in labour




o. Sales agents, etc.
p. Capacity of machinery, etc.
q. Marketing effort and advertising
9. General Problems Encountered 
a. None really at start-up 
b. Finding the working market
c. Mainly in setting up rather than running it 
d. Adequate finance for stocks
e. Getting suppliers to supply -
Negotiate suppliers terms/outside Wales suppliers
C.05
Coding Frames (cont/d)
f. No practical/technical (space) help
g. Lock profits to plough back.
h. Raising money
i. Own motivation, impetus, risk factor
j. Lack of help generally - info/general
k. Finding premises at size and price
1. Bureaucracy - timescales (time to plan, etc. and 
	to react)
m. Size to start - price to start
n. Client reputation - slow process - confidence
o. Secondhand equipment - problems of info and where 
	to buy
p. Time to train staff
q. Employees (finding) - problem
r. Partnership problems
s. Recession
t. Debtor age - cash flow
u. Administration - burden
v. Credit worthiness
w. Advertising - burden
C.06
Coding Frames (cont/d)
10. Factors Stunting Growth 
a. Delay in supplies of 
b. Site 
c. Fire/accidents, etc./health





f. Management resources/own effort and time
g. Lack Government financial help - finance
h. Lack profitability - plough back
i. Competition
j. Space
k. Experience - lack of
1. Market demand - recession
m. Confidence of clients - product tests, etc
n. Finance - cash flow
o. Seasonal trade
p. Bureaucracy and local planners
C.07
APPENDIX D
A Representative Mode1 of New Firm Pricing
The evidence presented here suggests that a reasonable 
coherent approach to determining price and scale decisions 
of new firms is possible and such an explanation might 
apply equally well to both manufacturing and service 
sectors. It is suggested that an eclectic model can be 
made up of at least four stages.
Stage 1; The Competition
The entrepreneur has already decided the type of new 
business he wishes to start. The business is invariably 
of the functionally identical Kind (to other 
products/services on the market), but this is of little 
help in further describing new firm behaviour. In most 
cases the founder regards his product as being different, 
or better than the competition and is at least likely to 
have some geographical location advantage.
The founder subjectively looks at the competition and 
bundles together their various product characteristics of 
quality, location, service, function, etc. These provide 
'benchmarks' for the new firm's decision-making and can be 
represented by the third dimension in Figure 1. Points 
A,B,C and D represent the nearest competitors (based on 
the subjective bundles) and a range of prices. If the 
characteristics are close together then the new firm takes 
a representative or average price of these firms, or if 
there is only one near competitor it is likely that this 
price will be the one against which the new firm will 
benchmark its price.
At this point, a particular policy will be followed almost 
dogmatically - such a policy is usually one of two types:-
Type I : policy to undercut competitors
Type II : policy to charge the same price as competitors
D.01
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If competitor firm A (nearest) is near the subjectively 
weighted (according to demand) bundle of characteristics 
adopted by the new firm, then there will be a tendency 
towards Type I policies, whereas if the characteristics 
bundle is far away, Type II policies are generally 
adopted. For Type I policies the amount of undercut is 
largely a subjective (guess), but is effected by the 
degree of nearness (substitutability) of competitors.
Stage 2: Cost Conditions
The resulting price which will be either PA for Type II or 
PA - (x) for Type I (where x = undercut).
Then the price itself becomes largely inflexible and does 
not vary with the scale of output as is shown by Figure 2.
Based on experience in that market and market research on 
personal contacts, or on the size of existing near 
competitors, the entrepreneur then arrives at a probable 
output level in his first year of trading (as given by Q 
initial in Figure 2). It is at this level that the entire 
business plan is usually based. Cash flow forecasts are 
then made with two fixed elements - price PA and output 
QI. With these fixed for the moment, average total costs 
are then calculated and are shown by point X . There is 
very little idea of where this point actually occurs on 
the firm's 'cost curve 1 . The result of this is that there 
is effectively a mark up of x above costs, but this mark 
up is not fixed or even a major variable for the firm to 
choose, but is determined by an already determined price 
level and the costs associated with probable output level
QI.
Stage 3^ The Safety Element
Most cash flow forecasting does include what is generally 
called sensitivity analysis, where variables are changed 
in the spreadsheet that effect the entire "bottom line- 
outcome. However, two observations can be made:-
1. The price charged is very rarely a variable in 
sensitivity estimating.
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2. Sensitivity of output is the main concern, but this 
sensitivity is based on the original output estimated 
in the first place.
At start-up the price elasticities are operationally 
meaningless, with flow forecasting based on what happens 
if sales are 10 or 20% lower than originally budgeted for 
with price assumed fixed.
Figure 2 shows two other cost points which are based on 
sensitivity of some % above or below QI. At an output of 
Q and Q , similar average total cost calculations are 
made and cost points emerge which may be joined up in 
theory, but in practice are seen as isolated points and 
not part of a general trend. This then means that there 
will probably be different mark, up margins of y and z and 
x at the different points of budgeted output.
According to biological theories of the firms, however, 
the larger the mark up the greater the safety margin, 
since most firms are particularly aware of the need for 
survival in the early stages of life than the need for a 
secure margin between cost and price may be as important 
as overall cost conditions, although it is likely that 
there is some threshold level of safety margin required.
Figure 3 shows declining cost points with output, 
therefore, increased margins, however, working in the 
opposite direction is the increase in what Shackle calls 
potential surprise as budgeted levels of output are 
increased. Depending on the importance of the two 
effects, a scale of start-up will be initially determined 
and a price already set.
Stage 4; Changing Cost Base
The output or scale decided on in the above stage, 
however, may provide a margin which is not large enough to 
be acceptable security for tne founder, as such the 
project may not go ahead at all, but more likely there 
will be a revision of the cost points set in the above 
stages. The cost points ex, cy and cz in Figure 2 may be 
termed the 'first cost conditions', however, at start-up 
the notion of fixed and minimum cost surface becomes
D.05
largely redundant. Pounders may look to reduce costs by 
starting at home, by starting part-time or increasing the 
use of secondhand equipment. These revisions make 
operational a set of secondary cost conditions - shown in 
Figure 4 - and is also associated with increased margins. 
Vvhiie these increased margins allow for geater security, 
possibly allowing the project to become viable, it is also 
probable that there is a trade off between lower secondary 
cost surfaces and future infant growth to the extent that 
growth of the business is also a goal of the founder after 
some level of survival safety margin is achieved then a 
lower limit is set to the secondary cost conditions as 
internal to rather than external to the firm. More risk 
averse entrepreneurs may be on low potential surprise and 
on second cost conditions. Less risk averse founders may 
start on higher acceptable potential surprise functions 
and on first cost conditions. It is possible that both 
will be seen to have the same average costs and by 
definition the same mark up margins, despite having widely 
different scales of start-up.
Indeed it implies that less risk averse founders will own 
firms which grow faster during the infant stage than those 
who are more risk averse, the same result derived by 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (see Chapter 3).
D.06
APPENDIX E
Methods for Estimating the Dynamics of Employment Change 
in New Firms
Lack of data prevents 'a components of change 1 approach to 
the analysis of job creation in the Welsh economy. Even 
if such data were available there are considerable 
practical problems related to its preparation (see for 
example, Armington and Odie, 1984, criticism of Birch's 
data) and more significantly there are problems associated 
with interpretation of the results of components of change 
approaches. Interpretation problems include the need to 
distinguish between net and gross changes and the problem 
of movements between size bands used. (For example, see 
CBI 1980 and Storey 1980).
Research may be better devoted to separating out the 
effects of individual components of change rather than 
aggregate various effects. These individual components 
can then be compared with other components immediately 
related to them. Such an approach requires quite detailed 
data which is very rarely available. However, it is 
possible to adopt this approach if a number of assumptions 
are made and borne in mind when drawing conclusions from 
the results.
The approach adopted here is to isolate the employment 
changes that occur within the first three years of the 
formation of a business. It avoids problems of net or 
gross job creation since no attempt is made to estimate 
changes in existing firms, either contractions, closures 
or expansions.
A base year should be set and assumed that all the firms 
being formed in that year start up at the very beginning 
of the base year in order to simplify the classification 
of results. Data is, therefore, required on the number of 
new businesses being formed and ideally an average over a 
number of years would provide a more representative figure 
for the base year.
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The next step would be to estimate the number of jobs 
created by the actual start-up of firms at the beginning 
of the base year requiring data on the typical size of 
start-up in different sectors.
To progress from this stage, however, requires two further 
sets of data. The first is the trend in employment growth 
in the infant firms at regular intervals and the second is 
the rate of failure of new firms according to their 
lifespan.
If these were available it would be possible to follow 
overall employment created by new firms with time and 
furthermore, it would be possible to break down this 
overall picture into new firm failure, contraction and 
growth.
It is obvious that such data is not readily accessible, 
but it is possible to make estimates. The base year 
chosen for estimates for the Welsh economy is 1983. This 
is because there is a convenient overlap between the 
present survey and figures for regional business start-ups 
based on VAT returns. In the first case the present 
interview survey carried out during 1985 was based on a 
number of new firms that actually started in 1983. In the 
second case the Department of Trade and Industry has 
published figures based on VAT registrations which show 
the total number of business starts and stops during the 
period 1980 to end 1983. This data is available at both 
the regional and county level.
By averaging the annual number of start-ups over this 
period and using this as the new firm formation figure for 
the base year 1983, it becomes possible to perform further 
operations. At the end of the base year employment 
changes will be made up of losses due to failure of some 
of the new firms which will depend on the average size of 
firms at the time of failure and the number of firms 
failing, counteracting these losses is the growth of the 
surviving new firms as they progress through their early 
or infant part of their life cycle.
E.02
Data Sources
Average business start-ups in 1983 can be obtained from 
Br_it..isti Biis_ines_s, 18 January 1985, based on the analysis 
of VAT registrations.
The main problem, however, comes from the need to estimate 
rates of failure of new firms over their initial lifespan. 
The only figures available are for the U.K. as a whole and 
are based on the 9 years ending on 31st December 1982. 
(See Appendix 1 and 2, Lifespan of Businesses Registered 
for VAT, Bri.t_.i£>h Business;, 7th October 1983). The data 
available from this source are the percentage of all 
failures that occur within 6-month intervals after a 
business had been registered for VAT purposes and is 
available by sector of trade.
It is necessary to rework these figures though, so that 
the rates of failure of all new firms can be estimated 
rather than the timing of actual firms that failed. This 
is possible since totals are available for the number of 
firms that survived the 9 year period. (63% of ail firms 
starting at the beginning of this period had failed by 
1982).
By weighting lifespan figures based on ail failures by the 
% number of firms that survived, the following rates of 
failure of all new firms can be derived.

















% failing in first
3 years 35.7% 37.2%
% failing within
9 years 60 % 64%
^ ̂  ,^ ̂  __^ ̂  ̂  .m —— ^ •• ™" ^ —— -» -™ ™™ *fc^ —— «•• ^ ̂ " —™ «• ^^ ̂  «—— i^^~> —— —».
Source: DT1 VAT Statistics - See Text
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Thus, for example, 1 in 20 of all manufacturing firms will 
have closed within the first 6 months of starting up. Tne 
service sector figures are weighted averages of finance 
and professional services, transport and other services 
sector, but do not include retail, construction or motor 
trades sector, to make the data directly compatible with 
the present survey.
It is not possible to generalise the growth of all new 
firms as a whole based on this survey particularly, 
because of the dominance in terms of numbers of new 
retailing firms. Because of this, estimates will only be 
made for:- (a) new manufacturing (production) firms; and 
(b) new business service firms.
Chapter 9 provides data on the average size of firms in 
manufacturing and business service firms for the first 
three years of life.
Method of Calculation
Estimates of job creation in new firms in Wales, as shown 
in Table 9.1, are derived from the available information 
outlined above. Take the manufacturing sector by way of 
example. During 1980-83 some 513 manufacturing firms set 
up on average each year in Wales. This is taken as the 
start-up total in the base year 1983 and for simplicity it 
is assumed that all 513 started up at the same time.
Using average start-up sizes in terms of full time people 
employed in the firm, including the founders, the total 
new employment in start-ups is calculated. For Wales 
almost 1200 full time manufacturing jobs would be created 
immediately.
The picture within 6 months of start-up is calculated with 
the estimated failure rates, i.e. 5% of the firms will 
have closed down causing a reduction in employment equal 
to the number of firms tailing, multiplied by the number 
of people employed at this early stage. Failures are 
assumed to occur evenly over the period and growth is also 
uniform within each period. Thus, the number of jobs lost 
in the first 6 months is the number of firms tailing, 
multiplied by the average size of the firm at 3 months of 
age (calculated by straight line growth). Firms that
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survive the 6-month period, however, do grow substantially 
and in this early stage more than offset the losses due to 
closure.
The process is repeated for each time period (and for the 
business services sector). It can be estimated, 
therefore, that within 3 years of birth new firms starting 
in 1983 will create directly 3,800 manufacturing jobs. 
Because of the lack of service sector firms sampled in 
this survey, which were over 2 years old, it is not 
possible to extend the analysis of the jobs created in the 
business service sector to the third year. However, by 
the end of the second (1985) year, new firms starting up 
in 1983 will have created almost 11,000 jobs in 
manufacturing and business service sectors combined.
Table 9.4 extends the picture to the manufacturing sector 
of the U.K. as a whole, but the major assumption in this 
case is that the average size of new manufacturing firms 
in Wales is the same as that in the rest of the U.K. Care 
should be taken in the interpretation of these results, 
therefore, but the average size of new independent firms 
surveyed by Storey for the North East was 9.4 compared 
with the 10.6 of the 3-year old firms in the present 
survey.
Table 9.2 shows the individual components which go towards 
the net change in new firm employment and are calculated 
along the same lines. Vacancies refer to the number of 
jobs created in each period including the founders 
themselves at the start-up stage and is calculated by the 
number of surviving firms multiplied by the increase in 
average size between periods.
The redundancies made from new firms include failed 
entrepreneurs and redundant workers, the former calculated 
at a rate of 1.4 founders per new firm. (The average for 
the sample as a whole).
As a result of simple averaging, internal calculating 
errors do exist, but are generally below 4%. The 
following is a list of assumptions made:-
1. Failure rates for the period 1973-82 hold tor the mid 
1980's.
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2. Overall, U.K. failure rates according to lifespan, are 
consistent across regions of the U.K. (A number of 
studies show that failure rates across regions are 
fairly standard, but the growth side of the equation 
is the one that varies - see Ganguly 1981, Birch 
1979).
3. Average employment growth of the sample here is 
representative of all manufacturing and business 
services in Wales as a whole.
4. The numbers of new registrations in any one year are 
all new independent firms and births, rather than 
branch plants and in-moves. This is obviously 
unrealistic, however, in terms of numbers of firms, 
these in-moves and subsidiaries make up only a small 
proportion of the total. (e.g. Appendix, Tables Al- 
Al0 show that even in the manufacturing sector less 
than 8% of firms of less than 10 employees are not 
independent). In terms of jobs however, only a few 
major branch plants may have considerable impact.
5. The births and deaths of firms are adequately 
described by VAT registrations and deregistrations. 
For an assessment of these problems see Ganguly 1982 
and British Business, 29 January 1982.
6. The average growth of firms interviewed, i.e. 
survivors, is the same as the growth rate of the 
failures. If, for example, the failures tend to be 
smaller on average, then the number of jobs estimated 
as redundancies will be overestimated.
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APPENDIX F
A SIMPLE POLICY SIMULATION
In Chapter 5 it was shown that the criteria adopted by the 
financial screening process filters the applications for 
finance for business start-ups according to the different 
emphasis put onto each aspect of the proposal. In this 
way the importance of various barriers to entry were 
assessed by a third party (the banks). It then becomes 
important to identify the nature of the financial filters 
in order to examine the significance of the primary 
sources of entry barriers.
As with barriers to entry, small firms policies cannot be 
taken at face value since the effects of these policies 
themselves will probably have to pass through the filter 
of the financial screening process. Small firm policies 
such as the enterprise allowance scheme will have two 
effects; firstly, it may increase the number of people who 
are potential entrepreneurs and secondly, it will effect 
the ability of those potential entrepreneurs to actually 
start a business.
Thus the rate of business start-up is increased because 
more try to start-up (and therefore obtain finance) and 
also because a larger proportion of these may be accepted 
because of the improvement that the various policies may 
have on the nature of the proposals for funding. The 
first of these effects has been studied by Willmer and 
Hoggard (1983), who treat the interactions between 
potential entrepreneurs and active entrepreneurs as being 
simulated by an epidemic process. They argue that a 
policy designed to boldly increase the rate of start-ups 
without regard for likely success of the ventures is just 
as likely to be inefficient at sustaining the growth of 
new viable businesses as is a policy which would support 
only potential sound new ventures.
Willmer and Hoggard do not, however, take into account the 
fact that even ventures supported by small firms policies 
still have to be screened by the banks with 'bad- 
applicants still being prevented to start-up. On the 
other hand those firms that are supported are likely to 
stand a higher chance of obtaining backing and
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successfully obtaining financial support from the banks. 
It is this second effect to which we now turn, in 
particular to simulate the effect that certain small firms 
policies have on the rate at which applications to banks 
for start-up finance are accepted.
The model used is extremely simple and is based on the 
criteria which banks use in assessing finance propositions 
(as described in Chapter 5). For simplicity, assume that 
the criteria used by banks can be classified into four 
groups: character, ability, means and proposal. These are 
in order of importance and are given subjective weights of 
.4 for character, .3 for ability, .2 for means and .1 for 
the proposal. We assume that every start-up has to be 
given financial backing by the banks and therefore has to 
go through the screening process.
The process is to simulate applications to banks by 
prospective entrepreneurs, each individual application 
will be made up by a set of different values for each of 
the four criteria based on a scale of 1 to 10^. Some 
applicants will be particularly strong in character or 
ability criteria, but score low on the financial means to 
invest in the project. We assume that these scores are 
randomly distributed and are independent of one another 
for each application. The scores are then weighted 
according to the importance put on to each criteria by the 
banks (as discussed above) and the results are assumed to 
produce an overall score for the applicant (ranging from 1 
to 10).
This process is repeated a large number of times (3,000 in 
this case, simulating 3,000 applications to banks) and 
normal threshold scores are now estimated. These 
threshold scores show the score which is required, below 
which the application would be rejected and no business 
would start up, a score equal to or above tnis threshold
For example:
weights
Character (1-10) = 5 x (.4)
Ability (1-10) = 5 x (.3)
Means (1-10) = 2 x (.2) (Sum - applicants score)
Proposal (1-10) = 6 x (.1)
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would obtain full bank financial support. The main 
problem comes in trying to estimate what this threshold 
score should be, however, very approximate estimates can 
be made. By comparing the number of enquiries about 
business start-ups received by the Small Firms Service in 
Males (1984) with actual start-ups (from 1983 VAT 
statistics) and assuming that those who did not start-up 
were rejected by the screening process, we can see that 
the filter rate was not consistent across sectors.
Around a third of all manufacturing proposals actually 
succeed in starting up, but this filtering rate is 
substantially lower than the 54% of the 'other' (non 
retail) service sector1 . Thus, in order to allow a third 
of all applications through the financial filter (given 
the values in this model), an overall score of 5.33 or 
above is required for applicants to start a manufacturing 
business. Likewise, a score of only 4.5 becomes the 
threshold for new service firm applications 2 .
It is now possible to examine the limited effects of 
various policy options. Two policy instruments are 
considered, policy one is in the form of a financial 
assistance scheme such as the Enterprise Allowance Scheme, 
policy two is in the form of increasing the ability of 
applicants to set up and run a business - the growth of 
business advice centres, enterprise agencies and various 
business courses. Both these policies have their main 
effect on applicants who have relatively poor scores 
rather than those who, for example, have a high degree of 
financial means to go ahead with a project. For this 
reason such policies can be simulated by reducing the 
range at which scores can be recorded at the lower end of 
possible scores.
Clearly these figures are very approximate, actual 
enquiries may not be sectorialy neutral with 
manufacturing enquiries more likely tnan those in the 
service sector.
A further assumption that the weights put on the 
criteria are consistent over sectors.
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For example, a 20% reduction in ranges of 'means' scores 
as a result of financial incentive schemes will be 
simulated by a random number score between 2 and 10 (with 
maximum scores being uneffected by the scheme).
Assuming that these schemes are introduced after the 
normal filtering rate was determined (as in Table 10.91) - 
and therefore the threshold limits - and taking both 
policies as having a 20% reduction in possible ranges, we 
will now be allowed to successfully pass through the 
financial filter and so start up. The simulation of 
applications in run again, this time with the reduced 
ranges as a result of the two policies adopted.
The results in Table 9.15 snow that these types of 
policies have a greater effect on the rate of 
manufacturing start-ups than on the service sector, which 
were already high. Furthermore, although the criteria of 
•means' and 'ability are less important in terms of 
weights than criteria based on personal characteristics, 
policies aimed at both of these (at the 20% level)
increase the rate of business start-up in manufacturing 
firms by around 50% and by almost 30% in the service 
sector. Taking these new filter rates as a result of 
these policy options and comparing them with the estimates 
for new jobs created in new firms (Table 9.1), then 
another 260 manufacturing and 700 service firms may have 
been able to start-up. This would mean that policies to 
aid new firm formation could create an extra 1,400 
manufacturing jobs and about 2,200 service jobs 1 within 
two years after start-up2 .
Assuming that the rates of failure and growth of firms 
supported in this way are not effected.
Table 9.15 also shows that given the parameters of 
this model there are diminishing returns to both 
policies after some point.
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